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ABSTRACT
MULES, FUELS, AND FUSION: ENERGY, ENTROPY, AND THE CROSSING OF THE
PANAMANIAN TRANSIT ZONE, 1848-1990
By
Jordan Coulombe
University of New Hampshire

Between 1848 and 1990 Americans attempted to construct numerous infrastructural
projects in Panama in hopes of bridging the Isthmus and connecting the seas. These schemes ran
the gamut from the creation of the Panama railroad in the early 1850s through attempts to
detonate nuclear explosives to create a sea-level canal in the 1960s. While these projects seem
quite alien to one another, these two plans, and other attempts to cross the Isthmus, were unified
by their shared reliance on energy’s capacity to overcome the entropy of the Panamanian
environment. In order to reshape Isthmian landscapes, American engineers, scientists, and
policymakers had to first harness and unleash a variety of energy sources that could do the work
of moving earth, constructing structures, and imposing order on the Panamanian landscape. Their
efficacy was always mediated by entropy, the environment’s tendency to trend towards disorder.
Without constant injections of energy, the fluid Panamanian landscape would shift and move,
destabilizing the landscape and wrecking human altered landscapes. This contentious
relationship between energy and entropy catalyzed an energetic arms race in which Americans
looked towards increasingly powerful sources of energy to hold entropy at bay. Ultimately this
proved a double-edged sword. By altering the environment in increasingly complex ways, they
simultaneously created the potential for increasing volumes of entropy. This positive feedback
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loop forced humans to consume more energy to contain entropy, thus restarting the cycle of
energetic and entropic growth.
This project tracks this process starting with the creation of the railroad and follows it
through the creation of the Panama Canal in the first two decades of the 1900s, initial attempts to
restructure the Canal during the interwar years, the attempt to build a new canal through the use
of nuclear excavation, and finally attempts to use the Isthmus to facilitate the transportation of
Alaska North Slope oil during the 1970s and 1980s. Along the way, the project tracks how new
energy sources provided new opportunities to reshape Panama, and the unforeseen consequences
that accompanied these processes. Ultimately, the unrelenting presence of entropy suggests that
while energy granted Americans the illusion of control over the natural landscape, their authority
was never as absolute as they hoped.

xii

Maps of Panama

“Map of the Isthmus of Panama, Showing the Route of the Railroad from Aspinwall to Panama,” ca. 1858, located
in Mitchell’s School Atlas, (Philadelphia: E.H. Bunker & Co., 1863), retrieved from Florida Center for Instructional
Technology, “Maps ETC.” located at https://etc.usf.edu/maps

xiii

“The Panama Canal Zone” from Albert Perry Brigham and Charles MacFarlane, Essentials of Geography (New
York: American Book Company, 1916) retrieved from Florida Center for Instructional Technology, “Maps ETC.”
located at https://etc.usf.edu/maps
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INTRODUCTION: Energy and Entropy: An Environmental Arms Race
In a speech before the American Legion in August of 1977, Ambassador Sol Linowitz
attempted to sum up the deep cultural attachment Americans felt for the Panama Canal: “It was
in a very real sense our moonshot of the early 1900s.”1 Linowitz’s comment reflected both the
ingenuity and persistence required to gouge the Canal out of the Panamanian landscape, as well
as the technological leaps that made such an ambitious project possible. Perhaps more than
anything else it reflected the civic pride Americans felt for the monumental accomplishment.
And while Linowitz might not have intended it, it also reflected the energetic demands of both
projects. The Apollo project required the generation of unprecedented amounts of force to tear
asunder the shackles of gravity and escape from the terrestrial prison that had confined humanity
for hundreds of thousands of years. The Canal required a comparable, if more diffused,
application of energy to realize the centuries-long quest to divide the Isthmus and unite the
world.
My dissertation, “Mules, Fuels, and Fusion: Energy, Entropy and the Crossing of the
Panamanian Transit Zone, 1848-1990,” expands on Linowitz’s observation by arguing that
historians cannot understand attempts to traverse the Isthmus without emphasizing the
importance of energy, a concept that historian Richard White has defined simply as “the capacity
to do work.” 2 The history of American infrastructural construction in Panama has been defined
by the dynamic relationships between muscles, motors, and movers, and the environmental

1

Linowitz, Sol Address in Favor of Treaties speech before the American Legion Convention, Denver Colorado.
August 19, 1977, located in “The Meaning of the Panama Canal Treaties.” US Department of State, September
1977, US National Archives at College Park (hereafter USNA), Record Group 185 (hereafter RG 185), Collection: UD
UP 30: Treaty Implementation Records, Box 4: Folder: State Department Texts of Treaties Relating to the Panama
Canal No. 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, pg. 11.
2
Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pg. 6.
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alteration they enabled in the Panamanian Transit Zone over a one hundred and fifty year
period.3 Ultimately, energy provides environmental historians with the capacity to view
connections between seemingly disparate developments. Traditional histories of Americans in
Panama silo their stories into discrete events such as the creation of the railroad, the creation of
the canal, or the proposal for a nuclear canal. A focus on energy provides continuity by
suggesting that the differences between these developments was quantitative rather than
qualitative. The creation of the Panama Railroad in the 1850s may seem alien to the proposed
nuclear canal of the 1960s, but both projects were predicated on the need to control and deploy
remarkable volumes of energy, as well as tap new sources of energy. Thus, energy allows
historians to cut through narrow perspectives of the Panamanian past and recognize the energy
proliferation that defined all American attempts to create transportation networks in Panama.
While Linowitz’s comment reflects a single moment, the human desire to harness energy
to transport materials across Panama spans centuries. From the mules that helped laborers build
the Panama railroad in the 1840s and 1850s to the proposed detonation of nuclear explosives to
create a new sea level canal in the 1960s, animals, chemicals, and atoms provided the energy to
convey people and goods across the Isthmus. Ultimately, the efficacy of these energy sources
proved a double-edged sword. Because energy allowed humans to dig up, dredge out, and
detonate Isthmian landscapes, it generated an unfounded sense of control over the Panamanian
environment. Consequently, for much of the 20th century, the story of the Panama Canal was a
triumphantalist narrative in which shrewd American engineers relied on technical prowess, a
3

The idea of thinking of Panama as a “Transit Zone” is a particularly useful concept as it implies that the Panama
Canal is not the only significant route through Panama, but rather one of several infrastructures created to cross
the Isthmus. This allows historians to establish more continuity between events both before and after the
construction of an American canal. Aims McGuiness’s study of the Panama Railroad uses this concept to great
effect in, Aims McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush, The United States in the World
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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can-do attitude, and American ingenuity to conquer a hostile environment and create one of the
largest manmade structures in history.4 A British Ambassador to the United States, James Bryce,
went as far as to call the Panama Canal, “the greatest liberty that man has ever taken with
nature.”5 Environmental and energy histories, however, suggest that this sentiment belies a
simple truth; energy’s capacity to alter landscapes in the Transit Zone often was accompanied by
unforeseen consequences.
At the root of the tension between environmental alteration and control is the intimate
relationship between energy and entropy. While the concept of energy is familiar enough to
historians at this point in time, entropy may be less so. First coined in an 1865 paper by the
German theoretical physicist Rudolf Clausius, entropy measures the degree of disorder in a
closed system and is closely tied to the concept of energy—in short, entropy can undo the work
done by energy. Clausius also defined the second law of thermodynamics, stating that entropy in
the universe constantly expands. By extension, this principle means that available energy in a
closed system can only ever decline.6 Although they probably never used the word “entropy,” its
existence created an obstacle for the human actors attempting to create transportation networks
on the Isthmus. Energy consumption flowed in one direction. After initial large-scale
investments of energy, the capacity to do work became scarce. To counter this development
Americans had to acquire and deploy constantly increasing amounts of energy to keep Isthmian
transportation networks functioning.

4

This school of thought began even as the canal was being completed with Frederic J Haskin, The Panama Canal
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1913), and continues into the 21st century with Matthew Parker,
Panama Fever: The Epic Story of One of the Greatest Human Achievements of All Time--the Building of the Panama
Canal. (New York: Doubleday, 2007.).
5
David G. McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1977), pg. 543.
6
Vaclav Smil, Energy: a Beginners Guide, (Oxford: One world publications, 2006), pg. 5.

3

Fortunately for them, Panama was by no means a closed system. Americans imported
energies in the form of human bodies, animals, coal, oil, and even radionuclides in hopes of
providing enough energy to alter and stabilize the environment. While people could use these
energies to alter the environment radically over the short-term, they struggled to counter the
entropy that threatened to undermine what they had wrought. It was here that entropy became
most problematic. If energy in a closed system is in a constant state of decline, the natural
question would be: how do humans do the work of maintaining environments after they alter
them? Theoretically, this was merely a matter of obtaining more energy. In practice, maintenance
proved far more vexing. Financially, short term acquisitions of energy, while extensive, were
justified on the grounds that they were one-time investments. The long-term impetus needed to
overcome entropy was much less alluring. As a result, the demands of maintaining transportation
networks in Panama always existed in tension with Americans’ desires to expand and adapt the
waterway to meet the needs of new technologies and energies.
More importantly, as humans used energy to alter the environment in increasingly
dramatic ways, they also required increasing volumes of energy to maintain permanence in a
dynamic environment. Landslides are a natural occurrence in Panama. And yet, as Americans
dug the Canal and steepened the slopes of the Cut, slides grew both more frequent and more
pronounced. Human energy consumption and landscape alteration exacerbated the potential for
landslides to disrupt the Canal, and entropy mandated that the only way to maintain the canal in
the face of such instability was to apply more energy from external sources.
The rub is that as time goes on, and as human attempts to alter landscapes grow
increasingly more complex, the potential for entropy to prevent these landscapes from operating
properly also grows, and in turn requires an injection of more energy to maintain the status quo.
4

The result is a sort of an entropic arms race in which humans, gaining access to new and more
powerful sources of energy, alter their environment in more complex and, consequently, unstable
ways, increasing the energetic cost of maintenance. In order to overcome entropy and add energy
to the system, they consume even more energy, thus creating a positive feedback loop in which
energy consumption grows rapidly. I believe that this trend is true of almost any environment. Be
it urban or rural, large or small, the mandates of energy, landscape alteration, and entropy dictate
an ever-increasing reliance on energy in order to maintain human altered landscapes.
Climactic and geographic forces directly impact this relationship easily, particularly
when environmental realities combine with culturally generated assumptions about how
landscapes should operate. Panama exemplifies this phenomenon. The tiny land bridge that splits
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is just about 50 miles wide at its narrowest point. Those 50 miles
vary wildly from the lowland swamps that dot the coast to the thousand-foot mountains of the
Continental Divide that run through the heart of the Isthmus. These environmental realities
generate a unique climate defined more than anything else by the presence of water. Panama has
two seasons, a wet season running from May to December and a dry season running from
January to April. During the wet season, massive deluges wash away soil, cause landslides, and
often wreak havoc with manmade infrastructural networks.7 Towards the coasts it was the highly
viscous muds that complicated manmade infrastructural networks. While not as dramatic as
landslides, shifting silts could prove just as problematic and required considerable volumes of
energy to counter. American engineers, often unfamiliar with the Panamanian environment,

7

The challenges faced by American infrastructure and state planning in fluid environments has been well
established by David Biggs in Quagmire: Nation Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta, (Seattle, University of
Washington Press, 2012) in which Biggs describes how the canals, and swamps of the Mekong Delta wreaked
havoc with first French and later American attempts to impose order over the region.
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struggled to deal with these realities. In this sense, entropy combined energetic realities with
environmental conditions and cultural assumptions about landscape stability to define American
attempts to reshape Panama by their incessant demand for access to energy.
This dissertation uses the thermodynamic definition of entropy in a literal sense to
describe the central tension between the need for increasing volumes of energy and the
consequences that stem from that process. As an exercise it also deploys “entropy” as a metaphor
by using the more popular definition of the concept: the tendency of the natural world to trend
towards disorder. This more liberal interpretation uses the effective operation of the Canal itself
as a measure of “order,” suggesting that from the perspective of American administrators, this
objective was paramount. Entropy then encapsulates those actors, be they human or natural, that
prevent the Canal from working as intended. It’s worth noting that, despite the negative
connotations entropy is associated with in contemporary society, this dissertation does not
assume that entropy is a negative force. Instead the term is only used to describe a shift from one
state of being to another. While the metaphorical use of “entropy” does have shortcomings, I am
intrigued by the concept’s ability to reflect similarities between seemingly divergent forces, be
they diplomatic, environmental, financial, or anthropogenic in nature.
At its most fundamental level, entropy provides a means of differentiating between shortterm and long-term uses of energy. Substantive landscape engineering- like the construction of
an interoceanic canal for instance- tends to rely on short, intensive injections of energy.
Maintenance of landscapes, on the other hand, relies on more diffused applications of energy.
Entropy allows historians to cut through the distinction between alteration and maintenance by
identifying the ways in which energy, or a lack thereof, dictated both processes. In this
dissertation, I will use “energy” broadly to describe the forces that Americans used to build a
6

stable transportation network, and I will use “entropy” to denote forces that tended to undermine
the functioning of the transit networks in the zone.
Environmental and energy history are well suited to deal with the questions raised by
efforts to transit Panama. Because the story of Americans in Panama is the story of humans
attempting to harness and unleash energy to overcome entropy and restructure the environment
of Panama, insights from environmental and energy histories are essential to understanding the
history of the Isthmus. Yet this is not a story of energy determinism. While the human capacity
to control and deploy energy developed rapidly over the 19th and 20th centuries, this in and of
itself did not yield infrastructural networks. Decisions about when and where to deploy energy
were just as important as energy sources themselves. The decision to adopt electrical energy in
the later years of Panama Canal construction and the decision not to use nuclear energy to
construct a new canal in the 1960s both were accompanied by significant repercussions. To fully
understand the way energy impacted the Isthmian Transit Zone we need to think of energy not as
a monolithic wellspring for progress, but rather as a purveyor of possibilities. The chemical
processes that generated energy presented humans with countless opportunities, yet it was human
decision and technology, cultural forces, that actualized this potential.
The story of American energy in Panama then is a complex one which combines human
actors, natural forces, and the energy that mediated their interactions. My dissertation will
examine the promise of energy as a tool to mitigate entropy and shape landscapes to human ends,
and the challenges that resulted from its application. Ultimately, I argue that Panama offers
historians a wonderful chance to see that energy catalyzed the creation of altered landscapes by

7

keeping the entropy that vexed the maintenance of permanent structures at bay. 8 And yet, this
process was never absolute. As humans adopted new, more powerful energy sources they often
unleashed as much entropy as they contained, ushering in an incessant clash between energy and
entropy that defined American attempts to cross the Isthmus for nearly 150 years.
Remembering Panama
Literature on Americans in Panama is nearly as voluminous as the spoil removed from
the Culebra Cut. The herculean efforts to cross and later divide Panama have attracted the
attention of numerous historians, resulting in economic, racial, political, intellectual, and labor
histories of the Isthmus.9 Despite this attention, historians have only begun to use environmental
history (and have yet to use the growing scholarship on energy) to better understand Panama.10

8

The term “hybrid landscapes” sums up the ideas of a variety of scholars who by the early 1990’s were trying to
emphasize the interconnections between natural and cultural forces. William Cronon’s article “The Trouble with
Wilderness” in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90, controversially pointed out that our idea of wilderness was itself a cultural construct.
Similarly Richard White’s Organic Machine emphasizes the Columbia River as a manifestation of the combination
of human actions and natural forces. The term also bears distinct similarities to “Second Nature” or human
constructed nature an idea that Cronon introduced in, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1991).
9
While Frederic Haskin, The Panama Canal, was among the first to give Americans insight into the Canal he was by
no means the last. Soon personal memoirs such as Mrs. Ernest von Muenchow, ed., The American Woman on the
Panama Canal (Balboa Heights, Panama: Star and Herald, 1916), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00013480/00001; and
Harry Franck, Zone Policeman 88 (New York: The Century Company, 1920), made their way north from the
Isthmus. Interest in the Canal was renewed in the late 1970s thanks in large part to the Carter-Torrijos treaties.
Books such as McCullough’s The Path between the Seas, and Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: A Crisis in
Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), soon came to provide Americans with an updated
account of the Isthmus. The 1980’s saw increased attention paid to the experiences of silver laborers with works
such as Michael L. Conniff, Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama, 1904-1981, (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1985); and Bonham C. Richardson, Panama Money in Barbados, 1900-1920 (Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1985). In more recent years studies have become even more divergent with Panamanian
perspectives, Ovidio Diaz Espino, How Wall Street Created a Nation: J.P. Morgan, Teddy Roosevelt, and the
Panama Canal (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2001), labor histories, Julie Greene, The Canal Builders:
Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); and economic studies, Noel
Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011).
10
As of this moment the only monographic environmental history of the Panama is Ashley Carse, Beyond the Big
Ditch: Politics, Ecology and Infrastructure and the Panama Canal (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014). Despite
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This project combines several recent trends in these fields to better understand the creation and
maintenance of Isthmian landscapes and the energy regimes that made them possible.
My focus on energy marks a departure from existing literature on Panama in several
ways. First, energy challenges the triumphantilist narrative exemplified by David McCullough’s
The Path Between the Seas. Despite the lasting value of this monograph, McCullough’s
celebration of American ingenuity lends itself to a story arc that begins with the failed French
attempt to build a canal and concludes in 1914 when the first ships steamed between the canal’s
massive locks. While fulfilling, McCullough’s work implies that the landscape remained static
from 1914 on. The continual presence of entropy in Panama challenges this assumption. Ashley
Carse first voiced this concern in Beyond the Big Ditch, arguing that the Canal’s reliance on a
steady supply of water (the average ship requires 52 million gallons of Gatun Lake water per
trip) suggests that the story of the Panama Canal is not one of human conquest of nature, but
rather the construction of an infrastructural system which requires constant maintenance.11 I
believe that Carse’s argument is reflective not only of the hydrological demands of the Canal, but
also its energetic needs as well. Coal, oil and human bodies did not stop coming to the Transit
Zone after 1914, suggesting that just like water, energy continued to play an integral role in the
management of the local environment.
Concerns regarding energy dominated the Isthmus long before a canal was built and long
after it was completed. Consequently, I also examine the creation of the Panama Railroad, which
shaped Panama in the decades prior to canal construction and the discussions about alterations to

Christine Keiner and Megan Raby amongst others, Ashley Carse et al., “Panama Canal Forum: From the Conquest
of Nature to the Construction of New Ecologies,” Environmental History 21, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 206–87,
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how fertile the state of environmental history in Panama is.
11
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the Canal that pestered the waterway throughout its existence.12 My hope is that energy provides
a continuity between the pre and post-canal eras and suggests that the Canal, while essential to
Panama’s history, is merely a single manifestation of several attempts to utilize energy to alter
the environment and cross the Isthmus. My project then is not on the Panama Canal, but rather
the Panama “Transit Zone,” both a physical place which has roughly the same geographical
borders of the Canal Zone, and an ideological construct which represents the cultural ideal of
minimizing travel time to expedite the movement of goods and peoples.
It’s worth mentioning that in addition to focusing specifically on the “Transit Zone” this
dissertation also focuses primarily on the experiences of Americans in Panama. As a result, it
mentions the pre-colonial, Spanish colonial, and French construction eras of the Transit Zone
only in passing. This is certainly a limitation in some ways, as it overlooks the contributions that
indigenous Panamanians, the Spanish, and the French made to development of Panama as a site
of transportation. Despite this fact, a focus exclusively on American perspectives provides a
degree of unity for the dissertation and also indicates a continuity in cultural assumptions about
energy and environment. As this project develops past the dissertation stage it will grow more
inclusive, encompassing the French, Spanish, and Panamanian perspectives that it currently
lacks.
My focus on energy regimes is drawn from the developing field of energy history. My
conceptualization of energy relies on Richard White’s The Organic Machine. While White’s
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definition, that energy is the capacity to do work, may be simple, its elegance lies in its capacity
to connect seemingly unrelated energy flows on the Columbia River, be they the calories stored
in salmon or the watts generated by a nuclear power plant. This allowed environmental historians
to bridge the nature vs. culture debate that had defined environmental history for decades by
recognizing that both natural and cultural forces were connected by energy. Similar energy
connections characterize human attempts to shape the Transit Zone. While 19th century mule
trains and 20th century nuclear explosions may seem alien to one another, they both provided a
means of bringing human aspirations of pan-Isthmian transit to fruition through complex and
expensive infrastructural improvement. White’s definition of energy provides me with the
freedom to compare these and other energy regimes and their shared “capacity to do work.”
My project will also recognize that the emergence of new energies played an essential
part in the development of the Panamanian Transit Zone. The adoption of coal, oil, and nuclear
energy provided new ways to cross the Isthmus and hence signal shifts in the energy history of
the Panamanian Transit Zone. Numerous scholars have dealt with the social, political,
diplomatic, and environmental consequences that have accompanied the adoption of new energy
sources.13 Of particular interest is Christopher Jones’ Routes of Power.14 Jones suggests that new
energy regimes only flourish when humans make a decision to utilize them in a particular way.
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In doing so they create “Landscapes of intensification,” locations where the concentration of
energy allows humans to alter the landscape to make it more conducive to energy consumption,
creating a positive feedback loop of exponentially growing energy usage.15 Panama exemplifies
this point. As Americans concentrated energy in Panama, they were able to create an
infrastructural network of rail lines, power stations, coal and oil depots, and roads which
facilitated the increased consumption of energy. This investment was crucial to dealing with
entropy and maintaining their transportation networks, but also redoubled their reliance on
energy by leading them to alter the landscape in increasingly dramatic and unstable ways.
This is not to say that shifts from one energy regime to the next were neat and
compartmentalized. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. While it is useful to
acknowledge that the emergence of new sources of energy such as fossil fuels ushered in radical
changes in the human capacity to reshape the environment, too many histories have failed to
acknowledge that energy transitions are messy, overlapping, and far more gradual than we tend
to acknowledge. This disconnect has led to the misnomer of energy “revolutions,” a label which
implies immediate, radical, and unilateral shifts in human energy regimes. These processes are
never so absolute. Energy transitions are entangled, and rarely result in the complete destruction
of any singular energy source. Indeed, the creation of Panamanian infrastructural networks
suggests that we should understand the emergence of energy regimes not as a process of
revolution, but rather of proliferation. Ultimately the construction of the Panamanian transit
networks challenges our assumptions about energy regimes and their development by suggesting
that while coal, oil, and nuclear energy provided new possibilities for human movement across
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the Isthmus, their utility was always mediated by the necessity of those energy sources that
predated them.
Energy transitions then were not so much revolutions as evolutions, gradual processes in
which numerous energy sources existed in conjunction with one another. Panama in the spring of
1914 exemplifies this point. As construction of the Canal approached conclusion, coal fueled
dredges removed silt from the bottom of its meandering waterways while human muscle put the
finishing touches on a hydro-electric station at Gatun dam which would provide the electricity
necessary to operate the Canal’s gargantuan locks. This hydro-electric station was not to be
confused with the oil-fueled generators located at sub-stations throughout the Canal Zone, which
provided electricity for the towns that dotted the Panamanian jungle. While these developments
seem to speak of the modernization of the Canal Zone’s energy sources, it is worth noting that
1914 also saw the importation of more draft animals than any other year of canal construction.
The completion of the Canal was not the result of a singular energy regime or revolution, but
rather the confluence of numerous energies which each fulfilled a specific function. I want to
challenge the traditional emphasis on energy revolutions by instead tracing this rich tapestry of
entwining energy sources which together reshaped Isthmian landscapes.
My hope is that by embracing the relationship between energy and entropy I can move
beyond the concept of “hybridity” that has defined environmental history recently. While
Panama certainly is the site of a hybrid environment, hybridity is a problematic idea. For the past
two decades, a push to perceive nature and culture not as separate entities, but rather as
interconnected forces, has dominated environmental history. Thus, human interactions with
landscapes do not yield conquest or control, but rather hybrid landscapes, places which retain
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both their made and unmade qualities.16 Hybridity is a particularly relevant concept to the Transit
Zone as incessant attempts to expedite travel across the Isthmus combined the cultural value of
transportation efficiency with the natural realities of a dynamic landscape. While hybrid
landscapes have been a useful concept for understanding environmental history, the term has
grown relatively static over the past several years, with historian Paul Sutter going so far as to
ask “If all landscapes are hybrid what are the useful distinctions to be made within this
category?”17 I argue that energy can help us move beyond the concept of hybrid landscapes by
emphasizing the connection between energy and entropic forces that lie at the core of landscape
alteration. If humans must do work to overcome entropy and create and maintain hybrid
landscapes, and energy provides them with the capacity to do work then it seems only reasonable
that we should focus on the relationship between entropy and energy and the overlooked role that
they have played in this process. In this way we focus on how landscapes are altered and
maintained, emphasizing the physical forces that enabled this process and connecting them to
humanity’s incessant need for increasingly more powerful sources of energy.
The Panama Transit Zone is also perfectly situated for the adoption of a transnational
approach. The Panama Transit Zone was a place where American energy and technology met
with Caribbean labor, Panamanian politics, and Euro-American visions of a global future. The
result of this strange alchemy was the creation of a truly transnational environment in which all
parties involved sought to capitalize on the energy needed in Panama and the capital interests
that accompanied the Transit Zone. Americans were acutely aware of the connection between
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their energy production and Transit Zone energy consumption. Indeed, during the years of canal
construction, lobbyists clamored at the opportunity to provide American energy in the Canal
Zone. William MacCorkle, a West Virginian politician and coal lobbyist, believed “If the nations
of the world approach this empire of commerce through our canal, it means millions of tons of
productions for West Virginia, and a gold stream pouring into our beautiful valleys and amidst
our people, which will be as unending as time.” 18 While MacCorkle’s dream for West Virginia
went unrealized, his comments were a harbinger of the Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil trade that
dominated the Isthmus between 1970 and 1990.
Underpinning these global structures was the continued role that human energy and labor
played between 1848 and 1990. Richard White himself acknowledged the connection between
energy, labor, and the environment by emphasizing the fact that the bulk of people know nature
through work.19 Numerous historians have taken White’s observation to heart over recent
years.20 Perhaps the most impressive of these recent works has been Thomas Andrew’s Killing
for Coal. Andrew’s description of coal’s ability to dictate the living and working conditions of
marginalized laborers provides a useful way of understanding the relationship between labor and
energy in Panama. While coal, oil, and atoms catalyzed transportation revolutions on the
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Isthmus, human muscle always lay at the core of landscape alterations. Despite their importance,
manual laborers found themselves marginalized by their more skilled peers. Numerous historians
have looked at the experiences of the marginalized men and women who made transit across the
Isthmus possible. Led by Julie Greene and Michael Conniff, these scholars have argued that the
adoption of a segregated labor force composed of white “gold” laborers and primarily AfroAntillean “silver” laborers created an easily exploitable labor pool capable of completing
dangerous and dirty jobs.21 While I agree, I also contend that if historians tap this vein of
scholarship with an increased focus on energy they may be able to identify other forces that acted
in conjunction with racial prejudices to help codify a racialized labor hierarchy.
It is worth mentioning that, despite my desire to write a bottom-up narrative,
Panamanians are largely absent from this work, particularly the first four chapters. There are two
reasons for this omission. First, sources authored by Panamanians themselves are challenging to
obtain, particularly in the American archives which served as the basis for this project. In
addition, this work seeks to focus specifically on the act of creating infrastructural networks.
Panamanians often distanced themselves from this process. In the creation of the railroad there
were a few Panamanians employed, but many of them decided to work in the transportation
networks already in place. It was no accident that many laborers were recruited from South
America and the Caribbean to construct the Panama Line. The same was true of the era of Canal
construction. Indeed, Barbadians far outnumbered Panamanians in the Canal Zone. Due to the
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constraints of sources and the dissertation’s focus on the Transit Zone, this work emphasizes the
American perspective and should be read as such.22
While manual laborers played an important part in Transit Zone networks, energy flows
tended to be directed by governments, administrators, and foremen. Consequently, my project
will also include top down interpretations of energy history. For guidance on this subject I look
towards Scott Kirsch’s Proving Grounds which examines how political realities shaped “Project
Plowshare,” the US government’s experimentation with nuclear engineering.23 In addition to
providing context for my analysis of Plowshare’s proposed nuclear excavation of a new Isthmian
canal, Proving Grounds expertly examines the relationships between energy and policy makers.
Kirsch suggests that the unprecedented possibilities of nuclear explosions always existed in
tension with the domestic and international concerns of American policy makers,
environmentalists, and human rights advocates. Kirsch notes that more than anything else, the
inability of scientists to control radioactive fallout doomed the project. I believe that Kirsch’s top
down approach, in conjunction with a bottom-up focus on human labor, will allow me to
demonstrate that energy pervaded all levels of Isthmian transit and meant different things to
different people.
By combining the insight of these historians with my focus on energy and entropy I can
unify the history of American infrastructural networks in Panama by drawing attention to the
continual role energy sources played in reshaping the Panamanian environment. The
environmental realities of Panama forced Americans to import and deploy remarkable volumes
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of energy to shape the Isthmus to their own ends. They managed to do so, and yet maintaining
and preserving the landscapes they created was no small task. Panama then presents a wonderful
microcosm to understand the struggle between energy and entropy that lies at the heart of
landscape alteration, a relationship that has defined human landscapes with the natural world for
millennia.
Organization:
To keep my dissertation focused, I will organize it around a series of episodic chapters,
each of which will deal with a particular time period and the dominant energy sources during that
era. Christopher Pastore’s dissertation “’From Sweetwater to Seawater’ An Environmental
History of the Narragansett Bay, 1636-1849” provides an excellent guide for the method. This
approach provides the benefit of observing changes in energy regimes, processes which can take
centuries, while still reflecting the continuity of energy’s centrality to Transit Zone transportation
networks. Consequently, this dissertation is broken up into six chapters, each of which takes a
snapshot of the Transit Zone under the sway of a particular source of energy. Flowing loosely
chronologically, these chapters show the battles between energy and entropy that defined
American attempts to cross the Isthmus.
I: “It Will Require all the Energy of Which Man is Capable”: Human Energy and the
Construction of the Panama Railroad, 1848-1854
Chapter one explores Americans’ first attempt to use Panama’s geographic position to
promote transportation: The Panama Railroad. This chapter follows the triumphs and trials that
accompanied railroad construction by focusing on Chief Engineer G.M. Totten who, more than
any other individual, brought the vision of an Isthmian railroad to fruition. While the railroad
grossly exceeded both its initial timeline and budget, it was an immediate success thanks in large
part to the California Gold Rush. As news of the bonanza made its way back east, the Panama
18

route emerged as the dominant means of transportation between New York and California.24
Even before construction finished in 1855, prospective prospectors rode or walked along the
tracks to the end of the line. The resulting transit system combined steam power and human labor
to convey tens of thousands of Americans across the Transit Zone. Ultimately, interest in
Isthmian transit unified American coal, Panamanian muscle, and a universal desire for profit to
create the world’s first transcontinental railroad. And yet this project also was bound by a unique
tension. While the promise of the railroad and the steam power that would propel it gripped the
imaginations of Americans and Panamanians alike, the awesome potential it held could not be
actualized without the muscles of thousands of workers. These workers had minds and desires of
their own and frequently exercised their autonomy, much to the chagrin of railroad
administrators. This tension between the dream of a railroad across Panama and the reality of the
need for human labor defined the creation of the railroad and foreshadowed the challenges that
later construction efforts would face.
II: Black Gold: Coal, Infrastructure, and the Racialized Energy Hierarchy of the Panama
Canal: 1904-1908
Chapter two deals with the first few years of Panama Canal construction. Initially work
was overseen by John Findlay Wallace, who had a fantastic mind for engineering but proved
incompetent at the task of arranging his labor force. Wallace’s tenure as Chief Engineer was
marked by disorganization, and progress was intolerably slow during this period. John Stevens,
who took over construction of the line in 1905, turned the sputtering Isthmian Canal Commission
into a model of efficiency. Stevens created a massive coal fueled infrastructure that could handle
the task of excavating the extraordinary amounts of earth necessary to build the canal. In doing
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so he also reorganized the human labor force working on the Isthmus. The increasing rigidity of
the gold/silver labor rolls in Panama coincided with the coalification of the mechanical labor
force and suggested a correlation between the growing importance of mechanical energy and the
simultaneous devaluation of unskilled, primarily West Indian, manual laborers. By the time
Stevens left his post in 1907 he had organized the Isthmian Canal Commission into a well-oiled
(or in this case well coaled) machine, but in doing so had also created an energy hierarchy in
which white, skilled machinists and engineers capable of harnessing and deploying coal-fueled
machines were privileged while unskilled West Indians were increasingly marginalized, even
though their energy was critical to the project.
III: Locks, Shocks, and Barrels: The Proliferating Energy Regime that Constructed the
Panama Canal: 1907-1914
Chapter three examines the energy proliferation that enabled the construction of the
Panama Canal. After the silver and gold labor system became entrenched in Panama, Chief
Engineer George Goethals faced the unenviable challenge of constructing the Panama Canal, an
accomplishment that had eluded several other engineers. Goethals capitalized on the
infrastructure and energy he had at his disposal, diversifying and expanding American energy
reserves in Panama and using a brute force approach to overcome the entropy that plagued the
region. By implementing electricity and oil on unprecedented levels, Goethals was able to
reshape the Panamanian environment and make it conducive to transportation. Using concrete,
he, and the men who worked under him, established a degree of permanence that would keep
Isthmian entropy at bay for decades to come. Ironically in doing so they also placed distinct
limitations on canal expansion by forcing future engineers to deal with a concrete landscape that
was meant by its very nature to resist change and alteration.
IV: The Canal, Fixed: The Limits of the Panama Canal: 1914-1947
20

Chapter four discusses how perceptions of the value of the Canal ebbed and flowed
during the interwar years and in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The utility of the Canal
always existed in a state of flux. World War One slowed traffic through the Canal, keeping it
from meeting initial projections of traffic. The 1920s reversed this trend with staggering
efficiency and brought up uncomfortable questions about the long-term viability of the
waterway. While the depression muted these questions somewhat, the Second World War
brought them back with resounding force. The development of large aircraft carriers that
couldn’t fit through the locks of the Canal, alongside the development of atomic bombs that
could close a lock canal for years at a time, forced Americans to reckon with the distinct
limitations of the waterway. This development forced the federal government to commission a
comprehensive canal study in 1947 which sought to identify a means of increasing the Canal’s
capacity and security. Ultimately these examinations proved fruitless thanks in large part to the
lack of an economical means of creating a new sea-level canal.
V: A Radioactive Flash in the Pan: The Atomic Canal: 1960-1970:
Chapter five continues the quest for a sea-level canal by examining the rise of a new
source of energy. While oil and coal power had become staples in Panama by the 1960s, the
potential of splitting, or fusing, the atom left fossil fuels in its radioactive dust. The “Atoms for
Peace” movement led nuclear enthusiasts to propose Project Plowshare, a government program
to gauge the feasibility of geographical engineering: detonating nuclear weapons to reshape the
geography of a region. Panama soon drew the attention of Plowshare administrators, and studies
into the possibility of a nuclear canal in Panama or Colombia were underway. After ten years of
study experts determined that the technology simply wasn’t practical in the fluid Panamanian
environment. While seemingly obvious to the contemporary observer, this development was a
21

monumental break in the arms race between energy and entropy in Panama. For the first time
American engineers explored a new source of energy and decided not to use it. The dangers
associated with nuclear explosives were simply too substantial to be overlooked and as a result
they shied away from unleashing this volatile new form of energy.
VI: A Crude Form of Survival: Alaskan Petroleum and Panamanian Pipelines: 1945-1990
Chapter six asserts that despite the decision to avoid the deployment of nuclear
explosions, Americans ultimately doubled down on their commitment to energy in Panama. The
appetite for oil that emerged during the postwar years wedded the Canal to petroleum products, a
development that was reinforced by the discovery of a massive oil field at Prudhoe Bay on
Alaska’s north shore. The transportation of Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil became a global
imperative and Panama was seen as a route to facilitate the movement of this commodity.
Ironically, in embracing the oil trade and, consequently, a bid for financial independence,
Panama found itself at the whims of global forces beyond its control. Discussions regarding the
creation of pipelines and other infrastructural networks between Panama and the United States
were complicated by the simmering tensions between the two countries. While the negotiation of
the Carter-Torrijos Treaties in 1977 alleviated these issues and allowed the ANS oil trade to
explode, prosperity was fleeting. The rise of General Manuel Noriega in the late 1980s led to
substantial sanctions and authoritarian economic policies which crippled the petroleum trade and
heralded the end of American energy schemes in Panama, for the moment.
Over the 150 years that separate Totten’s arrival in Panama and Noriega’s ouster,
Americans utilized a vast array of energy sources to reshape the Panamanian environment. The
arms race between energy and entropy reshaped the landscape and deepened human reliance on
energy sources and the often-unforeseen consequences of their deployment. These forces helped
22

expedite transportation across the Isthmus, creating new global markets and commodity flows
that shaped the world in the 20th century. And yet they also released instability, both in the
Panamanian landscape and in the economic, political, and social forces that shaped America and
Panama during the century.
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Chapter I: “It Will Require all the Energy of Which Man is Capable”: Human Energy and
the Construction of the Panama Railroad, 1848-1990
When Chief Engineer George Muirson Totten set foot in Panama in the spring of 1849,
he was convinced that the Panama Railroad could be constructed, but that, “it will require all the
energy of which man is capable.”1 Totten's words proved prophetic, and far more literal than he
anticipated. Throughout the five years of its construction, an incessant energy crisis plagued the
railroad, suggesting that the dream of connecting Atlantic and Pacific remained just out of reach.
Yet it was not shortages of coal, nor wood (the dominant source of energy for locomotives at the
time) that vexed construction of the world's first transcontinental railroad, but rather a lack of
human energy.2 The awesome potential of the steam engine could not be actualized without the
work of another prime mover, the human body, to contain the entropy of Panama and establish
an infrastructure which harnessed and directed the combustion of cords and coals.3 Human
muscle acted as the vanguard of mechanized labor, clearing jungles, filling swamps, leveling
hills, raising valleys, dividing tributaries, and bridging rivers to make the Panamanian
environment conducive to rail-borne transit. 4 And yet the work done by humanity's first prime
mover is shrouded by the smoke that issued from the engines of those that came after.
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The lack of attention paid to human energy, particularly during industrialization, is
unsurprising. This is not to say that humans are absent from histories of industrialization. Labor
historians have done a wonderful job of recognizing the ways in which the adoption of steam
engines and fossil fuels impacted the lives of workers. However, these histories are tinged by an
implicit assumption that the energy of human laborers was unimportant in relation to the
awesome power of these new machines. This isn’t necessarily an unreasonable assertion. The
metabolism of calories and the oxidation of coal are wildly different chemical processes, and the
gulf in the amounts of energy yielded by these reactions is so vast as to make any comparison
between the two challenging. Indeed, when referencing “all the energy of which man is capable,”
Totten was not referencing the measurable energetic output of the human body, but rather a more
abstract notion of vitality and vigor. Totten’s definition was far removed from the
thermodynamic understanding of energy that was germinating in the minds of European
physicists like William Thomson and Macquorn Rankine.5
Ultimately, the need for human energy was predicated on the realities of the Panamanian
environment. In effect, the creation of a rail line allowed for wheeled transit through the rugged
interior. While the wheel had long been a staple of human society, its capacity to mitigate
friction depended on the quality of the surface on which it traveled. On smooth, hard surfaces
(such as a rail line) only 30 kg of force is needed to move a one-ton object, yet this figure could
be four or even five times higher on loose soil and up to ten times higher in sand or mud, terrain
common to Panama.6 Unfortunately, Panama would not yield an efficient road easily. If the
central challenge regarding interoceanic transit was finding or creating a route with minimal
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friction, Panama’s only advantage lay in the fact that it was narrower than any other point in the
Americas. By all other metrics Panama was a brutal country, possessing a remarkable variety of
rocky hills, low lying swamps, dense jungles, and rushing rivers which made the Isthmus
virtually unnavigable for bulky coal-fueled machines. The hostility of the Panamanian interior
was so staggering that in 1811 Alexander von Humboldt was forced to concede that, "after the
lapse of 300 years there neither exists a survey of the ground, nor an exact determination of the
positions of Panama and Portobello."7 The challenge of crossing the isthmus was such that, with
the exception of poorly maintained mule roads and seasonally navigable rivers, it was next to
impossible to carry large amounts of machinery and material into the interior. Bulky steam
engines required a nimbler source of energy to clear them a path.
Complicating matters further was the fact that the unique hydrological conditions of
Panama made stable infrastructural networks difficult to create. Torrential downpours and the
resulting landslides exacerbated the entropy of the region, forcing Totten to continually hurl
energy at the Panamanian environment in hopes of establishing permanence. Tracks, piles, and
bridges were constantly under siege by erosion and, despite Totten’s best efforts, it was
impossible to entirely hold entropy at bay. Ultimately the tension between these forces shaped
Totten’s reliance on energy by forcing him to find ways to concentrate increasing volumes of
energy in the Transit Zone, an unenviable task to say the least.
Panama’s rugged environment dictated the railway’s reliance on human energy’s distinct
advantage over mechanized energy, its portability. The line itself crossed diverse environments.
The Atlantic terminus was the newly constructed town of Aspinwall on the small island of
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Manzanilla located in Limon (or Navy) Bay. A piled line across the bay connected it with the
Panamanian mainland, a swampy terrain where terra firma was scarce, and mosquitoes were
abundant. The line meandered south through these swamps and jungles until it reached the
Chagres river, roughly seven miles from Aspinwall. The next twenty miles of the line ran along
the eastern bank of the Chagres, occasionally bridging its tributaries, but not crossing the river
itself until reaching a 625-foot bridge at Barbacoas, roughly thirty-one miles from the Atlantic
terminal. Upon crossing the Chagres, the line left the swampy lowlands to ascend the continental
divide, a roughhewn landscape of rocky hills and valleys. At mile thirty-seven the line crested
the Obispo Valley and started its rapid descent towards the city of Panama, only ten miles away.
The descent presented its own challenges as the line wound back and forth through four miles of
foothills to ensure that its maximum grade was only sixty feet per mile. As it approached its
destination, the railroad again had to cross a quagmire of lowland swamps. All said and done the
line snaked its way through forty-seven miles of some of the most rugged terrain in the world.8
The inaccessibility of much of the line meant that in many circumstances human energy was the
only source of energy capable of weaving its way through the swamps, forests, and mountains
that stood in its path.
Despite being indispensable to the construction of the railroad, human labor was an
unwieldy source of power. Workers engaged in leisure rather than labor, complained about the
quality of food and drink, fell victim to the ravages of tropical diseases, or simply deserted in
hopes of pursuing more lucrative endeavors. The central challenge in constructing the Panama
Railroad was marshaling and deploying adequate stores of human energy. This is not to suggest
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that human energy operated in a vacuum. Pile drivers helped the railroad overcome entropy and
find stability as it made its way across swampy lowlands. An armada of steamships and sailboats
carried the foodstuffs necessary to fuel human bodies and the shelter necessary to protect them
from the dangers of the Panamanian environment. Ultimately the railroad itself would become
essential to completing the line. The rapidity with which locomotive wheels could traverse the
completed line made it the central artery upon which men and materials would reach and cross
the Panamanian interior. Thus, the five years it took to construct the Panama railroad between
1849-1855 were not defined by an energy revolution in which steam power overcame the natural
environment of Panama, but rather an energy proliferation in which human muscle, supported by
an increasingly complex network of steamships, sailboats, locomotives, pile drivers, and mules,
enabled the creation of steam energy-based infrastructure in the Isthmian interior. The entangled
network of energies that resulted contained the entropy of the Panamanian isthmus and provided
the first reliable means of crossing the Isthmus, bringing American visions of rail-borne transit
between the oceans one step closer to reality.
Marshaling Manpower and Materials
To say that George Muirson Totten, or as he was more commonly known “Colonel”
Totten, was frustrated would be a colossal understatement. Writing from Cartagena, New
Grenada in January of 1849, he watched as the discovery of gold in the Sierra Nevadas enticed a
swarm of prospectors, panners, and prostitutes to descend on the Isthmus of Panama en route to
California.9 The bulk of these prospective prospectors amounted to little more than paupers and
panhandlers. By the time Totten wrote his letter, over three hundred passengers had arrived on
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the Isthmus with hundreds more expected to follow. The US Mail Steamship Company and the
Pacific Steamship Company were completely unprepared for this influx of travelers and Totten
chastised the companies for double booking vessels, leaving passengers stranded on the Isthmus
without adequate shelter. Compounding this logistical dilemma was the fact that few travelers
brought the provisions necessary for the journey, and, furthermore, that comfortable shelter was
hard to come by, leaving many to, “suffer the inclemency of the climate.” “What is to become of
them?” lamented Totten, “Suffering there must be among them, perhaps death.”10
The acquisition of California and Oregon and the discovery of mineral wealth in the
region demanded action. Totten rightly discerned that the United States' new possessions would
radically alter development and trade in the Pacific and believed that the railroad was crucial to
that trade’s success. Having spent the bulk of his life working on railways and canals, Totten was
uniquely qualified to understand the importance of expediting travel to and from the Pacific
Coast. In 1831, at the age of twenty-two, Totten took a job as an engineer on the Delaware and
Raritan Canal. For the next two decades, Totten established himself as a talented engineer on
railroads and canals in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. Totten's major break came in
1843 when he was appointed Engineer-in-Chief of the Canal of Digue, a waterway which would
connect the Magdalena River with Cartagena.11 After seven years in Cartagena, the allure of
constructing a railroad across Panama was enough to pull Totten away from the canal. “A year
ago, I looked upon the result of this project as problematical,” Totten wrote of the railroad in
January of 1849 before concluding, “I now consider it necessary.”12 Within a year Totten found
himself in Panama, and shortly thereafter named Chief Engineer of railroad construction.
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Totten’s good fortune was in many ways the result of the fact that he shared the vision of
a group of New York magnates interested in expediting trade between the east and west coasts of
the United States. Led by William Henry Aspinwall, a partner in the largest import-export firm
in New York and the inspiration for naming the Caribbean terminus town the unlikely name of
Aspinwall, these businessmen came together to create the Panama Railroad Company.13 The
Company was founded in April of 1849, and in June of 1849 sold $1 million worth of stock to
the public- although, due to low sales, the directors had to purchase half of the stock
themselves.14 The financial concerns of the railroad now dealt with, Totten could begin his work
in earnest.
Totten’s earlier experiences led him to understand that his chief obstacle was the lack of
adequate laborers. Prior to being named Chief Engineer of the Panama Railroad Totten expressed
his concern that "From the magnitude of that work, foreign labor will be necessary. It will be
impossible to find a sufficient number of natives (Totten’s term to refer to laborers from Panama
and Colombia).”15 Labor recruitment proved a double-edged sword. Native laborers were sparse,
but Totten felt compelled to “impress upon the company, the necessity of using all the native
laborers that can be obtained, in preference to foreigners, who I do not think can stand the
climate."16 While tinged by racially biased assumptions, Totten’s comments reflected one of the
challenges of obtaining energy in Panama. Despite being relatively efficient, human labor still
possesses limitations. Healthy adults are normally capable of maximizing their energy output at a
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rate of roughly ten to twenty times their basal metabolic rate for short intervals.17 Individual
performance varies from person to person, but most able-bodied men are capable of maximum
exertions of roughly 1 to 1.5 kW.18 This level of activity is unsustainable, however, and over the
course of a day most production falls in the realm of two times one’s BMR or roughly 130 to 180
W. While Totten had no concept of basal metabolic rate, he was acutely aware of its
consequence; more workers meant more work.
The problem of obtaining adequate laborers was complex and affected by biases toward
particular ethnicities. In 1853, as railroad construction entered its final phase, Totten outlined his
personal preference for laborers. Among the best workers were the Irish and "natives,"
particularly those from Cartagena. Totten admitted that the Irish, "are not so efficient on the
Isthmus as in cooler and healthier climates." However, he suggested that "for periods of four to
six months, which is the term of their engagement, they perform a fair amount of work." These
limitations didn't apply to native Cartagenians who Totten noted were, "as accustomed to the
pick, shovel, and wheelbarrow, as are Irishmen,” and were also, “an elastic, hearty race, and in
all respects the most efficient common laborers that can be employed on your work.” Both Irish
and native laborers were far superior to the imported Chinese laborers who Totten noted “are at
first feeble and inefficient.” And yet Totten was not above leveraging their comparatively
ineffectual energy, suggesting that despite their shortcomings, “being steady workmen,
temperate, and but little affected by the climate, as they become accustomed to the use of the
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tools, and acquire strength from regular and wholesome food, they made useful workmen." 19
Totten established a clear hierarchy of laborers in which “native” labor was superior, followed
by Irish, and finally Chinese labor.
Totten’s assumptions about the efficacy of his laborers suggested that his preferences,
while certainly still reflective of contemporary racial biases, were also complicated by his
experience in managing and deploying human energy. In essence, the factors Totten weighed
reflected broader questions about the applicability of energy. Reliability, efficacy, ease of
acquisition, and cost-effectiveness were qualities that were frequently applied to other sources of
energy. Ultimately, Totten’s valuations were not only tied to racial assumptions, but also his
personal assessment of each group’s capacity to do work.
With these preferences in mind, Totten began the arduous process of filling labor rolls, a
task complicated by the fact that employment on the railroad was not the only line of work
available in Panama. The discovery of gold in California lured thousands of men and women
across the Isthmus, creating a transportation bonanza. Many of the laborers who came to Panama
had no intention of swinging machetes through dense jungles, instead, they directed their body's
energy towards the booming network of bongo canoes and mule trains that were already reaping
the benefits of the gold rush. These enterprising energy entrepreneurs used the Panama Railroad
Company to secure passage to the Isthmus. Upon their arrival, they vanished into swamps and
forests, making their way towards interior villages that facilitated transisthmian travel. What
drove them to forsake the railroad? Put simply: money. The adventurers making their way to
California were willing to pay exorbitant prices to speedily traverse the Isthmus. The desertion
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problem grew so acute that Totten was forced to admit that, “We are not able to find labourers
for our building and surveys at $1.12 per day, nor would $1.25 or $1.50 induce them to work for
us with consistency."20
Totten found himself faced with a predicament. How was he to control the laborers
making their way into Panama? Initially, Totten attempted to use force to prevent desertions.
When a group of laborers who had signed six-month contracts deserted in the fall of 1850,
Totten sent one of his assistants to track them down and reached out to local authorities for
assistance. Unfortunately for Totten his faith was poorly placed. The local alcalde sent a group of
armed men to apprehend the deserters; however, when Totten’s agent arrived to gather the
wayward workers, he found that they had been allowed to escape by the guards. The experience
was so frustrating that Mr. Michel, the assistant sent to find the laborers, decided to leave the
Isthmus shortly thereafter. An aggravated Totten was forced to concede that, "Under such
circumstances, although I see some of our deserters around here, it appears to me useless to try to
retake them."21
Human energy proved far more challenging to control than coal or wood. For workers,
the potential benefits of investing one’s energy in the transportation business far outweighed the
rewards of laying track. Laborers were quick to recognize this and often directed their labor
towards this more lucrative end. As a result, desertions plagued the railroad throughout its
construction, sapping valuable stores of energy and hindering progress on the line. These
individuals shrewdly used the transportation provided by the railroad company to fund their
journey to Panama before abandoning their contracts and heading into the interior in search of
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greener pastures. Totten had no illusions about the issue, writing in February of 1850, “We look
to Cartagena and the neighboring provinces as our only resource for our laborers. There is no
doubt that many of those we may bring here will desert us and enter the business of
transportation upon the river and overland."22 Ultimately, the railroad company decided that the
best course of action was to allow those lured west by the promise of gold to pay the railroad
company to walk along the unfinished tracks. Additionally, they sought partnerships with
existing transportation companies on the Isthmus, subsidizing potential competitors' expenses in
hopes of driving the muscle-powered transportation network in Panama out of business.23 These
aggressive policies indicated the lengths to which the railroad company was willing to go to
ensure long-term, reliable access to human energy. Solving the energy crisis was paramount,
even if it was done at great expense.
Driving the muscle fueled transit network out of business alleviated some problems, but it
wasn't just desertions that made human labor hard to manage and direct. Like all prime movers,
human bodies needed a steady source of fuel. Unlike steam engines, human bodies also
demanded a variety of vitamins and minerals. As a result, ensuring a steady and varied supply of
food was essential. Foods including beef, pork, cod, cornmeal, and potatoes made their way into
Panama, providing calories that could be metabolized by human bodies.24 The need for a steady
supply of food emphasized connections between the Isthmus and the United States. Roughly
every two weeks, ships made their way between Panama and New York, carrying rations of food
and other essentials for construction work. Steamships tended to carry laborers and specie, while
barks, schooners, and brigs- wind-powered vessels- were chartered to bring materials and
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sustenance to the Isthmus.25 The impermeability of Panama and the lack of local energy in the
region meant that it was easier to import energy into Panama rather than obtain it from local
sources, a trend which defined energy regimes in the Transit Zone throughout its existence. The
result was an intimately connected energy network which saw calories grown on American farms
fed to laborers imported from around the Americas, Europe, and later Asia. The energy network
in Panama then was a messy collection of overlapping energy sources from its very inception.
The basic foodstuffs imported into Panama were supplemented by other items depending
on the backgrounds of the workers in question. Because healthy and happy humans were so
important, Totten had to provide not only an efficient source of fuel but also a palatable and
culturally acceptable one. For his European and American workers, Totten made a point of
obtaining pickles, a popular remedy for scurvy. Similarly, Totten requested 30 barrels of rice
because "it is an article of prime consumption with the black laborers."26 This cultural
predilection towards different sources of fuel separated human labor from mechanical labor.
While different varieties of timber and qualities of coal yielded variable amounts of energy, the
utilization of a particular fuel was a product of cost and accessibility rather than cultural
proclivities. Steam engines seldom made their displeasure known at consuming Pennsylvanian
rather than Welsh anthracite, but human laborers frequently directed their energy at protesting
substandard grub.
These challenges meant that work progressed slowly through the summer and fall of
1850. This was not surprising. Totten had only arrived on the Isthmus earlier that year and had
spent much of his time trying to obtain a reliable store of human energy. The Panamanian
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climate also hindered progress. The variances in weather led Totten to admit that, “a day’s work
is a very uncertain quantity.”27 Totten put these complications mildly. The wet season made
work almost impossible, particularly in the swampy lands surrounding Limon Bay.28 At their
most extreme, these conditions could actively work against the maintenance of human labor. In
September of 1850 Totten wrote that five or six of his Irish laborers had deserted as they were,
“not pleased at being placed to work in the water.”29 These concerns were well founded. The
combination of heavy rains and inadequate shelter made tropical disease a constant companion to
the laborers. At times these outbreaks grew so pronounced that work on the railroad ceased
altogether.
To deal with these challenges, the company grew increasingly aggressive in its attempts
to provide Totten with the necessary manpower to create the railroad. A bevy of energy
speculators saw the potential financial windfall that came from providing manpower to the
Panamanian railroad. The financial incentives behind the trade of human energy have long been
acknowledged by historians of slavery, and yet it is worth noting that energy tycoons often
peddled their wares in other coerced labor markets as well. These manpower magnates signed
contracts with the Railroad Company, promising to recruit laborers throughout the United States
before transporting them to the isthmus. Successfully recruiting human energy could provide
immense financial benefits. E.D. Baker signed a contract with the Company in July of 1850
stipulating that he would take down to the Isthmus roughly one thousand men, the bulk of whom
were engineers and mechanics, on one-hundred-day contracts. In return, the company would pay
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Baker five-thousand dollars for the first fifty days of work and ten-thousand dollars of company
stock at the conclusion of the hundred days.30
A few months later, the Company signed a contract with a Mr. Armstrong to ship twenty
to thirty Jamaican laborers to the Isthmus so that “an early trial may be made of the value of their
labor.” Baker, Armstrong, and other middlemen like them capitalized on the energy needs of the
railroad company by procuring, stockpiling, and distributing energy, reaping a tremendous profit
as a result. Their business interests suggested that long before coal or oil bonanzas swept through
the United States a vibrant energy market already existed, one driven not by fossil fuels but
instead by human muscles.
Despite these ambitious attempts to provide the energy necessary to construct the
railroad, progress remained elusive throughout the wet season of 1850, and optimism that the
coming dry season heralded greater productivity proved misplaced. Diseases and deluges grew
more manageable during the dry season, but transportation into the interior grew increasingly
problematic. Totten frequently advocated for the creation of a dirt road along the proposed
railway to ease the transportation of materials.31 The initial period of construction saw such
severe labor shortages that it was impossible to bring this plan to fruition. Additionally, as the
company staged much of its work from the island of Manzanilla it still had to cross Limon Bay
to reach the mainland. The answer to both challenges lay in the Chagres River. The Chagres was
the largest river along the railroad line and had served as a major line of transportation across the
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Isthmus for centuries. The company began employing steamers to take advantage of the minimal
friction presented by the river and penetrate the Panamanian interior.32
While in principle this would overcome many of the challenges presented by the
landscape, it proved far from easy in practice. As the rivers fell in the dry season, the bulky
steamships drew too much of a draft to make their way upriver.33 The combination of difficult
access to the interior during the dry season and poor working conditions during the wet season
led to the adoption of a cyclical labor schedule in Panama where the wet season would be used to
marshal manpower and materials in Panama which could then be brought to bear on the work
during the dry season. This was not a rigidly followed cycle, and often the railroad saw a more
fluid application of human energy, however, the dry season was clearly understood as a period
when work could be more easily accomplished if the necessary materials were available.
Ultimately the first year of construction made little headway. Distracted by attempts to
obtain human labor, Totten brought little of this energy to bear on the Panamanian environment.
Despite this, as 1850 concluded, Totten and the company were optimistic that their actions had
not been in vain. Gradually men and materials made their way into Panama and soon
construction would commence in earnest. Or at least that was the hope.
Reaching the Chagres
As the rainy season gave way to the dry season in late 1850 a sense of optimism settled
over the line. In New York, company President John Stephens authorized the purchase of a
second-hand locomotive to aid in the construction.34 Meanwhile, on the Isthmus, Totten took
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steps to try to get roughly 600 men to the line by November, and, while desertions still plagued
him, he finally seemed to be making headway in concentrating a store of human energy on the
Isthmus. In addition, a steam pile driver arrived to help create a fixed line through the swamps
surrounding Limon bay.35 Unfortunately for Totten, this process proved to be as smooth as the
vexing landscape he was trying to cross. Once again it was not concerns over coal or steam
energy that complicated construction, but rather the difficulties of controlling and deploying
human energy.
Caffeine addicts are quick to make their displeasure known if they fail to get their hands
on a decent cup of coffee. The Irish laborers on the Panama railroad were no exception. Over the
winter of 1850, a group of them decided not to work "on account of bad coffee and bad bread."36
It is telling that these men were more outraged by the blasphemy of a bad brew than by the
maladies of malaria and yellow fever. While quality coffee may not have been percolating on the
Isthmus, discontent most certainly was. The strikers' frustration with the railroad's substandard
joe was so pronounced that they threatened to use force to rectify the situation if necessary. Dr.
Henry, the foreman overseeing the disgruntled and undercaffeinated rebels, warned railroad
administrators to "look out for their own safety as he (Henry) would not prevent his men from
coming over and redressing their own grievances."37 Clearly both sides struggled to find
common grounds. Totten felt compelled to chastise the United States’ lack of preparation for
such a crisis, writing, "I certainly think our government negligent by not having an armed vessel
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on this coast,” before reassuring the Board of Directors that “I do not fear the revolvers or bowie
knives of Dr. Henry's men."38
While the brewing revolution on the Isthmus never boiled over, it exemplified the
challenges faced by administrators in trying to control laborers. Underlying questions of caffeine
were questions of control, particularly between Totten and Henry. Henry asserted that Totten
lacked the authority to direct his men and their energy, while Totten countered that Henry was
“not capable of managing his men, but consults with and is controlled by them.”39 While the
general laborers’ disquiet may have been fueled by concerns over coffee, Totten and Henry
grounded their conflict in questions over who had the authority to direct human energy, and the
efficacy with which they deployed that energy. Ultimately, in the eyes of the railroad’s directors,
primacy lay with the man capable of maximizing the efficiency of laborers and so Totten was
given power over Henry and his men, a decision which clearly implied that fomenting an energy
crisis on the Isthmus was an egregious sin that bore serious repercussions.40
It's also likely that the climactic conditions of Panama exacerbated the labor conflict. Of
the 150 men who followed Dr. Henry, Totten estimated that roughly 100 were laid low by
diseases, and eight eventually died. Their suffering evoked little sympathy from Totten who
suggested “if they had worked more and complained less” they may have been able to clear
forests and swamps, erect shelters, and better protect themselves from the environment. This
critique was somewhat misdirected however as, by January of 1851, complaints about the lack of
quinine were springing up across the Isthmus.41 Indeed, Totten’s initial response to the strike was
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not providing better quality food to the men, but instead obtaining mosquito nets for the men.42
Regardless of where the fault lay on the matter the outcome was clear, and, by February, Dr.
Henry and all of his laborers either voluntarily left the work or been asked to leave with the
exception of a few men."43
The situation with Dr. Henry at an end and the dry season now arriving, 1851 presented
Totten with the opportunity to finally make headway on the line. Totten's initial goal for the dry
season of 1851 was to complete the line between Navy Bay (Limon Bay) and Gorgona, a town
on the Chagres River more than halfway across the Isthmus. Totten pursued this ambitious
objective through the sequential construction of the line. Surveyors first located the line, then
general laborers cleared and graded it. If necessary, pile drivers next provided cribbing for
landfill and the creation of solid ground. Finally, the track itself was laid and the line progressed
north to south through the interior.44 While perhaps overly ambitious, the plan seemed feasible to
Totten. By February of 1851, he had 800 men on the road, expected an additional 400 to arrive
presently, and 300 to trickle in over the coming months. With the help of this substantial influx
of human energy, Totten was hopeful that the line to Gorgona could be completed by July, prior
to the worst deluges of the wet season.45
Totten's spirits were further bolstered by the promise of the line's newly arrived steam
fueled labor. In November of 1850, the company contracted with George Sellers, a renowned
locomotive engineer, to create three locomotives in Cincinnati and ship them from there to
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Panama, the first to be transported to Aspinwall, by June of 1851 and the other two the following
month.46 In order to unleash the potential of the locomotives, it was imperative that headway be
made on the line. Anticipating this boom, the company purchased 10,500 yellow pine piles and
424,000 board feet of yellow pine from J.T. Gilchrist’s lumberyard in Bangor, Maine and 1200
tons of iron from Caron Brothers & Co. of London. These materials were carried to Panama by
privately chartered schooners and allowed construction of the line to begin in earnest.47 Totten
was optimistic that with the aid of another steam fueled component of his diversifying energy
reserves, the piledriver, he could have the line ready for the locomotives.
A series of challenges soon proved Totten’s faith misguided. Chief among these obstacles
was a lack of foresight regarding the complications that accompanied Totten’s increasing
reliance on the pile drivers. The fluidity of the Isthmian landscape meant that it was next to
impossible to find terrain capable of supporting the combined weight of track and train without
shifting. To overcome the instability of the Panamanian environment, piles were driven deep into
the swampy soils that flanked the Chagres in hopes of striking solid ground. This was a more
challenging process than it seemed. Initially, the railroad used twenty-four-foot piles, but these
proved too short and thirty-foot piles soon became the norm.48 These piles formed an
exoskeleton of sorts that was filled with soil and packed down until it was dense enough to lay
track across. The lynchpin of this whole plan was the pile driver, a machine Totten had absolute
faith in. In February of 1851, he bragged that he had five pile drivers on the road, each of which
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could lay a mile of track a month.49 At this pace, construction could average roughly five miles
of track a month, a clip that put them well on their way to reaching Gorgona by July.
Unfortunately, Gorgona remained out of reach. While the pile drivers had the potential to
work at such breakneck speeds, such a pace was seldom realized. Totten failed to anticipate that
by increasing the complexity of his energy regime he had simultaneously unleashed the potential
for new challenges. The heavy rains and shifting soils of the Isthmus proved as conducive to
machine labor as they had to human labor and soon mechanical issues crippled the promise of
reaching Gorgona. In one instance, a second-hand machine died after driving only 76 piles.50
Three weeks later a replacement hammer for another piledriver couldn’t be lifted, weighing 2000
pounds rather than the machine's maximum of 1500 pounds. To make matters worse, the lack of
freshwater near Manzanilla meant that alterations had to be made to the steam engines' boilers to
allow them to run on salt water.51
The mechanical problems with the pile drivers pointed to another more serious issue that
accompanied the diversification of the Isthmian energy regime. These finicky machines required
a corps of engineers and mechanics to operate and maintain them, and workers of such quality
were in short supply. As soon as the machines arrived on the Isthmus, Totten searched for
suitable workers, admitting, “we have only one road pile engine at work at Navy Bay from the
want of engineers to manage the other.”52 The issues accompanying the arrival of the steam
engines pointed to broader shifts in the Panamanian energy regime and a reorientation of the
importance of human labor.
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The productivity of steam engines outpaced even the most capable laborers. The sheer
force exerted by the pile drivers proved as much. And yet actualizing this power relied on a new
type of human energy, one defined not by the amount of work that it could do, but rather by the
specialized type of work that it could do. As steam began to augment human energy in the
Isthmus it meant that less human energy was required to complete a singular task, however, the
complexities of directing steam energy required increasingly specialized mechanics and
engineers capable of harnessing steam power and ensuring its reliability. These specialized
laborers became essential to railroad construction, and Totten went to great lengths to obtain
their services. The addition of steam energy to the Isthmus ultimately created an "energy
hierarchy," a stratification of power and privilege directly tied to one's capacity to direct
powerful sources of energy. During railroad construction, these hierarchies were certainly
present but remained amorphous. Track layers, masons, and quarrymen, positions that gradually
lost their significance in the coming decades, were still of tremendous value to Totten as
mechanical labor lacked enough precision for these tasks. As humans developed more
sophisticated prime movers and harnessed more powerful energies, they inadvertently created
increasingly rigid energy hierarchies to ensure energy’s effective deployment. The presence, or
lack thereof, of engineers to direct the first manifestations of steam energy on the Isthmus was a
testament to complexities that arose from a diversifying energy network.
The lack of engineers and the mechanical issues impacting the pile drivers led to work
progressing slowly during the first few months of the dry season of 1851. As February gave way
to March, enough engineers made their way to the Isthmus to render the pile drivers effective.
The engineers also maintained the steamships that carried supplies up the Chagres. These
developments sparked the return of Totten’s optimism and he proclaimed to John Stephens that
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“We have got a good start, and with a fair supply of laborers, can now make more progress in
one month than we have done in the last two.”53 The time had finally come to begin laying track.
As with the adoption of pile drivers, the process of laying track required the acquisition
of new laborers. Like the engineers, track layers were valuable not so much for the quantity of
energy they could direct at the work, but rather their precise application of energy towards
skilled ends. The ranks of the track layers were filled with a variety of carpenters including ship
carpenters, bridge builders, and millwrights. Interestingly, Totten attempted to avoid house
carpenters who he believed “are of little use.”54 In addition to manpower, Totten also tried to
import more animal labor in the form of mules. Totten believed the mules were indispensable for
the process of track laying, and that, for the purpose of moving materials through otherwise
impassable terrain "one mule will count equal to three men."55
As late as the wet season of 1850, energy on the railroad had been almost entirely human
in nature excepting the ships that carried materials to the Isthmus, and almost entirely unskilled
apart from Totten and his assistants. By early 1851, the small unskilled force on the railroad had
grown exponentially and variety of other prime movers had joined them. Five pile drivers added
steam energy to the increasingly diverse energy network, and skilled laborers such as engineers,
surveyors, and track layers now directed their energy towards precise tasks, allowing other
sources of energy to work unimpeded. Meanwhile, ocean-going steamships and sailboats
continued to provide material support from American ports while newly deployed river
steamships used the Charges (as best they could) to gain access to the Panamanian interior. In
those regions inaccessible to boats, a corps of muleteers provided overland transit. The once
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homogenous energy network in Panama had grown, and so too had its capacity to reshape
Isthmian landscapes.
The increasing potential of energy on the Isthmus was not without its drawbacks.
Increasingly complex issues accompanied the increasing complexity of the labor force. By June
of 1851, Totten was content with the number of general laborers, mechanics, engineers, and
surveyors on the work, but was having difficulty obtaining the necessary track layers. Many of
the men who had agreed to go to Panama had lied about their credentials and lacked experience,
leading Totten to deem them "good for nothing."56 For qualified track layers, disease remained
problematic, limiting their efficacy as sources of human energy. Even when tropical diseases
declined over the dry season, the specter of pestilence haunted the Isthmus. Its impacts were felt
as far away as New York where it hindered labor recruitment. In one instance, twenty-five wellregarded ship carpenters were on their way to the Panama Railroad Company offices to apply for
employment when an anonymous interloper cut them off and proceeded to terrify them with tales
of Isthmian hazards. All twenty-five men quickly rethought their decision and concluded that
Panama simply wasn't worth the risk. The situation was so dire that when Totten sent an assistant
to New York to recruit forty track layers he requested divine intervention. "God held him in his
mission…" wrote Totten, "We are working at an awful disadvantage for the want of this craft."57
Work progressed inconsistently. Stretches of great productivity were accompanied by
periods when work halted altogether. Mechanical issues with the engines of pile drivers,
locomotives, and steamships meant that talented engineers were constantly in demand. As the
summer of 1851 progressed, the pile drivers became increasingly troublesome. The scow pile
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driver at Mindee was "a snail," and another pile driver had become so problematic that Totten
simply did away with it, characterizing “all machines of the kind on dry land perfect nuisancesinventions to retard the work."58 The one exception to these piling problems, the pile driver at
Gatun, was also removed from service after a flood damaged the piles crossing the Gatun River.
These mechanical woes were accompanied by rampant sickness as the wet season returned. One
of Totten’s foremen had to return home because of a case of dysentery and another poor laborer,
one Mr. Niles, was in even worse shape, his leg having been amputated after it was crushed in an
accident. As if to add insult to injury, Niles was then struck by a nasty case of lock-jaw before
returning home.59 Totten was particularly concerned by the high rate of sickness among his
native force. By August of 1851, the situation was dire. Illness swept through the ranks, resulting
in a few deaths and the departure of fifty of his native laborers, dropping their numbers to around
500.60
The result was a state of flux along the line as the wet season concluded. Surveying,
clearing, and grading, work that could be done primarily with human and animal energy, nearly
reached Totten’s intended target of Gorgona and yet the combination of disease and mechanical
issues prevented piling and tracklaying from making any progress. Totten grew increasingly
concerned as these issues progressed, feeling despair over the state of chaos on the line, and
writing to President John Stephens:
You must not think strange of my change of plans. This country does not admit of
fixed plans. One is obliged to adapt himself to circumstances. Sickness is
constantly breaking in upon one's intentions and thwarting all his best endeavors.
I believe there are more causes for discouragement here than on any other work in
the world. Sometimes I almost despair- and nothing but my most sanguine
temperament keeps up my spirit. If I do not communicate these feelings to you it
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is because I know that it would be of no use and therefore, I always try to pass on
good appearances.61

Disease, environment, and the unpredictability of mechanical energy had pushed Totten nearly to
the breaking point. The increasing complexity of the energy network in Panama had allowed for
some progress to be made, but the issues that arose from it seemed insurmountable. It was at this
moment, when it appeared the work might be doomed to fail, that Totten realized there may be a
solution to his woes. He was simply going to make them someone else’s.
Contractors and River Crossings
Totten's despair in August did not lead him to abandon the work. Indeed, over the next
few weeks his resolve seemed hardened. By the beginning of September 1851, Totten was
confident that he could open the line to Gatun by the end of the year if not sooner.62 Despite
continued challenges Totten reached his goal in December of 1851 and the railroad began service
over the first seven miles of track between Manzanilla and Gatun.63 While this section
represented only a fraction of what was to come, the opening of the line to passengers ushered in
a new stage in railroad construction on the Isthmus, suggesting that, despite all the difficulties
presented by the Panamanian environment, rail-borne transit was a viable means of expediting
transit between the oceans.
The creation of the first section of track aided the work immeasurably. In the dry season
of 1852, Totten began employing the locomotive Pottsville, a second-hand locomotive purchased
from the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroad Company, to pull dirt cars between Gatun and
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Manzanilla.64 Again, Totten found that utilizing more complex forms of energy came at a cost.
The Pottsville fell out of commission when an engineman burned out the engine, rendering it
useless. As had been the case with the adoption of pile drivers Totten now had to find laborers
capable of managing the locomotive. He told the company, "We are exceedingly in want of one
or two good locomotive engineers, who are at the same time good machinists and can repair their
engines. For want of which men the Pottsville is now laid up, when her services are daily
required."65
Even as these hardships complicated the work, Totten remained enthralled by the
potential of this steam fueled labor force and attempted to expand it as rapidly as possible. The
arrival of a skilled machinist, Mr. George Nichols, in January of 1852 further accelerated this
process, and upon Nichols’ arrival Totten asked for “two Sellers locomotives and engineers to
run them,” accompanied by anywhere from fifteen to thirty dirt cars of the highest quality.66 In
response the company tested out the three Sellers locomotives it had previously purchased,
preparing them for service in Panama, and contracted out the construction of thirty Boston
Rocker dumping cars to carry dirt across the line.67 These steam engines sped up the progress of
construction during the dry season of 1852, allowing laborers to carry materials more easily
between Manzanilla and their forward stations along the line. While human labor remained
paramount in Panama, mechanical labor played an increasingly important role.
Despite these successes, the problems of the fall of 1851 remained in Totten’s mind and
he began insisting with increasing regularity that the Board explore the potential of contracting
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out some, if not all, of the remaining work.68 After a period of reluctance, the Board began
seeking contracts in December of 1851. Initially, contracts covered specific tasks, such as the
erection of a bridge over the Chagres River, but as time went on the Board warmed to the idea of
contracting out the entirety of the remaining work. 69 Totten was making headway by the spring
of 1852, but construction was far slower and more expensive than initial estimates suggested. In
response, in April, the Board of Directors granted the executive committee the authority to
contract out the Pacific half of the road from the Chagres River crossing to the Pacific terminus
at Panama City.70
While the Board examined contracts in New York, Totten drew closer to the Chagres. By
July of 1852, his goal was in sight as the line finally reached Barbacoas, the point at which the
line crossed the river.71 This was not to say that the work was completed. The entropy unleashed
by heavily falling rains undid much of the energy laborers invested in reshaping the landscape. A
series of deluges in May of 1852 proved particularly disastrous. For weeks laborers worked
feverishly to prevent the newly laid track from shifting as rains bombarded the line. Despite their
best efforts, several train cars were thrown off the tracks on May 24th, leaving nearly 400
passengers trapped at Frijoles station overnight.72 The situation didn’t result in any major injuries
or damages but served as a sobering reminder of the Panamanian environment’s entropic
proclivities. The extension of the line placed additional burdens on Totten’s already taxed labor
force, requiring a corps of track gangs to maintain set rail lines. At times these small track gangs
could not provide enough energy to overcome Panamanian entropy. After one particularly
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devastating storm Totten was forced to reassign some of the laborers from the excavation corps
to provide the energy necessary to right the tracks. This added another layer of complexity to the
task of managing Isthmian energy stores and Totten requested “5 good repair gang foremen and
60 good track layers” to ensure that he had the energy on hand to keep the existing line stable.73
As Totten approached his objective so too did the Board approach theirs. At a meeting on
May 7th, the Executive Committee met with Miner Story to go over the details of his proposal.
After a month of negotiations and haggling, both sides agreed to terms and Story made his way
down to Panama to commence the work.74 Similar to Totten, Story’s previous experience made
him well qualified for the task of completing the railroad. A career contractor and entrepreneur,
Story made a name for himself working for the Portland and Montreal Railroad.75 The Board
placed faith in Story's previous experience; however, ominous signs accompanied the execution
of the contract. Negotiations were almost derailed when the contract prepared by Story was
compared to that prepared by the Board. The two contracts were "found to be different in form
and arrangement so much as to be impracticable."76 The two parties eventually found common
ground, but the disagreement foreshadowed a series of contractual conflicts that undermined
work on the Isthmus for over a year.
To fulfill the terms of his contract and complete the entirety of the line between
Barbacoas and Panama, Story needed to overcome the chief obstacle lying in his path, the
Chagres. Totten had long contemplated the best way to bridge the river, and while he had yet to
settle on a final design, he knew a tremendous labor force was required to erect the bridge.
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Totten was happy to wash his hands of the challenge of crossing the Chagres in the summer of
1852, but he too seemed uneasy about the way Story approached the task, noting that the
contractor had little idea of where he was going to look for laborers.77 Totten’s concerns were
soon forgotten amongst his other responsibilities. While he would not be directly overseeing
construction of the track, Totten retained his post as Chief Engineer and focused on improving
the existing line and preparing the Pacific terminus at Panama City.
Totten first directed his efforts towards the improvement of the Cruces Road, a mule road
which connected the Chagres with Panama City. The Cruces had played an essential role in
Panamanian transit networks for centuries, having been used to transport silver across the
Isthmus since the 16th century. By 1852 the road was in a state of disrepair, a fact brought to light
by a disastrous attempt to carry American soldiers across Panama. In July of 1852, the troops
unloaded at the Atlantic Terminus and passed over the rail line without difficulty. They were
supposed to be met by a muleteer at Barbacoas who would carry them the rest of the way to
Panama City, however, the man fell ill and when the troops arrived there was no one to guide
them to their destination. The results were disastrous. By the time replacement mules arrived
many of the soldiers had been struck by cholera, several of them dying as a result.78 The
suffering of the soldiers pointed to the necessity of establishing a safe, reliable mule service over
the line until the railroad was complete.
It was not only humanitarian concerns that dictated improvements to the Cruces Road.
The Railroad Company also sought to transport mail over the Isthmus and recognized that it was
reliant on the mule road to do so until railroad construction was complete. Frequent
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conversations with steamship companies in the United States and England suggested that the
Board was convinced of the railroad’s potential not only as a conveyor of people, but also of
parcels, packages, and posts.79 Both Totten and the Board were acutely aware of the importance
of reliable mule transit and so Totten spent much of the summer of 1852 improving the mule
road.
Renovation of the Cruces became increasingly necessary by the fall of 1852. Freight
increased dramatically on the rail line after it was opened to Barbacoas in the summer of 1852. A
single trip in August saw over six-hundred express packages cross the Isthmus along with other
freight. The repairs to the Cruces road progressed slowly and it was incapable of adequately
handling such a volume of packages. A month earlier, a group of packages sat in Cruces for eight
days waiting to be carried over the mule line. In another instance, parcels accompanied by a
representative of the railroad arrived in Cruces to find no mules waiting for them. The unlucky
representative had to carry the packages over the road piece by piece on a limited supply of
mules, a process taking four days.80 It was ironic that the completion of the railroad to Barbacoas
exacerbated rather than diminished the need for animal labor.
The difficulties with the mule road paled in comparison with the growing tensions
between Story and the company. Story initially seemed to be a good fit, but work had ground to a
halt by December of 1852. Story’s continued inability to obtain and maintain adequate stores of
human energy particularly concerned Totten. “A large number of Mr. Story’s men have desertedboth white men and Natives,” Totten reported in October of 1852.81 He felt compelled to point
out that "the season has now arrived when that line should be covered with laborers. Not less
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than 6000 men should be upon it in the month of January, where there will not be 1000."82 In his
next letter to William Young, the sitting President of the Company, Totten was even more blunt,
writing, " It does not appear to me that Mr. Story has an adequate idea of the amount of work
before him. He should have a force of 4000 daily laborers which will require a force of 6000
men on the work and recruits by every steamer to keep up the supply. The season for work is at
hand and should be taken advantage of."83 It was not Story’s mechanical or engineering abilities
that Totten questioned, but rather his ability to obtain and marshal the stores of human energy
necessary for the work. Totten, having by this point spent years adapting to the unique energy
needs of Panama, understood what Story failed to; in Panama the chief determinant of success
was enough human labor to overcome the constraints of the Isthmian environment.
By February of 1853, the Board was openly criticizing Story’s slow progress.84 Concerns
began to emerge that he was no longer actually fulfilling his contractual obligations. The
Executive Committee remarked, "It is of course evident that the part of our contract with Mr.
Story providing for the road being ready for the engine to run to Gorgona by the 1st February
will not be complied with.”85 Totten echoed the Board's frustrations with Story's slow progress,
writing, "I am greatly disappointed in the progress that has been made as well as in the prospects
for the future."86
The flood of April 7th, 1853 made manifest the Board’s and Totten’s frustrations with
Story. Seasonal flooding was common to Panama during the wet season and regularly derailed
progress on the line. These floods, or “freshets” as they were called, served as a testament to
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entropy’s radical capacity to sow disorder in human organized landscapes. Small freshets
plagued the work from its inception, shifting embankments, destroying piles, and hindering
construction as the line made its way from Manzanilla to Barbacoas. Fortunately, these freshets
had been on smaller rivers such as the Mindee and Gatun.87 While still dangerous, the smaller
size of these rivers and the fact that less energy and material had been invested in crossing them
tempered their capacity for destruction. The same could not be said of the freshet of April 7th.
The widest and strongest river along the line, the Chagres could make or break railway
construction. Even before arriving in Panama, Totten was acutely aware of this fact.88 The bridge
crossing it needed to be several hundred feet in length and exceptionally sturdy to deal with the
floods that occurred during the wet season. To withstand the energy of the freshets, engineers
proposed a foundation of stone masonry and wooden piles. As an additional precaution against
nature's energy, the bridge was to be erected during the dry season. Story’s initial contract
stipulated that the bridge was to be finished by February 1st, 1853, yet by that date it was only a
quarter complete.89 The work continued to move slowly over the next several months. Story’s
inability to obtain adequate stores of human energy was acutely felt in the masonry corps, and
between January and March, Totten’s requests for quarrymen, masons, and carpenters grew
almost incessant.90 These shortages were not entirely Story’s fault- a severe bout of sickness
among the masons prevented them from bringing their skills to bear on the work. Yet ultimately,
as the wet season approached, the bridge remained incomplete.
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In the weeks leading up to the disaster, Totten grew increasingly optimistic about the
completion of the bridge. By late March construction seemed to be going well despite the
numerous setbacks and labor shortages that had hampered its completion. In a letter to William
Young on March 30th Totten noted that the first span was almost completed as the track laying
and advanced masonry neared completion. Totten suggested “These are all matters worthy of
particular notice the remainder of the work being simply grading.”91 Totten's optimism proved
short-lived. The freshet heralded the arrival of the rainy season in spectacular fashion. Rushing
waters carried away the nearly completed first span of the bridge as well as temporary
scaffolding and structures meant to support the second and third spans. The flood was so
powerful that it washed away the gravel bed of part of the river. Construction on the bridge
needed to start from scratch, the force of the rushing waters having entirely destroyed the
structures bridging the river.92
The loss of the bridge brought the tensions between Story, Totten, and the Board to the
breaking point. Culpability for the natural disaster, however, was far from obvious. Story felt that
the Company should be liable for paying for the damages as they were outside of his control.
Totten and the Company saw the matter differently and suggested that Story had broken the
terms of his contract months earlier when he failed to complete the bridge and sections of track
by the dates outlined therein.93 While valid criticism, Totten had also missed several deadlines
during his tenure leading construction without any punitive action. It was more likely that the
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destruction of the bridge provided a justification for the Company to act on their previous
concerns about Story’s slow progress and lack of labor recruitment.
The termination of Story’s contract lingered on well into the summer, but the freshet of
April doomed Story the moment it happened.94 However, Story's most intolerable folly in the
eyes of his employers was not the loss of the Chagres Bridge, but rather his inability to maintain
enough energy to alter the Panamanian environment. Disease, landscape, entropy, and desertion:
the four horsemen of the energy apocalypse in Panama, certainly deserved much of the
responsibility for Story’s ineffectiveness. However, whereas Totten tried to overcome these
obstacles by increasing his available energy sources, be they human, animal, or mechanical,
Story, at least in the eyes of the Railroad Company, looked on passively as his workers trickled
away from the line. By the time of the April flood Story had only 811 men left on the work.95
The Board acknowledged this issue, and, in an ultimatum delivered to Story in June of 1853,
they suggested “that unless (Mr. Story and his legal representative, Mr. Law) proceed
immediately with more energy and by a greatly increased force on the line of the road, that the
company will find it necessary to take the work out of their hands and assume the completion of
it on their own account.”96 Perhaps the most cutting criticism of Story came from Totten who
suggested that Story himself was the root of the problem, writing, “the objection of the labourers
appears to be to the treatment of the contractor, more than to the company or the climate.”97
Story’s failure was not the result of the natural realities of Panama, but rather his inability to
recruit and maintain an effective store of human energy. The result was a complete inability to
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contain Panamanian entropy and the erasure of considerable investments of energy. Totten, once
again in control of the work, quickly learned from Story’s failures and took aggressive steps to
avoid them.
The End of the Line
Story’s failure initiated the final period of railroad construction. Story may have been the
victim of poor circumstance, but his incompetence served as a lesson to Totten to redouble his
own recruitment and retention efforts as he prepared to cross the Chagres and complete the line
to Panama City. This period still possessed difficulties, particularly in relation to the adoption of
Chinese laborers, but it was the smoothest period of railroad construction. The significant
portions of the line already completed made it far easier to get materials into the Panamanian
interior, and Totten and the Board’s aggressive labor recruitment paid dividends as thousands of
laborers made their way to Panama. A new era of Isthmian transit was on the horizon.
Construction of the line progressed slowly over the summer of 1853. Story’s contract was
not terminated until August, leading to substantial confusion over whether Totten or Story was in
control. Despite this, Totten focused on preparing the Atlantic terminus of the line: Aspinwall.
Located on Manzanilla Island, Aspinwall became the headquarters for many of the railroad's
operations as well as the point of departure for Atlantic steamers. As a result, the quality of the
city directly correlated with the efficacy of pan-isthmian transit. Totten improved the city over
the summer of 1853, constructing wharves, a machine shop, and buildings for several other
auxiliary services.98 Simultaneously, he maintained track between Aspinwall and Barbacoas,
filling cribbing and reinforcing embankments to prepare the line for the rains of the wet season.
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In addition to these physical improvements, Totten again filled out the labor rolls in
anticipation of the coming dry season. While Story was still nominally in charge of railroad
construction at the end of May, Totten began encouraging the Railroad Company to send agents
to recruit laborers. Totten was particularly concerned by the fact that the bulk of Story’s white
labor force finished their labor contracts by July of 1853. “What are the prospects for a force
hereafter?” he worried, “This is a question to which I must turn the attention of the board.”99
Recognizing Story’s failures, the Board heeded Totten’s warnings. They explored the potential
of recruiting laborers from Ireland, Jamaica, and China, hoping that proactive action would
generate a substantial labor pool in time for the dry season.100 In July of 1853, they sent Francis
Speis to England to obtain laborers and directed Henry Coit and George Lamar, fellow board
members, to contract for Chinese workers.101 These laborers were essential to the completion of
the road and Totten was keenly aware of this, noting, “The time requisition for constructing this
division must, of course, depend upon the amount of labor which can be thrown upon it."102 By
1853, Totten fully recognized and accepted that the best way to reshape the Panamanian
environment and contain entropy was by maximizing his available stores of human energy and
hurling as much of it as possible at Panamanian landscapes.
In August 1853, Story left the Isthmus, leaving Totten once again the sole source of
authority along the railroad. Totten predicted that with enough laborers he could complete the
line by August of 1854. Calculating that Story had completed roughly eight miles of road with
no more than 900 men, Totten believed that he required a force of roughly 5000. By November
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of 1853, his force was already considerably larger than Story's had been, consisting of roughly
1200 Chinese and Jamaican laborers and 390 white men. He expected to receive roughly 2000
men from Cartagena in January 1854, with 500 more to follow in addition to roughly 1700
Chinese laborers and 1000 Irish laborers expected to arrive in early 1854. If all went well, this
would yield a labor pool of roughly 6790 men.103
While he waited for more laborers to arrive, Totten directed the laborers he did have at
his disposal to a series of tasks along the road. Among the most pressing issues was the
continued improvement of the Cruces Road. By this point the Cruces was in such bad shape that
it was harming the mules themselves. An exasperated Totten wrote, “Not a train of mulestreasure, mails, or any other- goes over it without a large number of them breaking down. The
wonder is that they make the trips as well as they do.”104 While animal energy was more
geographically liberated than steam energy, it could not contend with the poor state of the road.
The problem became so pronounced that traversing the length of the road took 39 hours in the
dry season and up to 57 hours during the wet season.105 In August, the Railroad Company struck
a deal with the Pacific Mail and US Mail Companies in which each party paid one-third of the
expenses to repair the road. The companies were natural allies in this venture, and so the
Railroad Company authorized Totten to spend up to $50,000 dollars on the improvement of the
road. 106 This investment paid immediate dividends. Totten directed considerable resources
towards the completion of the road. As his available stores of manpower increased, Totten placed

103

Totten and Railroad Co., “Communication from the Board of Directors: 1853,” 13-14
Totten Young, 19 July 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1.
105
Totten Young, 19 August 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1.
106
Speis, “Minutes of the Board of Directors, 4 August 1853”, Board Minutes, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1.
104

60

150 men at work on the Cruces road, and by December they had successfully completed the
repairs.107
Completion of the Cruces Road rehabilitation was a significant development for the
Panama Railroad Company, but it paled in comparison to the task of finally completing the
bridge over the Chagres. Reconstruction of the bridge commenced by the end of May 1853;
however, the work moved slowly. Totten estimated that one hundred carpenters were required to
complete the bridge- he had five. And not just any sort of laborer would do. Totten expressed his
preference for American carpenters, once again suggesting that complex and specialized tasks
demanded equally specialized and precise prime movers and energies.108 This small labor force
made gradual progress on the bridge and by the beginning of August they completed the
scaffolding for the first and third spans of the bridge as well as the trestling for the track.109
Gradually the labor situation improved and, with the arrival of a steamer in August, Totten
believed that he had an adequate number of carpenters to complete the work, although he was
still in want of quarrymen and masons to create the stone foundation for the bridgework.110
As more laborers arrived and the energy directed towards the bridge increased, the work
progressed rapidly. By mid-September 1853 the first two-hundred-foot section of the bridge was
complete and merely needed to have the track laid across it.111 By the end of the month, Totten
was confident that construction of the bridge could be finished by the beginning of December.112
Excited by the potential of the bridge being completed, Totten also directed his expanding labor
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force to clear and grade the line on the other side of the river. Prior to the bridge's completion
they had laid three miles of track on the far side of the river and graded several more miles.113
The bridge itself was completed by the beginning of December, and, more importantly,
withstood several freshets without issue. Immediately upon completion of the bridge, the railroad
carried riders to Gorgona and only the final stretch of track needed to be completed.114
Totten and the Company’s recruitment techniques proved quite effective. While the labor
force failed to reach the 6000 men Totten desired, by the end of December it sat at 2110 with the
promise of an additional 700 Irish laborers set to arrive in January.115 This energy influx was not
without complications. The increase in personnel demanded an equally massive increase in
calories. Totten requested 800 barrels of beef, 900 barrels of pork, 157,000 pounds of bread and
154,000 pounds of rice to feed his expanding labor pool.116 These resources required the
company to begin chartering more vessels to keep its workforce on the Isthmus supplied. By
November of 1853 schooners and steamers were relying on currents and coal on a nearly weekly
basis.117 This solidified the expanding energy network in Panama by increasing both its
regularity and efficacy, further enabling the rapid construction of the road.
The influx of human energy expanded the Company’s ability to restructure the
environment, and within a year the line was complete. This process went smoothly excepting the
importation of Chinese laborers. Small numbers of Chinese laborers had been employed since
early 1853 without incident. This changed as their numbers increased in 1854. The central
concern Totten held regarding Chinese laborers had always been their adaptability to the climate,
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an issue compounded by the poor conditions in which they were transported to Panama.
Regardless of the cause of their illness, the problem grew so pronounced that by the spring of
1854 the Board of Directors examined the potential of setting up special treatment facilities for
Chinese workers on the islands of the Bay of Panama.118
The Chinese laborers, disdained from the moment they arrived in Panama, continued to
be the target of hostility. The marginal steps taken by the Board did little to improve the physical
and emotional hardship Chinese laborers faced. Disease, death, and an exceptionally high
number of suicides soon took their toll. Concerned only with their capacity as a source of energy,
the Board saw the destitute Chinese as nothing more than an inefficient tool to be replaced by a
more fit and effective one. In response, the Board adopted a policy of trying to remove as many
of the Chinese laborers as possible from the Isthmus. They implemented a variety of practices to
this end, including lowering fares to transport Chinese workers away from the Isthmus, buying
out their contracts, or selling them outright.119 Eventually, in November of 1854, the Board
worked with the government of Jamaica to send the remaining one-hundred ninety-seven
Chinese laborers to Jamaica in exchange for a corps of Jamaican laborers at a cost of $17.77
each.120
The exploitation and brutalization of Chinese workers indicated the complicated issues
that developed from the increasing devaluation of unskilled human labor. The growing
importance of specialized human energy in Panama reinforced the biases that dogged Chinese
laborers. The difficulties Chinese laborers faced in dealing with the climate of Panama and the
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terrible conditions they were kept in served as justification for the assumption that they were an
inferior source of energy, valuable only for their cost-effectiveness.
Such perceptions cannot be explained by racial biases alone. Totten's distaste for
Jamaicans was quite clear. In a letter to John Stephens, he wrote of how they required "driving or
tasking" and that if placed with other laborers they would become dissatisfied with their lower
wages.121 When a new cohort of Jamaicans arrived in Panama in December of 1850, Totten
admitted they were “a little better lot than the former” but that they were still “not the kind of
labourers one requires.”122 It is remarkable then that Totten willingly accepted Jamaican laborers
in exchange for Chinese laborers. Prejudices impacted his perceptions of both groups, but his
valuation of the energy each could contribute led him to conclude that Jamaican laborers were
more valuable. No explanation exists for this decision other than the fact that Jamaicans were
healthier and hence were more reliable. While he neglected to keep figures of deaths amongst the
non-white labor force, Totten did acknowledge that, “the proportion was greater among Coolies
and less among Jamaica men and natives.”123
Despite the hardships faced by the Chinese, work progressed rapidly during 1854. The
combination of increased human energy on the Isthmus and the completion of the bridge over the
Chagres meant that, while still arduous, the work faced less unpredictability than it had in earlier
years. In addition, Totten’s experience allowed him to direct his stores of human and mechanical
energy with greater competency than ever before. In the fall of 1854, laborers cut through the
Obispo valley, summiting the continental divide nearly 300 feet above sea level. From there they
made their way down the Pacific slope, careful to maintain a maximum grade of 60 feet per mile,
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lest the combination of gravity and the limited friction of the rail line brew a recipe for runaway
locomotives. As they continued towards the Pacific terminus, they crossed more swamps, but
with the added manpower the labor force overcame the ravages of disease.124 And so, in January
of 1855, the task was completed. The track ran 47 miles and 3,020 feet from Aspinwall to
Panama City. The world’s first transcontinental railroad was complete.
Opening a Line and Ending an Era
Getting George Law and his eighteen companions to the Isthmus in February of 1855
proved far easier than it had been to get laborers there. The men, officials and guests of the
Panama railroad, were furnished with free passes by the U.S. Mail Steamship company to travel
from New York to Aspinwall. Upon their arrival they boarded the train and rode it the length of
the line, officially recognizing the railway’s opening.125 By the time of their arrival the line had
been running for over a month, so the trip was more pomp than substance, and yet it reflected the
entangled energy network of Panama perfectly. The men likely took horse-drawn carriages or
walked to the steamships, nestled in their berths in New York's harbor. Their luggage was carried
on board by human muscle, and they were carried to Panama by the combustion of coal, a
process overseen by a specialized group of mechanics, engineers, and sailors possessing the
skills and knowledge necessary to direct and control steam energy. Upon their arrival in
Aspinwall they made their way to the train station while a group of laborers transported their
luggage. From there the steam engine of the train drove pistons, allowing the train's wheels to
travel along tracks which minimized the friction of the Panamanian environment. Behind the
scenes, a supplementary force of men and mules worked to ensure that the heavy rains of
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Panama didn’t erode any embankments or shift the tracks. After a few hours the men arrived in
Panama City where, if they so desired, they could board a Pacific Mail Steamship Company
Steamer and make their way to California, going from sea to shining sea via the Panama Route.
Eventually, the Panama route was overshadowed, a victim of entropy. The irony behind
the creation of such a massive energy infrastructure was that it was a relatively static landscape.
The sheer cost of obtaining the energy and material necessary to create the Panama route meant
that it was impractical to alter the railroad after its completion, and, aside from work done to
maintain the line against landslides, little energy was invested in its development. The lack of
investment in energy meant that the line suffered distinct limitations in the types of locomotives
it could accommodate, and it became increasingly obsolete. The creation of a new transportation
network, the American transcontinental railroad, in 1869 undermined the primacy of Panama as
the central conduit between East and West. Goods and materials from Central and South
America still made their way through Panama, but American ridership dwindled. As convenient
as Panama was, the Isthmus failed to rival the Transcontinental railroad as an overland route of
personal transportation across the United States. Yet this did not mean all hope was lost. Indeed,
as the 19th century closed and the 20th opened, many Americans would look not forward, but
backward, towards visions of an interoceanic canal, a scheme that had been associated with
Panama since the days of Spanish colonization.
The energy sources that held entropy at bay and created the railroad reflected important
trends that would continue to define transit across Panama. The challenges faced by Totten in
controlling human energy indicated the importance human muscle would play in shaping
Isthmian transit. Coal alone did not fuel this passage. Even after the completion of the line in
1855, The Panama route was a transportation network in which coal, wood, and human muscle
66

all played crucial roles. The proliferation of these various energy sources rendered the Panama
railroad a success and brought visions of pan-isthmian transit to fruition.
This, however, was not a “revolution.” There was no moment of disruption that radically
altered the status quo. Instead, a massive proliferation of energy sources saw older sources of
energy such as animal, muscle, and wind power joined by the emergence of the world’s first
fossil fuel, coal. The energy regime that powered the Panama Railroad suggested that while
monumental, the shift to coal energy was neither immediate nor absolute. The creation of a coalfueled transit network was facilitated by the bodies of laborers who altered landscapes and
countered entropy in ways that enabled coal to flourish. Even when coal seemed ascendant,
muscular and mechanical energy sources worked in symbiosis, reinforcing the effective
deployment of one another. This trend was not isolated to the construction of the railroad. As
visions of an empire danced in the heads of American leaders, and Panama again became the site
of a massive infrastructural project, the fusion of human and mechanical energy lead to an even
more massive energy proliferation and an even more complex energy network, one which once
again had to contend with entropy.
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Chapter II: Black Gold: Coal, Infrastructure, and the Racialized Energy Hierarchy of the
Panama Canal: 1904-1908
When Canal Zone Policeman Harry Franck first caught sight of the Culebra Cut, the
point at which the Panama Canal crossed the Continental Divide, in January of 1913, the
mechanization of the Canal Zone labor force enthralled him. Franck wrote with awe of
“pounding rock drills” and “belching locomotives.” He described, “the rattle and bump of long
trains of flat cars on many tracks, the crash of falling boulders, the snort of the straining steam
shovels, heaping the cars high with earth and rock.” Franck ended his depiction of the Cut by
noting that “over all the scene hung a veritable Pittsburgh of smoke.”1 Franck’s wonder of the
steam-fueled behemoths is not surprising. Indeed, most historians of the Panama Canal cannot
help but emphasize the significance of the steam shovels, dredges, and locomotives that gouged
out and moved nearly 200,000,000 cubic yards of earth and rock.2 And yet, Franck noticed
something which historians have largely overlooked. The mechanized labor force that parted the
Isthmus and connected the seas was useless without energy and the haze of smoke it left in its
wake.
Coal’s importance came as no surprise to the builders of the Canal. Decades of
familiarity with the hazards and unpredictability of the Panamanian environment had germinated
a degree of cynicism when it came to landscape alteration. The Panama railroad proved that
Panama was a rugged country with an entropic landscape that often shifted in unanticipated
ways. The failed French attempt to build a sea-level canal across the Isthmus in the 1880s
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reinforced these difficulties and suggested the limits of humanity’s ability to enforce its will on
Panama. If Americans were to succeed where Suez Canal engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps had
failed, they needed to harness and direct remarkable amounts of energy.
Steam shovels, dredges, and locomotives formed a coaly trinity that gouged out and
carved up hundreds of thousands of tons of rock. While a variety of steam shovels were used on
the Isthmus, the machine most synonymous with canal excavation was the 95-ton Bucyrus. The
Bucyrus was a marvel of modern technology, hauling up to five cubic yards (roughly eight tons)
of material in a single scoop. When operating at its peak efficiency, a ninety-five-ton Bucyrus
filled an entire dirt car on its own in about eight minutes.3 Locomotives enabled the remarkable
efficiency of the Bucyrus by conveying dirt cars from the canal bed to dumping sites scattered
throughout the Canal Zone. The lack of progress made by steam shovels in the years before the
railroad was improved served as a testament to the importance of the line. Prior to the railroad
renovation in 1907, steam shovels operated at barely a quarter of their capacity.4 While steam
shovels and locomotives carved up the Isthmus on dry land, a variety of dredges removed
material from the aquatic landscapes of Panama. These ladder, dipper, and suction dredges failed
to garner the celebrity that accompanied the Bucyrus, but they were indispensable in countering
the entropy of the Panamanian landscape. These three coal-fueled harbingers of modernism and
other machines including pile drivers and track layers revolutionized construction, turning the
dream of a canal into a reality.
Before they could make the dirt fly, American engineers and machinists had to create an
infrastructure capable of enabling the remarkable amounts of energy imported into Panama.
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Prime movers needed to be regimented, organized, and placed in a system that allowed them to
work efficiently and effectively. The inability to accomplish this task ultimately vexed
construction during its first several years as a feckless John Wallace struggled to deal with the
entropy presented by the Isthmian environment. John Stevens, who took over for Wallace in July
of 1905, proved far more effective in organizing and deploying the energy he had at his disposal.
Beginning in 1905, he set about restructuring the obsolete Panama railroad, turning it into an
efficient, modern line capable of hauling thousands of dirt cars.
And yet it wasn’t enough to restructure his mechanized labor pool. Stevens also
understood the essential role that a substantial pool of human energy was to play in canal
construction. Between 1904 and 1914, tens of thousands of laborers were recruited to the Canal
Zone by labor agents in the West Indies, America, and Europe.5 The result was an energy regime
that combined human muscle and coal energy to counter the entropic landscapes of Panama. And
yet the relationship between human labor and coal energy became increasingly complicated as
canal construction progressed. Gradually, human energy too was restructured and reorganized,
often by its perceived value to the construction of the Canal.
As construction progressed, humans found themselves increasingly toiling away in the
shadow of coal-fueled machines. The landslides, shifting landscapes, diseases, and derailments
that characterized canal construction amplified the importance of coal in Panama. By 1907 over
20,000 tons of coal were consumed monthly.6 The unprecedented ability of steam shovels and
train cars to remove soil ultimately made machines more important than the men who scurried
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alongside them. Harrigan Austin, a silver laborer who came to the Isthmus in 1905, spoke of
working “Day and night, sun or rain; for they were times when it was compulsory to go through
the rain in order not to hold up the shovels or the trains things had to be on time.” 7 The
implication was clear, coal energy, not human energy, was the key to dividing the Isthmus and
uniting the world. As a result, human labor and life played second fiddle in an orchestra of
mechanized labor.
Ultimately, the importance of coal-fueled machines in the construction of the Canal
privileged those workers who had the skills and training necessary to operate such machines
while simultaneously devaluing unskilled labor. Generally, the ranks of the skilled laborers were
filled by white American men who had training working with machinery. The Isthmian Canal
Commission (ICC) preferred drawing its unskilled labor corps from the West Indies or South
America. The result was that skin color became an easy way of distinguishing between skilled
and unskilled laborers.
Many historians have addressed this tension and pointed to the classification of laborers
into either “gold” or “silver” labor pools.8 This process began in 1904 when the U.S. government
took over the administration of the Canal Zone. The ICC adopted a policy practiced by the
Panama Railroad Company of separating employees into gold and silver payrolls. Nominally this
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system merely identified the type of metal in which laborers were paid. In practice the
distinctions between groups was vast. Gold laborers were better paid, occupied separate housing
and transportation facilities, tended to work on machines, and were almost exclusively white
Americans. Silver laborers, on the other hand, were darker skinned, generally West Indian, lived
in subpar facilities, performed dangerous, dirty labor, received less pay and were often
transported in segregated rail cars.9 Harry Franck succinctly described the gold and silver system
as an "awful gulf that separates the sacred white American from the rest of the Canal Zone
world." 10
The evolution of the gold and silver system from a country of origin system to a racial
system accompanied the increasing reliance placed on coal. Coal, and the machines that it
powered, privileged those laborers who had the training and experience necessary to harness and
direct coal energy. This development reinforced assumptions about Jamaican and Barbadian
inferiority, providing an ideological justification for the entrenchment of the gold and silver
system without the necessity of adopting an explicitly Jim Crow system of racial segregation. By
the time the Canal Zone's mechanized labor force was restructured and deployed in 1908, the
silver and gold system had become almost entirely racially defined.
By restructuring the energy infrastructure in Panama between 1905 and 1908, John
Stevens created an environment conducive to the efficient use of energy to combat entropy. Coal
provided the tremendous amounts of energy necessary to impose a degree of order over the
entropic Isthmian landscape. And yet the importance of coal and the simultaneous devaluation of
unskilled human labor combined American's insatiable appetite for energy and modernism with
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their longstanding racial biases, a recipe which created an energy hierarchy in which white
Americans who had the training and ability to harness coal-fueled machines, stood on top.
Fueling the Imagination
For weeks Americans had waited with bated breath. On May 19th of 1898, they could
relax, slightly. "OREGON IS SAFE," read the headline of the Duluth News Tribune. The U.S.S.
Oregon, a state-of-the-art battleship completed just a few years earlier, had successfully reached
the Caribbean after a treacherous 13,000-mile journey that took it from San Francisco, around
the tip of South America and through Spanish controlled waters on the eve of the Spanish
American War.11 Newspapers around the country watched the Oregon's progress with rapt
attention. From Minnesota to Georgia, Pennsylvania to Idaho, and everywhere in between
newspapers chronicled the trip of America's most expensive vessel. 12 The Oregon completed the
trip in an amazing sixty-seven days, a testament to what the newest generation of coal-fueled
warships could accomplish. In the nationalistic fervor sweeping through the nation, the Oregon,
and the sailors aboard it, were never far from conversation. They were a physical manifestation
of the emergence of America as a global power. While readers were primarily concerned with the
role the Oregon was to play in the war with Spain, the Oregon's journey also emphasized the
need for a quicker passage between the Pacific and Atlantic. In the period leading up to
American acquisition of the Canal Zone, coal dictated the naval, imperial, and economic
concerns that ideologically legitimized the creation of an interoceanic canal.
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Coal’s capacity to eradicate space and time proved essential to concerns over naval,
colonial, and economic efficiency. In Nature's Metropolis, William Cronon argues that railroads
“fundamentally altered people's expectations of how long it took to travel between two distant
points on the continent,” and consequently, “time accelerated and became more valuable the
greater the distance one could travel.” 13 Cronon's comments can apply to any coal-fueled
transportation technology. Coal's substantial yields provided the power to move people, ideas,
and goods through space more rapidly than ever before. Coal was also geographically liberated;
useable anywhere humans could carry it, making it a perfect source of energy for transportation.
These two characteristics allowed coal to radically shrink the world by expediting transit and
opening new possibilities for globalization. This smaller world emphasized the importance of a
canal to further expedite transportation times.
The journey of the Oregon exemplified the increasing importance placed on naval power
and the rapid deployment of America’s military might. While naval prowess had long been tied
to military success, a strong naval fleet became the chief characteristic of an international power
in the late 19th century. Coal provided new possibilities for the movement and range of naval
vessels and advocates such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and future President Theodore Roosevelt
clamored at the opportunity to increase naval spending and bolster the United States’ fleet.14 This
naval fervor gave rise to new ships like the Oregon, which heralded the rise of the United States
as a global power. However, the U.S. was not alone in its desires. Russia, Japan, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and even China sought to emulate America's naval expansion by creating stateof-the-art ships of their own. Russia went as far as to invite Irving Scott, the designer of the
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Oregon, to Russia to contract for battleships of their own. 15 This nascent naval arms race caused
military strategists and politicians alike to clamor for the tactical advantages provided by an
interoceanic canal.
The expansion of naval power also promoted canal construction by emphasizing the
geographic shortcomings of coal. While coal was a spatially liberated source of energy and could
be carried to any location, it did possess its own set of challenges. Increasingly large naval
vessels required increasingly large stores of coal to fuel their voyages, more than could be
carried on board. To cope with these natural limitations, governments provided coaling stations
at which ships could refuel. The Oregon stopped at coaling stations in Peru, Chile, Brazil, and
Barbados before reaching the Florida Keys.16 The construction of a canal limited the need for
coaling by shortening travel distances and minimizing the amount of energy consumed over the
course of a voyage. The successful completion of the Canal negated these concerns by shortening
trips and utilizing the United States’ coaling stations exclusively.17
Questions of naval efficiency and coaling stations were directly tied to the expanding role
of the United States as an imperial power.18 Imperialism carried both militaristic and ethical
demands that the Canal and coal could help America meet. Joseph Bishop, a journalist who later
became Secretary of the ICC, described America's imperial obligations, writing, “We have
shown we are exceptionally fit for the work of colonization... and we have honored ourselves in

15
“Likes the Oregon: Russian Government Will Probably Contract for Vessels Like Our Splendid Battleship,” Helena
Independent, June 9, 1898, pg. 1.
16
“Captain Clark Could Make a Good Guess: Commander of the Battleship Oregon Let Slip a Significant Word,”
Idaho Statesman, May 27, 1898, pg. 1.
17
“59th Congress Senate Document No. 313. Reports of the Various Coals 1896 to 1898. Expenses and Equipment
Abroad 1902-1903 and Recent Chemical Analyses of Coal at Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C.” (Government Printing
Office, 1906), pg. 115.
18
For a comprehensive discussion of this topic see, Peter Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in
Industrial America, (Baltimore, US: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015.)

75

the eyes of the world for the way in which we have performed it.” The success of America's
imperial mission in Cuba and the Philippines wasn't solely the result of alleged moral
righteousness; military force was intimately tied to these ventures. It was no accident that in his
book, Issues of a New Epoch, Bishop combined coal shortages, the Panama Canal, and American
imperialism. Militaristically, the Philippines presented a unique challenge. Sitting thousands of
miles west of America's west coast, it was difficult for naval forces concentrated in the Atlantic
to reach. In June of 1901, over 70,000 troops occupied the Philippines, and traversing from the
Philippines to America's other colonial outpost in Cuba was impractical. Without the completion
of a canal, these two holdings were isolated from one another, complicating imperial cohesion.19
The militaristic concerns of empire were combined with a focus on uplifting native
populations. Indeed, one of the greatest objectives of the American colonial mission was
allegedly to prepare Cuba and the Philippines for self-governance.20 Coal was essential to this
mission. William MacCorkle, ex-governor of the state of West Virginia, expressed the value of
coal as a social equalizer in the aftermath of the Canal’s construction, arguing that countries,
“yellow, brown, and white- filled with the desires of new commerce, fired with new hope by the
touch of the West, thrilled with new ideas of government and religion are all mingled in one
tremendous combat for the mightiest markets vouchsafed to man since the stars sung together.”21
MacCorkle suggested that through the utilization of coal transportation, these nations could reach
these markets as civilized, democratic, and friendly entities. The Canal could expedite this
process by more rapidly conveying these goods and ideas around the world, benefiting both
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America and the peoples it was destined to uplift.
The most alluring argument for the construction of the Canal was the potential economic
benefit Americans could reap. An American canal teeming with coal-fueled ships could provide
tremendous financial benefit to the United States. Americans had already toyed with the idea of
creating coaling stations in Panama in the 1880s.22 While the idea didn’t come to fruition at the
time, a canal made a coaling station a far more intriguing opportunity. If international commerce
was funneled through a single point, whoever controlled energy distribution in that location
would have access to a remarkable number of potential customers. A canal with suitable coaling
stations could give Americans a virtual monopoly on the oceanic energy trade, guaranteeing
money would flow north into America as ships flowed through the Canal.
Coal provided opportunities for the expansion of American naval, imperial, and economic
interests that were too enticing to be overlooked. As the United States expanded its empire and
global influence, the Canal moved from a pipe dream into a reality. The only lingering question
by the dawn of the 20th century was where and when this structure would be built. Canal
proponents had ample fodder to graze on. Pitches for interoceanic canals sprung up every few
years during the second half of the 1800s. Boosters suggested Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, and
Colombia amongst other Central and South American nations as potential sites. In the 1880s, the
French went so far as to begin construction of a sea-level canal in Panama under the guidance of
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the national hero who had been the brains behind the Suez Canal. All
these ventures ended in failure. And yet the enthusiasm they garnered proved invaluable to canal
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lobbyists.23
By the end of the 19th century, the chorus of voices calling for a new canal had reached a
crescendo. The American government, under the leadership of President McKinley, responded
with the creation of the Isthmian Canal Commission (ICC) in 1899. The Commission, often
known as the "Second Walker Commission" thanks to its chair, Admiral John G. Walker,
intended to once and for all determine the most feasible route for the creation of a canal. The ICC
studied the canal question for two years and initially suggested Nicaragua was the best location
for a canal thanks in large part to the $109 million price tag La Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de
Panama (New Panama Canal Company), the French firm that had failed to build a canal in
Panama, had placed on its assets. After a protracted negotiation, the New Panama Canal
Company agreed to slash its price to $40 million. At the behest of President Roosevelt, the I.C.C
reconvened, this time recommending that Panama be the site of the Canal. After some political
wrangling, Roosevelt was able to get Congress to support the idea as well. The U.S. next pursued
negotiations with Colombia to obtain the concession necessary to construct the Canal. Despite
the best efforts of diplomats, the Colombian government rejected the Treaty. Not one to be
deterred by such a trifling matter as sovereignty, Roosevelt decided to support the fledgling
Panamanian independence movement, determining that fomenting a rebellion was a far easier
course of action than diplomatic negotiation. After a quick coup and some strong-arming of the
newly formed Panamanian government, the US obtained its concession and was set to begin
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work on the Canal.24
Encountering the Limits of Power
On May 4, 1904, the whistles blew at Bas Matachin for the first time, and "the old French
workers and other nationalities such as Jamaican and a few native, danced and jumped about 2
feet high when they understood that the American government were in charge of the new
undertaking."25 The euphoria in the Canal Zone was matched by that back in America. Thanks to
the seemingly unlimited potential of coal, America was picking up where the French left off. Yet
the question remained: could Americans overcome the entropy of the Panamanian environment
and succeed where the French had failed?
Initially, the question of American success was very much in doubt. As Americans arrived
in Panama in the spring and summer of 1904, they had no idea what type of canal they wanted to
construct, let alone how they would go about constructing it. Consequently, the first year of canal
construction was beset by nearly continual delays, both bureaucratic and energetic. John Wallace,
the first Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal Company, knew that he had to bring human and
mechanical energy to bear on the Panamanian environment if it were going to yield a feasible
waterway, and yet the chasm between intent and reality was wider than the Canal itself.
Wallace’s tenure was marred by marked difficulties in deploying energy thanks to the lack of a
tangible infrastructure to support coal’s utilization.
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The ICC was tasked not only with determining the site for the Canal but also bringing the
vision of Isthmian transit to fruition. Members of the ICC made their first visit to Panama on
April 8th, 1904.26 The scene that greeted the Commission when they landed in Cristobal was not
encouraging. Colon and Panama, the two major terminal cities on the Isthmus lacked water and
sewage systems. The harbor facilities at Cristobal, the major port on the Atlantic side of the
Isthmus, were incapable of receiving the tremendous amount of equipment necessary for the
excavation. The force still at work under the French Company consisted of a mere 700 laborers
and a few obsolete steam shovels. The ICC conceded that "Neither the equipment nor the
organization of the force could be considered adequate, or in any way fitted for the prompt
removal of the great mass of material in the Cut."27 Housing facilities were dilapidated.28
Machine shops and machinery “had practically remained idle for over sixteen years, and was
almost entirely concealed by the jungle.”29 Tropical diseases remained troublesome both to the
effective utilization of human energy and as a deterrent for labor recruitment.30 If Americans
were going to carve a canal out of the rugged Panamanian landscape, they had a lot of work to
do.
These initial obstacles to the creation of a canal reflected a broader lack of knowledge
about the conditions of work in Panama and realities of the Panamanian environment. The first
Americans deployed to the Isthmus were mostly surveyors and engineers meant to provide a
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better understanding of how and where the Canal would be constructed. In May of 1904, the first
engineering party left New York for Panama. Their primary objective was to determine whether
the best course of action was the creation of a sea-level or lock canal. A sea-level canal required
more substantial amounts of energy to excavate, but upon its completion would be far easier to
operate. A lock canal required less intensive excavation but presented several engineering
challenges including finding a suitable water supply, constructing large enough locks, and
providing the energy necessary to operate the locks. The design of the Canal was not the only
charge given the engineers. The ICC mandated that "At the same time the great question of water
supply of the canal, the control of the Chagres river, especially when in flood, and certain larger
details of alignment, section of the prism and plans of harbor at the two termini of the canal and
other questions of less magnitude, are to be conclusively settled."31
In some ways, these men had learned from their forebears working on the Panama
Railroad and the French Canal. The emphasis placed on containing the Chagres River was a
testament to this fact. The Chagres and its seasonal freshets had the potential to destroy any
major infrastructural network, and Wallace was acutely aware of this fact. Indeed, the Chagres
became such a priority that a special party of engineers was created by the ICC to determine the
best site to dam it.32 Preliminary studies suggested either Tiger Hill, Gatun or Bohio, on the
Atlantic side of the Transit Zone, or Gamboa closer to the Pacific terminus. Damming the
Chagres also had the potential to turn a liability into an asset. Wallace hoped that a hydroelectric
station at the dam could harness the kinetic energy of the rushing Chagres and convert it into
electricity. Wallace went so far as to suggest that damming the river was a panacea of sorts, as a
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dam might “solve the problem of the control of the Chagres River, the provision of water for any
low-level lock canal designed, and the supply of efficient electric energy for lighting purposes,
railroad operation, or the operation of machinery use in the construction of the canal; and
incidentally a water supply for the towns and villages situated along the line of the canal, and for
supply of the work."33 Wallace was ahead of his time. It took ten years, but the creation of a
hydroelectric station at the Gatun dam eventually provided the energy necessary to operate the
locks on both ends of the Canal. In these early years, however, a hydroelectric solution to the
ICC’s energy woes was far from realistic.
The objective of taming the Chagres was admirable and pointed to a growing realization
of the challenges presented by Panama’s hydrological conditions, but it also emphasized a failure
of imagination that plagued much of Wallace's tenure as Chief Engineer and continued to vex
those who came after him. While coal energy allowed humans to alter the environment in
exponentially greater ways than ever before, it also had the potential to destabilize Panama's
entropic environment in exponentially greater ways than ever before. Damming the Chagres
provided an answer to the issue of flooding and freshets, but removing and redistributing tens of
millions of cubic yards of material exacerbated Panama's frequent landslides, the first of which
occurred on September 23rd, 1904 in the Culebra Cut.34 Throughout the years of excavation, it
was not flooding but landslides and unstable soils that became the chief obstacles to the
successful completion of the Canal.
While engineers toiled and trudged through the mountains and valleys of Panama,
Wallace took Roosevelt’s mandate to “make the dirt fly” to heart. Wallace immediately sought to
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set his motley collection of men and machinery to work in the Culebra Cut. This task was
challenging. The bulk of the French machines remaining on the Canal had fallen into disrepair.
The 465 machinists in the Canal Zone worked tirelessly to bring them back into working order,
but even when these machines were fixed, their productivity was marginal at best.35 Wallace was
adamant that work be continued in the Cut. From the inception of the work, he believed that
"The time and cost of excavating that section of the canal embraced in the Culebra Division,
through the Continental Divide, will be the controlling feature in determining the time and cost
of completing the canal."36 Gumption could only take one so far on the Isthmus, however, and
the rocky terrain proved difficult for the French engines to penetrate. Between the start of
excavation on May 4th and December of 1904, only 243,472 cubic yards of material was
removed from the Cut.
Recognizing that the French machines could not provide enough power to make headway
in the Cut, Wallace contracted for fourteen American steam shovels in the fall of 1904, and by
December 31st three were already on the work.37 Despite this, energy consumption remained
relatively low during the first year of construction. The Culebra Division consumed only 5584
tons of coal over the course of the year, a figure considerably less than the 8818 tons of coal used
by the defunct French Company in 1900.38
While these new machines proved far more adept at cracking Culebra, the energy of
steam shovels did not exist in isolation. The increased capacity to remove earth was useless
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without an equally massive increase in the capacity to transport earth and a place to deposit it. To
bring the full power of the new American steam shovels to bear on the Panamanian environment,
it was necessary to exponentially increase the available stores of energy in the infrastructure that
supported the shovels. Wallace was aware of this fact. Towards the end of his tenure, he wrote,
"One thing I have clearly demonstrated, and that is that we have so far not even approximated
the average potential capacity of our steam shovels. The largest output and most economical
results can only be obtained with these shovels are at work to their full capacity continuously. Of
course, this simply depends upon the shovel being continuously and constantly supplied with
cars to load."39
This was no small task. A regular supply of cars required: enough cars to load, the power
to transport these cars, enough trackage to handle the cars, facilities to keep the cars in working
order and properly arranged dumping sites, amongst other concerns.40 Complicating matters
further was the fact that even if all these conditions were met the rail lines were continually
vexed by the fluid landscape of Panama. The Belgian locomotives that Americans inherited from
their French forebearers were extremely rigid and could be derailed by the slightest shifts of the
track. Panama’s spongy soils often settled and moved due to rains and excavation, leading to
inconsistencies in the track. Division Engineer H.F. Dose complained that “The result has been
that numerous derailments have taken place daily, causing serious interruptions to the work.”41
The Canal effectively faced an energy bottleneck throughout 1904. The lack of a modernized
transit network meant that constant derailments slowed the work, and slow progress assembling
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newly arrived machines caused the mechanical labor force on the Isthmus to grow slowly. The
answer to the ICC’s burgeoning energy problem lay in the same place it had for G.M. Totten half
a century before, in the demand for human labor to create an infrastructure necessary for coal
labor to thrive.
The human labor necessary to create the Canal was in short supply during the initial
phase of canal construction. When work began in July of 1904, the ICC had roughly 2,392 men
on its rolls. By the middle of February of 1905, that number had reached only 3,620.42 The slow
growth in human energy was problematic, hindering the deployment of mechanical energy
thanks to the lack of personnel to erect machines and lay track. The Engineering Committee of
the ICC suggested that successful completion of the Canal required roughly ten years work by
100 steam shovels and that it was imperative that this mechanical labor force be installed within
two years.43 A dejected Wallace complained that this required his men to receive, assemble, and
deploy a shovel every week. “They could be installed and put to work at the rate of one a week,”
lamented Wallace, “but owing to the difficulty in securing necessary labor of all classes, together
with the shortages of track tools and track material, one every two weeks will be about the best
we can do."44 Unless the labor shortage was dealt with, it was impossible for the Canal to be
constructed.
The challenge in obtaining human energy foreshadowed the entwining of energy and
racial biases in the hierarchization of the labor force. In general, Americans were reluctant to
make their way down to Panama, and, as a result, the ICC relied on West Indian labor to fill the
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bulk of its labor rolls. These West Indians faced marginalization from the moment the work
began. The first annual report of the Bureau of Materials and Supplies complained, "The greatest
difficulty has been experienced in securing a laboring force sufficient to meet the needs and
requirements of this Bureau, and it can be said that at no time has it been adequately supplied.
The Jamaican is shiftless and lazy and returns but a small measure of work for his wage."45 The
ICC was caught between a rock and a hard place. They could not recruit enough skilled
American laborers, and while they could obtain scores of West Indians, they believed these men
lazy, unskilled, and, most egregiously, a completely inefficient source of energy for the price.
This marked a longstanding tradition of valuing human labor based primarily on its relationship
to energy. Those workers who directly enabled coal energy were in high demand; those who only
tangentially aided in the unleashing of coal were not. Thanks to discrepancies in training
opportunities in and between the US and the Caribbean, these qualifications were perceived to
fall along racial lines, a distinction that was quite palatable to white American administrators.
The chief deterrent to the acquisition of skilled, American labor in Panama during the
first year of construction was the constant specter of tropical disease. These microscopic
murderers had defined the efficacy of human energy on the Isthmus for centuries and in the
process created a "reputation of the Isthmus of Panama for unhealthfulness."46 These diseases
significantly limited the effectiveness of human energy. The problem grew so pronounced that
the Commission was forced to adopt a policy that all employees of the Commission received free
healthcare and medicine.47 Additionally, they frustrated recruiters' attempts to bring Americans to
the Isthmus. W.E. Dauchy, a senior engineer with the ICC, suggested that "Yellow fever scares
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have done a great deal towards keeping such men away."48 The ICC looked to the eradication
campaigns launched in Cuba and Puerto Rico as models that may be applicable to Panama.49 The
rub was that enacting such an insecticidal campaign required a substantial sanitation force
stocked with considerable stores of human energy, a resource that was hesitant to come to the
Isthmus due to the presence of mosquitos to begin with. As the dry season of 1905 progressed
and the labor shortage continued to fester, Wallace's inability to overcome Panama's energy
bottleneck came under increasing scrutiny.
The ongoing energy crunch, culicidaec crisis, and mechanical issues pushed Wallace to
the brink, but the curse that damned the tenure of Chief Engineer Wallace was the bureaucratic
logjam that rendered progress on the Canal a logistical impossibility. Throughout the dry season
of 1905, Wallace’s letters to the ICC grew increasingly combative. The main point of contention
was the anemic pace at which material was imported to the Isthmus. In February, Wallace
warned the Commission that, "Delay in the filling of requisitions, or delay in providing the
necessary number and kind of men when needed, will result in the holding back of some
particular part of the work, which in turn will impede and delay the organization and progress of
the work in some other direction."50 The Commission did little to heed these concerns and
shortages in machine parts, timber, tools, oils, paints, coal, tracking, and personnel continued to
plague progress.51 By June of 1905, Wallace’s patience had run its course. Burdened by the
magnitude of the work and disenchanted by the bureaucratic hurdles he faced; Wallace resigned
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his post on June 26. The first phase of canal construction had come to an end. With little progress
to show after a year of work, the fate of the Canal hung in the balance.
Getting on the Right Track
As Wallace’s tenure in Panama came to an end, Americans had been at work in Panama
for over a year and had shockingly little to show for it. There were a few areas of optimism. Coal
consumption had exploded throughout the zone from 3,496 tons between May and December
1904 to 8,123 tons between January and June of 1905.52 Many French machines had also been
rehabilitated by the mechanical division, and surveys were providing considerable amounts of
information to the ICC. Yet these minor victories were completely overshadowed by the laundry
list of issues that remained unresolved. Labor recruitment sputtered along, and while the number
of laborers on the isthmus had grown to 8,706 men, nearly every department was still clamoring
for more.53 Tropical diseases wreaked havoc on human bodies, a problem worsened by the fact
that many of those who made their way to Panama with the promise of suitable quarters found
deteriorating shacks waiting for them.54
The hardships faced by human energy reflected and compounded the hurdles Panama’s
environment placed in front of the ICC’s mechanical labor force. A year of hard work saw the
rehabilitation of 58 French engines and 980 French dumping cars, and the assembly of ten new
American steam shovels, the bulk of which were at work in the Culebra Cut. And yet this
Frankenstein French force succeeded in removing only 741,644 cubic yards during a year of
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work.55 At this pace it would take nearly 300 years to excavate the Canal. And yet the work could
not expand without substantial preliminary work to modernize and restructure the infrastructural
network supporting these machines. Dauchy cut to the core of this issue, writing,
At Culebra, the work has reached a stage where no great expansion is possible
without a large amount of preliminary work being done. This preliminary work
consists of the construction of a large amount of railroad track, for which a
corresponding amount of grading has to be done. Also, the diversion of certain
streams preparatory to carrying on excavations on a large scale; the building of
roundhouses for the care of locomotives, the construction of storage yards, and
numerous connections between the existing tracks and tracks to be construction,
with the Panama Railroad; also the double-tracking of the latter and the
preparation of numerous dumping grounds and of tracks leading to them; also the
installation of modern drilling machinery. All of this work requires a large number
of preliminary laborers. Five thousand additional laborers could be used to
advantage at once and have been asked for for some weeks.56
While he didn’t explicitly state it, the implication of his comment was clear; the Panama
Railroad was the weak link. The lack of track and the inferior quality of the track that existed
rendered progress untenable. What the Panama Canal needed was someone who understood
railroads and had extensive experience in their construction and administration. Fittingly enough
that was exactly who they received.
John Stevens had made a name for himself working for the Great Northern Railroad
where he rose through the ranks from a locating engineer to the Chief Engineer of the railroad in
just over five years.57 His insight and engineering aptitude led him to be named the Chief
Engineer of the ICC on July 1st, 1905, a few days after Wallace’s resignation, and by the end of
the month he had departed for the Isthmus.58
John Stevens’ greatest contribution to the excavation of the Panama Canal was likely his
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decision to halt the excavation of the Panama Canal. Upon arriving in Panama, Stevens quickly
obtained the lay of the land, and within a few months he expressed his plan for how the work
should proceed. Stevens discontinued the practice of rehabilitating and utilizing French
machines, a task which he saw as pointless. Stevens criticized the work done in the Culebra Cut,
dubbing it, “largely in the nature of experiments” which were useless, “owing to several causes,
among these causes being poor equipment, poor tracks, unsuitable dumping grounds, and
piecemeal work generally."59 Stevens recognized what Wallace had struggled to come to terms
with. It was not enough to throw continually increasing amounts of energy at the Canal and
expect it to be built. Organization of energy was just as important as its volume. To this end,
Stevens began contracting for a tremendous amount of new American plant including 300 steel
flat cars, 120 locomotives, 800 wooden flat cars, 6 earth spreaders, 6 heavy unloaders, and 31
steam shovels. The acquisition of these new machines reflected the general restructuring of the
line. What had previously been a quagmire of energy incompetence was evolving into a model of
efficiency.
The desire for modern and efficient material transcended the machines that removed and
distributed earth and rock. Stevens’ chief contribution to the work was the overhauling of the
Panama Railroad. The importance of the railroad to canal construction wasn't a novel realization.
Wallace clearly expressed the importance of the railroad in conveying spoil. The ICC had gone to
extreme lengths to ensure that they obtained the railroad when they purchased the resources of
the French company, writing, " It was admitted on all sides that the railroad was an essential
instrument to be used in the construction of the Canal. If there had been no railroad in existence,
one would have had to be built over which to distribute material for the construction of the
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Canal."60 Despite this knowledge, the railroad's condition was abysmal by 1905. When Stevens
shared his professional diagnoses of the railroad, he disdained it as "lines which, by the utmost
stretch of the imagination, could not be termed railroad tracks."61 He felt the inadequacies of the
railroad were so pronounced that on August 15th, within two weeks of arriving on the Isthmus, he
halted all excavation work in the Canal Zone and focused all of the energy at his disposal on the
task of rebuilding the railroad, thus creating an infrastructure for the deployment and
augmentation of mechanical energy.62 This involved laying new stronger track that resisted
shifting Isthmian soils, strengthening bridges, adding more signals and building more support
facilities including a coaling plant at Cristobal.63 While the work took time, the shift in priorities
inaugurated a considerably more optimistic and productive era of canal construction.
To construct the new Panama railroad, Stevens had to continue to develop the human
labor stores on the Isthmus. The number of laborers on the Isthmus ballooned from 8,706 on July
1, 1905, when Stevens was named Chief Engineer, to 12,977 three months later on September
30th.64 As the year progressed, this number continued to grow and by June of 1906, there were
16,145 men employed by the ICC65 The substantial growth in energy reflected the priority placed
on obtaining human labor. More importantly, the expansion of the human energy stores in
Panama allowed Stevens to more aggressively implement coal energy as well.
The little black rock accompanied the human bodies flowing into Panama, creating a
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broad network of interconnected energy sources capable of bridging the oceans. Between July of
1905 and June of 1906, the Culebra Division, the chief coal consumer along the line, used 25,033
tons of coal by itself. Of this, more than 13,532 tons of coal were used in transportation.66 As the
rail lines in the Culebra Cut expanded, more locomotives were put to work, which in turn could
haul more cars, thus allowing more shovels to work more efficiently. This positive feedback loop
of energy consumption was responsible for the progress made during the fiscal year. The work
accomplished during the first year of Stevens’ tenure was preparatory in nature, but it yielded an
infrastructure capable of supporting the demands of construction. The Mechanical Division had
been hard at work erecting machinery and by June 30th 1906 the ICC’s mechanical labor force
included: one 45-ton shovel, fifteen 70-ton shovels, 23 95-ton shovels, 100 French locomotives,
39 American locomotives, 541 French dumping cars, 324 American dumping cars, 1061
American flat cars, twelve Lidgerwood unloaders, thirteen bank spreaders, and 22 unloading
plows.67 Thanks to the expansion and modernization of the Panama Railroad these machines
could now commence canal construction.
Distinguishing Between Silver and Gold
And yet machine labor also needed men to operate it, particularly white American men on
the gold rolls who had both the experience and training to direct coal-fueled machines. As
employment increased, the ICC increasingly focused on trying to obtain and appease these
workers. The ICC was concerned that “Most of the men who come down here from the States are
isolated from their homes and families. There is practically nothing in the way of amusements or
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anything to occupy the time of the men when they are not at work.”68 These gold laborers
presented the ICC with a unique challenge. Their skill and technical training qualified them for
the most important positions on the Isthmus, ranging from clerks and stenographers to steam
shovel engineers and machine shop foremen, but they were also among the toughest laborers to
maintain as they came from good paying jobs and stable conditions in the United States. The
ICC and Stevens were aware of this fact and attempted to incentivize living and working on the
Isthmus. Stevens authorized a raise for his mechanics in December of 1905 and created a variety
of venues for their entertainment, including restaurants and commissaries peddling high-end
meals and luxury goods, as well as club houses and community centers that provided
amusements for off duty laborers.69 In those areas the ICC could most easily control, the lived
environments of canal employees, they created a segregated landscape which privileged the gold
laborers who controlled and directed coal energy.
The privileging of gold laborers was tied to the crucial role they played in enabling
machines. In 1907, as excavation began in earnest, D.W. Bolich, a senior Division Engineer,
estimated the amount of manual labor required to equal the Canal's mechanized labor force.
Bolich believed that it would take 124 laborers to match the pace set by a single steam shovel.
Since there were roughly 44 shovels regularly at work in the Canal Zone that year, Bolich
suggested that 5,456 laborers were needed to match this output, not mentioning foremen to
oversee their work. This figure contrasted starkly with the 298 men who actually operated the
steam shovels. A similar trend emerged when looking at the disposal of dirt. Bolich found that
seven mechanized unloaders and plows could handle the duties of unloading train cars for a day.
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This mechanized labor force required just under 70 men to operate. Bolich suggested that this
work would require 2,660 laborers as well as foremen to be done manually.70 Mechanized labor
so far transcended human capabilities that individual laborers, particularly those who didn't
operate machinery, became increasingly irrelevant.
Due to this shift, West Indian laborers, who formed the bulk of the Canal Zone labor
force, were not privy to the same benefits and perks as their American counterparts. Indeed, the
men who made up the common labor pool of the ICC were often viewed with scorn and distaste
by those that hired them. Dauchy, who administering the Culebra Division, described his
common laborers as “an un-ambitious, inefficient and worthless class,” and wrote that they may
have worked more effectively if Dauchy had foremen who “had a knowledge of this negro labor"
at his disposal.71 Dauchy’s opinion was shared by nearly all American ICC administrators.
Stevens himself said of West Indians in comparison to common laborers in the United States, “I
doubt their efficiency can be rated at more than 33 percent."72 The stigma attached to West
Indian laborers in conjunction with the burgeoning importance of mechanical labor rendered
them increasingly interchangeable.
The developing energy hierarchy in Panama was most pronounced in the lived
environments both sets of workers faced. By 1906 and 1907, work on the Isthmus had
progressed to the point that most men were no longer living in the ramshackle quarters that had
greeted the first labor crews. The scale of improvement was more pronounced in the gold
laborers’ quarters, where both the variety and quality of housing afforded these important energy
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enablers far outstripped anything offered to the expendable human energy of silver laborers.
While gold laborers seldom accounted for more than ten percent of the Canal Zone’s total labor
force, the Division of Building Maintenance consistently poured more resources into the
construction of gold quarters. In 1907, the Division spent only $482,502.88 on silver quarters in
comparison to $1,432,415.51 for gold quarters.73 This level of investment directly reflected the
priority placed on gold laborers and indicated the solidification of their superiority in the energy
hierarchy of the Canal.
Silver laborers frequented labor camps which were often only refurbished boxcars filled
with bunks. Joseph Gard, who journeyed from Barbados to the Canal Zone in 1906, was
promised a bunk by his recruiter, but when he arrived, "it was not so. There was some large
wooden bunks, three (workers) leaves I took one the night we had no light and for a whole week
I had all restless night."74 Even if one found a bunk he could find himself crammed into a single
car with 83 other men. Unsurprisingly, the converted cars lacked latrines and cleansing stations,
so workers had to walk to other buildings, often through the rain, to reach what laborer Aaron
Clarke jokingly dubbed, “our office for sanitary convenience.”75
The ICC also found it easier to keep accurate counts of employee numbers when they
resided in these camps. To enforce their oversight, the ICC provided meal tickets for unmarried
silver employees living in the labor camps. At the end of each day, a foreman provided tickets to
those men working below him.76 Laborers brought these tickets to dinner where they received
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breakfast and lodging tickets for the following day. Dinners generally consisting of rice, red
beans, and meat. Vegetables, in short supply throughout the Canal Zone during the early years of
construction, were a rarity.77 The ICC adopted policies which essentially forced laborers to eat in
sanctioned mess halls. If laborers wanted to live in the labor camps, they needed to receive a
lodging check, given to them at the mess hall. The ICC justified this practice by claiming that
they wanted to prevent unemployed workers from taking advantage of their facilities. However,
sick workers who were unable to work and obtain meal tickets were often removed from camps
as a result.78 In many cases, the punishment for being found in a labor camp without a lodging
check was a thirty-day stay in a jail cell.
The meal ticket system forced segregation by mandating West Indian workers who lacked
the time to prepare meals live in labor camps. In addition, it sought to provide administrators
with complete control over West Indian bodies and the energy they possessed. The smallest
infractions or misuse of one's own energy by missing work, even for legitimate reasons, was
grounds for removal. Perhaps the greatest indictment of the living conditions accorded silver
employees was the fact that very few silver employees decided to utilize them, preferring instead
the freedom that came with living in Panama City or other communities outside the ICC’s
jurisdiction. A frustrated John Stevens was forced to concede that, despite the best attempts of
the ICC to control human bodies, West Indian laborers would often work long enough to bank up
some money and then disappear into the bush for weeks at a time until they needed to restock
their coffers. The result was that while there were well over 20,000 West Indians on the Canal by
June of 1906 only about 10,000 actually worked each day.79
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The ICC consistently provided better quarters for their gold employees, valuing their
labor and contentment above all else. The comforts accorded individual gold laborers depended
on their position. Low-level gold employees often found themselves sharing rooms in houses of
over twenty employees. Despite the cramped conditions, they had access to beds with mattresses,
personal storage and basic comforts including furniture.80 Men who held more prestigious
positions generally resided in better quarters. An anonymous steam shovel operator spoke
enthusiastically about his living arrangements, claiming, “We have nicely furnished rooms with
baths, electric light, and toilet rooms, and the board is exceptionally good. In fact, everything is
done to make it as pleasant as possible for the man, and I have not seen a man that was not
satisfied; as for myself. I like it very much.”81
The greatest privilege accorded to gold workers was their access to family quarters. By
1910, out of 4,646 gold employees, 1,737 resided in family quarters. Comparably, of the 25,044
silver employees on the ICC's rolls, only 1,341 lived in family quarters.82 The quarters were the
most spacious that the ICC offered. A description of family quarters under construction in
Balboa in February of 1914 claimed that they included a living room, kitchen, two bedrooms,
and a bathroom along with decks and verandas for socializing. These spaces provided a greater
amount of comfort to gold employees and the advantage of having family nearby allowed for the
completion of domestic tasks and familial structures that silver laborers could not easily access.83
The differences between silver and gold laborers were perhaps most stark when it came to
mitigating the impacts of mosquito-borne diseases, particularly malaria. Yellow Fever was also
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problematic in the Canal Zone, particularly during 1904 and 1905, but by 1906, an aggressive
sanitary campaign effectively eradicated the disease by wiping out Aedes aegypti- the mosquito
species serving as a vector for the transmission of yellow fever- preventing it from being the
scourge it had been during the construction of the railroad and the French attempt to build the
Canal.84 Malaria was far more problematic. Unlike Aedes aegypti, which tended to thrive in
stagnant water left by humans, Anopheles mosquitos- several of which could serve as vectors for
malaria- proved far more difficult to control. Due to the high heat and heavy rainfall in Panama
they could breed year-round.85 As a result, malaria ran rampant throughout the Canal Zone and it
was silver men who most frequently fell victim to the disease.86
Malaria permeated every component of life in the Canal Zone. And as Stevens attempted
to bring more men into the Isthmus, the disease spread. In 1906 alone, 21,736 workers were
admitted to hospitals for treatment of malaria out of a workforce of 26,000.87 William Gorgas
effectively combated the disease through the removal of stagnant water, fumigation, and the
erection of mosquito netting and by 1912 only 5,580 were treated for the disease.88 Still, malaria
remained the most common affliction in the Canal Zone. It was not uncommon for a single
individual to be treated for malaria multiple times in the span of a few weeks. Allen Belgrave, a
Barbadian general laborer, described his experiences with malaria while working in the Canal
Zone in 1906, writing, "Malaria fever began to worry me, I went to the rest camp, got quinine
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treatment for two days, I return to work the fourth day, could only work two hours, six to eight,
fever and my bowels took me in such a way that I had to be taken back to the rest camp.”
Belgrave was laid low by malaria two more times over the next few months before being offered
a job in the relative safety of a hospital. 89 His experience was far from unique.
While malaria impacted all laborers in the Canal Zone, the burden of death lay heaviest
upon the silver community, particularly before Gorgas' sanitation department made headway
against the disease. Much of the inequity stemmed from the geography of the Canal Zone.
Elevation varied wildly along the path of the Canal as rolling hills were interspersed with
lowland swamps that became breeding grounds for mosquitoes.90 Frequently, silver labor camps
lay close to these sources of stagnant water, providing a buffet of blood for disease carrying
mosquitoes. The result was that in 1906 black laborers died from malaria at a rate of almost eight
per thousand while white laborers died at a rate of only two per thousand. These figures declined
over time, largely equalizing by 1908, yet by that point in time hundreds of black laborers had
died of malaria and tens of thousands more experienced the hardships of the disease.91
The focus on providing lodging and eradicating tropical diseases in gold labor camps
reflected the ICC's acknowledgment of the importance of the energy provided by gold laborers.
These men, thanks to their training and experience in tasks ranging from bookkeeping to
operating the controls of steam shovels, provided a specialized energy that was in short supply in
the Transit Zone. This reality, combined with preexisting beliefs about the inferiority of West
Indian labor, led the ICC to create an environment which consistently provided better diet, living
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conditions, and medical care to gold employees. As Stevens restructured the infrastructure and
mechanized labor force of the Canal Zone, he also reinforced this fledgling energy hierarchy by
creating environments and conditions which reinforced the superiority of white American
laborers on the gold roll. However, these benefits extended primarily to the environment that the
ICC could most easily control, the living quarters of employees. As workers made their way into
the ditch itself, the distinctions between silver and gold remained ideologically present, but the
unpredictable energy at work in the Cut subjected men to many of the same dangers, and
challenges.
Unpredictable Equality
Gold and silver laborers were on their most equal footing when they stood on the sloped
banks of the Canal itself. While the ICC could exercise considerable control over the lived
environments of gold and silver men, the injection of tremendous amounts of energy into the
Cut’s already entropic environment was a recipe for chaos. Men and machines toiled side-byside, attempting to excavate and move tons upon tons of rock. Aiding them in this venture was
the energy of chemical explosives. While dynamite could be directed and unleashed, the sheer
violence and speed with which its reaction took place meant that it could never be completely
controlled. Compounding these issues were the unstable tendencies of the Panamanian
environment itself. As excavation commenced and banks became steeper, slides became
increasingly problematic. Gold and silver men both encountered these realities in the Canal as
they physically occupied the same space. The unpredictable energy at work in the canal bed
presented perhaps the greatest challenge to the developing silver and gold system, impacting the
lives of all laborers with equal tenacity.
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By January of 1907, Stevens was ready to put his newly renovated railroad to the test by
reinitiating excavation of the Canal. Between July 1906 to June 1907 excavation removed
5,570,432 cubic yards of material, 4,047,071 cubic yards of which was removed between
January and June 1907.92 This increased productivity was primarily due to a substantial increase
in the amount of mechanical labor and energy directed towards the work. In June of 1906, the
Department of Excavation and Dredging averaged just under ten shovels at work per day. By
June of 1907, that figure was up to 29.03 shovels at work per day.93 Dredging also increased
during the year. The Atlantic terminal only had one French ladder dredge in June of 1906. In
September, a 16-inch suction dredge joined the work and in March these two machines were
joined by a 5-yard dipper dredge. Recognizing the importance of dredges to the work, the ICC
made a point of contracting for two oceanic seagoing dredges, the Ancon, and the Culebra, with
the Maryland Steel Company at the end of the year.94 While dredges were never as numerous as
steam shovels, they were far more efficient. The three dredges at work on the Atlantic had
removed 1,112,321 cubic yards of material by the end of the year.95
Enabling this increased productivity was a substantial investment in coal energy. During
this period the ICC consumed 116,586 tons of coal. This figure was in addition to the 86,865
tons of coal consumed by the Panama Railroad and various steamship companies supplying
materials to the isthmus. The 203,451 tons of coal imported to the Isthmus between July of 1906
and June of 1907 more than doubled the previous maximum of 99,438 tons brought to the
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Isthmus the previous year.96 This energy did not come cheap. The Culebra Division paid an
average of $6.48 per ton for the 79,500 tons of coal its consumed over the course of the year.
Costs more than doubled the average of $3.00 to $3.25 per ton for domestic coal consumption in
the United States.97 Despite this, the Culebra division was lucky in comparison to some of its
counterparts. The La Boca Dredging Division, working at the Pacific terminus of the Canal, was
forced to pay an average of $7.50 per ton.98 The fact that the ICC was willing to pay such
exorbitant prices for coal indicated the importance of the little black rock.
Despite its primacy, there were some tasks that coal simply was not cut out for.
Shattering the rocks that littered the Canal Zone was one such task. To break apart rock and soil,
particularly in the Culebra Cut, it was necessary to rely on a far more violent combustive
reaction. Dynamite was the primary explosive of choice. More powerful than black powder,
dynamite’s chief benefit to the builders of the Canal was the inherent instability of
nitroglycerine. An incredibly reactive compound, nitroglycerine released enough energy to
shatter rock formations. This power was essential to excavation in the rockier areas of the Cut.
Between July 1906 and June 1907, a total of 1,998,655 pounds of dynamite and 408,385 total
pounds of black powder were used to loosen 3,291,856 cubic yards of rock.99
The tremendous amount of variance in Panama’s landscapes demanded this broad array
of different energies. Steam shovels and human muscle removed loose materials from the canal
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prism and loaded it on to locomotives that carried it to dumping sites where it was deposited. For
rocky areas like the Culebra Cut, where steam shovels were unable to work effectively, chemical
explosives provided a rapid, violent reaction capable of breaking up rock so steam shovels could
remove it. In swampy and oceanic environments, dredges used coal energy to remove soft sand
and muck from the approaches of the Canal and deepen harbors for incoming vessels. None of
these actions were possible prior to Stevens’ tenure on the Canal. The restructuring of the Canal
Zone’s infrastructure provided enough support to mechanical energy to allow it to thrive. And
yet infusing the Panama environment with an unprecedented amount of energy injected chaos
into the workscape. Laborers now needed to contend with both natural and unnatural dangers.
One of the most dangerous components of the literal powder keg at the bottom of the
Canal was the unpredictability of explosives. In the early years of canal construction, blasting
crews relied on blasting batteries and fuses to detonate their charges. The high humidity and
moisture content of the Canal Zone wreaked havoc with firing mechanisms, often preventing the
ordinance from exploding.100 Unexploded sticks of dynamite needed to be removed before
excavation could continue, but due to the shifting of the ground during explosions it was difficult
to account for every device. Laborers and shovelmen needed to navigate a literal minefield, lest
they inadvertently set off a catastrophic explosion.
James Lewis of Antigua was working in Pedro Miguel, one of the lock sites on the
Pacific end of the Canal, in 1906, helping steam shovels load soil onto dump cars. Powder gangs
set off dynamite, loosening the soil so that the steam shovels and Lewis’ crew could load the
cars. On one occasion, after loading a car, Lewis and his crew moved down the line to continue

100

Gailliard, D.D. “Annual Report of the Central Division FY 1909,” July 27, 1909. Retrieved from USNA, RG 185,
Collection PL 153 31, Box 502: Folder: Annual Report of the Central Division FY 1909-1913, pg. 70.

103

their work. Fifteen minutes later a deafening explosion rent the air; the entire powder gang they
had been working with was gone. Lewis remarked, "On the track lines you could see parts of a
man's body. It's an awful sight to see." Lewis was spared physical injury over the course of his
canal career, but many others weren't so lucky. A single explosion on December 12, 1908, at Bos
Obispo took the lives of over twenty men. Canal Zone employees could only mourn from behind
the controls of a steam shovel, or while tying a fuse themselves. Death simply became another
part of the Canal Zone environment.101 Dynamite was crucial to the excavation of the Canal, but
it also suggested the limits of human control over energy.
In addition to the immediate dangers presented by explosions, the injection of energy into
the Isthmus also destabilized the shifting landscape of Panama. One of the ironies of canal
construction was that to impose a static order on the Canal Zone, humans first had to loosen,
shift, and redistribute the land. In doing so they unleashed the entropy bound in Panama’s
landscape by catalyzing slides and slope failures that toppled machines, derailed equipment, and
injured the unwary. As time went on slides became increasingly common along the Isthmus. The
Cucaracha Slide, which began in 1904, remained problematic in 1907, and continued to vex
excavation until the Canal was finished in 1914 when the Culebra Cut was flooded and dredges
were brought in to deal with it once and for all.102 Major landslides didn’t appear until late 1908
and 1909, but slides occurred with increasing regularity as the work progressed and more energy
was brought to bear on the Panamanian landscape.103 These slides may have lacked the violence
of unexpected explosions, but they still threatened both silver and gold men alike.
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Landscape alteration made unnatural threats such as train derailments, flying rocks,
premature or delayed explosions, overturned machines, and drowning normal occurrences in the
canal bed environment. The spontaneity of workplace accidents prevented administrators from
controlling these events and, consequently, they impacted gold and silver laborers with equal
ferocity. In 1907, for example, 55 white laborers and 87 black laborers were killed by "accidental
traumatisms" (workplace accidents).104 In 1908, 79 white laborers and 111 black laborers lost
their lives to “violence.”105 These tragedies emphasized that, in the chaotic environment created
by the energy pouring into the Isthmus, gold and silver men were at their most equal. Indeed,
gold men may have been at even greater risk due to their proximity to machines. Explosions
didn’t differentiate between skin color or rank. Ironically it was here, in the very area that Canal
Zone administrators sought to most dramatically alter the environment, that they also
encountered the most substantial limits to their control.
Administrators’ answers to these issues was simply to inject more energy into the
Isthmus. The aforementioned escalation in energy and progress between July 1906 and June
1907 indicated that Stevens' infrastructure and organization could be scaled to deal with any
challenges Panama could throw at the Commission. Entropic forces such as landslides and
explosions accompanied this increase in energy but were seen as necessary evils of restructuring
the Panamanian landscape, and the more energy that the ICC had at its disposal, the more
effectively it could deal with these inconveniences. Thanks in large part to the efficacy of
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Stevens techniques, the Panama Canal seemed feasible, and yet as it drew closer to reality, the
distinctions between gold and silver laborers grew increasingly stark.
Good as Gold
Few images reflected the growing chasm between silver and gold laborers as dramatically
as one taken during Theodore Roosevelt’s visit to the Canal in the fall of 1906. In November,
Roosevelt visited the Canal Zone to observe excavation first hand. In typical Rooseveltian
fashion, the trip oozed charisma. The President traveled by rail across the Canal Zone, stopping
to interact with countless workers, silver and gold alike, during his journey.106 Excitement
accompanied Roosevelt wherever he went, but few moments were as iconic as when Roosevelt
took the controls of a Bucyrus Steam Shovel in the Culebra Cut. A photograph of that moment
shows Roosevelt sitting easily atop the massive piece of machinery. A slew of other men watch
as he reclines behind the controls of the all-important machine, a king atop an anthracitic throne.
The image conveys Roosevelt's persona, and perfectly embodies the labor hierarchy of the Canal
Zone. Roosevelt, clad entirely in white, looks down from the Bucyrus. To his right, a group of
men, including several black laborers, wait, ready to assist the operator of the machine.
Roosevelt's coat, hat, and positioning convey a simple fact: control of a Bucyrus, and control
over coal energy more broadly, was reserved for men as white as the outfit worn by the President
on that November day. 107
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Roosevelt's visit marked the end of the preparatory phase of canal construction. Under
John Stevens, the energy infrastructure of the Canal Zone had been entirely restructured. The
revitalized Panama Railroad carried tons upon tons of material, allowing steam shovels to work
at peak efficiency. Human labor was also reorganized to meet the demands of the coal-fueled
labor force. Initially, the distinctions between American laborers and West Indian laborers were
reflected through their different experiences in the lived environments. As the labor force grew
throughout 1907, however, these distinctions become increasingly encoded in the formal hiring
and employment policies adopted by the ICC Over the course of 1907 and 1908, the ICC
enshrined their racially defined labor classes through explicit policies that clearly asserted that
recruitment and promotion within the gold roll was a benefit reserved for white Americans. In
hiring, wages, advancement, and position the "awful gulf" was excavated thanks in large part to
coal energy.
Ironically, the catalyst for the adoption of such formal pro-American policies was not
West Indians, but instead, the influx of Europeans who came to the Isthmus between June 1906
and June 1907. In June of 1906, there were only about 500 Europeans on the work; by the
following year that number had reached 4,317, most of whom were Spaniards or Italians.108
Europeans were seen as better laborers than West Indians, but still not as essential to
construction as mechanically savvy Americans. To deal with this tension, the ICC placed
Europeans on the silver roll but provided them with nearly double the wages, better living
conditions, and more benefits than West Indian laborers.109 The only complication was that the
ICC could no longer rely on complexion alone to distinguish between the tiers of its energy
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hierarchy. Formalizing the gold and silver system became essential to reinforce the distinctions
between Americans and the rest of the Canal Zone world. Policies adopted by the ICC during
1907 and 1908 ensured that while they made up a minority of the labor force, Americans and
their ability to fulfill essential functions in the coal energy regime of the Canal Zone were placed
well above their non-American counterparts.
While the ICC had implicitly relied on the employment of skilled laborers from the
United States since construction began in 1904, it formalized this process in 1907, decreeing,
"employments of unskilled laborers are not made in the United States. Neither are persons
employed who have followed no regular trade or profession or who have not specialized in one
particular kind of work."110 The policy reflected the fact that it was simply cheaper and easier to
obtain unskilled labor from the West Indies and Europe, and simultaneously ensured that
Americans would seldom be placed in the unskilled labor pool. Furthermore, the important role
that these individuals were to play in canal excavation demanded far more vetting than that
required for an expendable and replaceable common laborer. In the employment process "Agents
of the Commission receive applications for all outside positions, personally examining the
individual, and looking into his previous service record. This includes trainmen, steam shovel
operators, foremen, and mechanics."111 The ICC hoped that this intensive review ensured that
only the most talented and qualified men operated the controls of a steam engine. The
Commission went so far as to adopt a policy that should a position open in the Canal Zone which
could not be filled by internal promotion, Americans would be given priority over foreigners.
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The implication was clear. Americans possessed better qualifications and abilities to operate
machinery than their counterparts.112
It was not only in hiring that these distinctions were drawn. Promotion also favored
American laborers. The ICC's employment practices allowed “authorities on the Isthmus to fill
the position of foreman by the promotion of journeymen who have rendered faithful and
satisfactory service on the Isthmus and are otherwise qualified.”113 Because the ICC went out of
its way to hire white American journeymen, the individuals who moved up the ranks into
positions of greater importance were also invariably American. Indeed, when making promotions
the ICC stated its considerations as, “A. Efficiency. B. Conduct. C. Length of Service. D.
American Citizenship.” This is not to say that silver laborers, primarily of European descent,
were completely absent from supervisory roles, however as one ventured up the labor hierarchy
their presence became increasingly rare.114
Nothing so aptly captured the distinction between American and foreign laborers as the
practice of replacing foreign employees with American employees. In August of 1908, in
accordance with an order from the Secretary of War, the ICC began a process of retaining
American employees through the termination of foreign clerks. In a circular in the Panama
Record, William Goethals, Chairman of the ICC, wrote that foreign employees must be replaced
with Americans, and further, “The retention of aliens now employed in clerical positions paying
$1,500.00 per annum or more will be authorized only in exceptional cases where it is shown to
my satisfaction that the duties of the alien employee demand peculiar qualifications, which he
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alone possesses, and could not be satisfactorily discharged to any available American.” 115 The
wording adopted by Goethals made it all but impossible for foreign workers to remain in the
valued position of clerk, further reinforcing the boundaries in place in the Canal Zone.
Despite the rigidity of the ICC's policies, there remained rare situations in which a white
American and a black West Indian may have been employed in the same line of work. This was
particularly true in mid-level positions. In these situations, American laborers made more than
double the wage commanded by their West Indian counterparts. Thomas Gittens came to the
Canal Zone from Barbados in 1905. By 1907 he was employed as a rodman for the Panama
Railroad. While not technically employed by the ICC, Panama Railroad employees were subject
to similar treatment as their ICC counterparts. Gittens recollected, “I started to work with the
railroad and with the sivel (civil) engineers work as rodman for $30.00 a month, in those days a
rodman from the states was paid $83.33.”116 Gittens was still better off than many of his
counterparts. Amos Clarke noted that many Americans were salaried employees, making sixtyfive to seventy-five dollars monthly, whereas "West Indians were paid 10 cents per hour,
Italians, Greeks, and Spaniards 20 cents per hour."117 Ultimately Americans held positions of
dominance even when employed in the same positions as their West Indian or European
counterparts.
The true scope of this racialized labor force was seen in the descriptions of how the coalfueled machines operated. White men were expected to operate most machines in the Canal
Zone. 298 laborers served as pitmen and firemen for steam shovels in the Culebra Cut in 1907,
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clearing track and shoveling coal into the machines while a crew of "two white men" served in
the positions of engineer and cranesmen, the most skilled jobs on the shovel. This type of labor
arrangement was not unique to steam shovels. A track throwing machine, which helped settle the
railroads and move unnecessary soil, was "handled by three white men and six laborers."
Operating the plows and unloaders that removed soil from train cars took "28 white men" to
operate the machinery as well as "43 laborers and firemen."118 This experience was echoed by
West Indians working in the Canal Zone. John Prescod came to the Canal in 1906 from Barbados
and worked alongside a steam shovel. Prescod never sat behind the controls, instead, he served in
a support role, trudging through mud and water daily, noting, "one pair of boot last me one
day."119 George Morgan had a similar experience working for the Panama railroad where he
served as a fireman, stocking the train's coal reserves for hours on end. In each case silver men
didn't interact directly with technology, instead, they supported the trains and steam shovels
while white men operated the machines themselves.120
Wages also reflected the value of American laborers. The all-important cranesmen and
engineers mentioned by Bolich were acutely aware of their importance to the Canal Zone. While
Morgan, Prescod or any of the nameless silver laborers who toiled next to their machines could
be easily replaced, engineers possessed the ability to direct and maneuver mechanical energy and
thus could negotiate from a position of strength. Interestingly these laborers were among the
most difficult for administrators to keep happy. In December of 1906, the steam shovel operators
and cranesmen working in the Culebra Cut asked for raises. When the ICC suggested a five
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percent raise after the first year and a three percent raise every following year, the incensed
operators resigned en masse even though they were making $210 and $185 a month respectively,
figures between 40 and 70 percent higher than those same positions would pay in the United
States. Most of these malcontent mechanical manipulators returned to work after a brief hiatus
after receiving more modest raises. Their ability to petition for, and receive, higher wages
indicated the unique power they held on the Isthmus.121
Thanks to the policies adopted by the ICC during 1907 and 1908, the reorganization of
the Panama Canal's human energy regimes came to fruition. As Theodore Roosevelt sat atop the
Bucyrus, his white coat and hat starkly contrasting with the mud and dirt adorning the laborers
around him, he came to embody the superiority of Americans in the Canal Zone. A year after
Roosevelt left the Canal Zone, the gold and silver system was almost completely racially
defined. A coal-fueled mechanical labor force presented a reliable means of codifying these
implicitly racial distinctions while explicitly tying them to the experience and training of
American laborers. Gold laborers were valuable thanks to their ability to operate the heavy
machinery essential to the construction of the Canal. The coal-fueled machinery that was
constructing the Panama Canal thus created a racialized, exploitable, and expendable labor force
defined by de facto segregation between white American and Black West Indian laborers; it was
an energy hierarchy in which white Americans, like Roosevelt, sat on top.
Making the Dirt Fly
Despite the tremendous progress that characterized his tenure as Chief Engineer, Stevens
abruptly resigned from his post in February of 1907. While no concrete reason has ever been
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provided for his decision to leave the work, the most likely scenario was that he was simply
overburdened by the scope of the undertaking.122 Stevens’ decision was a blow to the progress of
the Canal, particularly on the Isthmus itself where many laborers saw the railroad man as a force
of nature. And yet Stevens' departure contrasted starkly with Wallace's departure two years
earlier. Wallace had left a floundering mass of energy lacking any sort of cohesion or
organization, an unnecessarily complex monstrosity, completely unfit for the task of creating the
Canal. Stevens, on the other hand, bequeathed his successor a well-oiled machine capable of
rapidly and effectively moving and deploying energy to just about any point on the Isthmus.
While the scale and scope of excavation grew exponentially between 1908 and 1914, the
foundation laid by Stevens allowed escalation to take place smoothly and efficiently.
The key to this transition lay in Stevens’ decision to discontinue digging and focus work
primarily on the modernization of the Panama railroad. While not digging seemed blasphemous
to many, Wallace included, it provided the resources and focus necessary to turn the antiquated
railroad into the circulatory system of the Canal Zone. By 1908 the Culebra Cut alone contained
over 151 miles of track.123 The exponential growth of the transportation network in the Canal
Zone allowed steam shovels to work at their full capacity, removing tons upon tons of material
from the Cut. Plows, unloaders, and spreaders used their coal energy to remove and deposit this
soil at dumping sites far away from the canal bed. Meanwhile dredges removed silt, sand, and
soil from the waterways of the Canal Zone. This interwoven network of coal-fueled prime
movers provided the labor necessary to excavate the Isthmus and bring the dream of interoceanic
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transit to fruition.
And yet the very success of coal energy also catalyzed changes within the human energy
at work on the Isthmus. ICC administrators conflated the need for technically savvy laborers
with their racial prejudices and biases to create a hierarchy of labor. American laborers, who had
training and experience utilizing coal-fueled machines, occupied positions of prestige in the
Canal Zone. Initially, this manifested itself in better living conditions, food, and wages. As time
went on this system became increasingly entrenched. In 1907 and 1908, as Stevens’ tenure came
to an end, the ICC began codifying the energy hierarchy in Panama, creating policies that
permitted the hiring of skilled laborers only in America, and purging non-Americans and African
Americans from the gold roll. These actions reflected the new reality in Panama. While Jim
Crow may never have explicitly made his way down to the Canal Zone, he cast a shadow over
the work.
The restructuring of both the mechanized and human labor pools in Panama was due in
large part to the indispensability of coal. The creation of a stable transit network in Panama
required remarkable amounts of energy to overcome the entropy of the Isthmus. Coal was the
only fuel capable of providing such quantities of energy. As a result, it was necessary to create a
landscape conducive to the deployment of coal-fueled prime movers and obtain human energy
capable of facilitating its implementation. The wedding of the demand for coal energy and the
creation of the tiered labor system in Panama reflected the complex and unanticipated
consequences that accompanied energy proliferation.
And yet the energy proliferation in Panama was not done. As William Goethals took over
the work, he escalated all facets of canal construction, pouring even more energy into the
Isthmus in hopes of forcing it to yield a passage. In doing so he destabilized the already entropic
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tendencies of the region precipitating a complex series of challenges that required an
increasingly diverse array of energy sources to create. Oil, electricity, and animal labor gradually
joined coal, and human muscle in the Isthmus, broadening the spectrum of energy Americans had
at their disposal and carving a path between the seas.
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Chapter III: Locks, Shocks, and Barrels: The Proliferating Energy Regime that
Constructed the Panama Canal
It started simply enough. On October 10th, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson pressed a
button in the White House. From there it got complicated. The push of the button sent an electric
charge along telegraph lines running overland from Washington, D.C. to Galveston Texas. The
electrical current was then channeled south, through the Central and South American Telegraph
Company's submarine cable, before being diverted to the company's Transisthmian cable.
Finally, the current traveled down a local circuit near Gamboa Dam, a dyke which prevented the
waters of the artificially constructed Lake Gatun from entering the Culebra Cut. In August, over
a month before the current arrived, engineers drilled holes into the Gamboa Dam and, in
preparation of the current, carefully packed these holes with explosives. When the current
reached the Gamboa dam it closed a local circuit and tripped a weight connected to a switch. The
second the switch was thrown a massive explosion gouged a 125-foot opening in the dam. Water
rushed into the Culebra Cut, flowing across the last stretch of land blocking the aquatic highway.
The Panama Canal was finally complete… kind of.1
The official inaugural voyage through the Canal didn’t take place until August 15th, 1914,
nearly a year after Wilson triggered the demolition of the Gamboa Dam.2 And yet the fact that it
was the President himself who sent the signal that destroyed the last major obstacle in the path of
the Canal was telling. The complexity surrounding the detonation of the Gamboa Dam reflected
the intricacy that defined the energy regimes at work in Panama. Coal remained paramount to

1

Goethals, William. “Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission and the Panama Canal for the Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 1914,” September 20, 1914. Retrieved from USNA, RG 185, Collection PL 153 31, Box 503: Folder:
Annual Reports of the Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission, pg. 38.
2
Isthmian Canal Commission, The Panama Canal Record, Vol. 7 No. 52, August 19th, 1914, pg. 521.

116

canal construction in 1913. Part of the incentive for flooding the Cut was that coal fueled dredges
could easily remove the material remaining in the Cut.3 Despite coal’s continued centrality, the
energy sources at work in Panama in 1913 were far different from those that were in place when
John Stevens had left the work six years earlier. It was fitting that it was an electrical current that
triggered the blast at Gamboa. Electricity now powered locomotives and cranes at Miraflores and
Gatun and provided power throughout the Canal Zone. Meanwhile, oil powered fixed engines at
the major machine repair shop in Gorgona and 40,000-gallon storage tanks were being
constructed at terminal sites to provide oil for passing vessels. The Canal of coal had become the
site of a massive energy proliferation that saw oil and electricity join the coal and human muscle
powering Panama.
As the energetic infrastructure that was installed by John Stevens expanded under the
guidance of George Goethals it diversified, adding new sources of energy to deal with the variety
of tasks that accompanied the expansion of excavation and the commencement of construction.
This transition defined the second half of canal creation and heralded the increasing diversity that
came to define energy regimes in general over the 20th century. Yet it is worth remembering that
this was by no means a revolution in which the combined forces of electricity and oil usurped the
throne of coal. Instead, all three energy sources saw rapid growth in their use, plateauing only
when construction was ending.4
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The increasing consumption of energy in the Canal Zone embodied what Christopher
Jones has dubbed a "landscape of intensification," a location where the influx of tremendous
amounts of energy allowed for the creation of an environment more capable of harnessing and
deploying energy through positive feedback loops. The creation of the Panama Canal was reliant
on this process and suggests further that even as fossil fuels were ascending to dominance in
Panama, a complex web of supplementary energies and prime movers remained essential to
canal construction. As coal, oil, electricity, and muscle shifted the earth, creating a passageway
for water to flow between the seas, they also provided the energy to construct a fixed landscape
of concrete capable of, at least temporarily, countering entropy in Panama.
It was the fusion of these various sources of energy that allowed the completion of the
Canal. As the tasks necessary for the Canal’s completion grew increasingly complicated and
specialized so too did the energy sources used to complete these tasks. Ironically, this process
liberated canal construction from the challenges of Panama’s entropic environment, while
simultaneously enslaving it to expanding energy regimes and a static structure and size. The
massive energy proliferation that took place between 1907 and 1914 pointed to both the promise
and challenges of energy expansion. Navigating this task was crucial to the successful
completion of the Canal and reflected a broader reliance of constantly expanding energy regimes
that came to define American energy consumption in the Canal Zone and beyond.
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Table 1. Fossil Fuel Consumption in Panama: 1907-1913
Year*

Coal
Consumed (in
tons)

Barrels of
oil
consumed

1907

203,451**

N/A

Oil Consumed
(in tons of
coal)

Total Coal
and Oil (In
tons)

Not tracked
203,451
separated
1908 380,792**
N/A
Not tracked
380,792
separately
1909 292,608
290,958
88,796
381,404
1910 398,719
463,186
141,292
540,011
1911 415,199
784,642
196,160
611,359
1912 401,385
876,325
219,009
620,394
1913 371,764
904,917
226,229
597,993
*Information listed in Fiscal Years (running July 1-June 31st)
**Note that oil was not tracked separately from coal until 1909

Difference Oil % of
from
total
previous
energy
year
N/A
N/A
+177,341

N/A

+612
+158,607
+71,348
+9,035
-22,401

23.3%
26.2%
32.1%
35.3%
37.8%

Table 2: Electrical Generation in Panama: 1908-1912
Year*

Electricity Produced (in
Difference from Previous
Kilowatt Hours)
Year
1908
984,744
N/A
1909
3,703,407
+2,718,663
1910
9,500,000 (number not
+5,800,000
exact)**
1911
24,671,095
+15,171,095
1912
30,857,213
+6,186,118
*Information listed in Fiscal Years (running July 1-June 31st)
**The energy produced at the newly opened Gatun and Miraflores plants could not be tracked
conclusively during the year
Inherited Energy
When George Goethals was named Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Company
following the resignation of John Stevens, he inherited a force remarkably effective at the task of
excavation. Steam shovels, railroads, dredges, and bodies all worked in concert with one another
to dig the big ditch. Goethals also acquired a tangible plan for the construction of the Canal. In
addition to restructuring the labor force, Stevens had been a staunch advocate for the

119

construction of a lock style canal, believing such a structure was the only way of completing the
herculean task. While Stevens wasn’t the architect of the plan, his convictions eventually rubbed
off on Canal Zone administrators and the American government and on June 19, 1907 the
decision was made to commit to a lock style canal once and for all.5
While the lock style canal required less excavation than a sea-level canal, it also
mandated more construction work. The Isthmian Canal Commission (ICC) had to find a way to
raise boats nearly 100 feet above sea level while also creating a structure capable of withstanding
the Isthmus' entropic tendencies. Goethals’ central challenge then was taking an energy
infrastructure adept at excavation and converting it to one capable of the equally demanding task
of construction. The key process in this transformation was the broadening of the energy regimes
at work in the Canal Zone. Human muscle, coal, and explosives were tremendously effective at
destroying landscapes, but they faced limitations when it came to constructing them. To
overcome these challenges Goethals began a gradual process of energy proliferation, which
relied upon the emergence of oil and electricity.
This process was already beginning during the end of Stevens’ tenure. By mid-1907 the
excessive price of coal caused some to consider whether it might be more prudent to begin
converting some engines to run on fuel oil instead. Coal was effective for mobile engines thanks
to its portability. A fireman could easily keep a coal-fueled boiler stoked with little more than a
shovel. As a liquid, oil needed to be loaded and transported in cumbersome barrels that were
difficult to handle, particularly on mobile engines. When it came to fixed engines however, oil's
cheap price and great efficiency made it a compelling choice, particularly considering the
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massive quantities of energy being consumed on the Isthmus. This Culebra Division alone
consumed 79,500 tons of coal in the fiscal year 1907, a total that cost $515,453.6 Due to the
difficulty of transporting coal to the interior and Pacific coast in particular, it was among the
chief expenditures of the Division. Oil proved far more economical thanks to an 8-inch pipeline
Union Oil constructed across the Isthmus to carry its oil from California to the east coast,
precluding the exorbitant shipping costs that accompanied the importation of coal.7 Starting in
1907, oil consumption on the Canal grew rapidly. Energy proliferation was percolating in
Panama.
The growth of oil occurred because of coal, however, not in spite of it. As excavation
expanded in 1907 Stevens, and later Goethals, constantly augmented their mechanical labor
force. The Excavation and Dredging Division had 39 shovels on the work in July of 1906. A year
later that number jumped to 63.8 The additional shovels paid immediate dividends. In August of
1907, shovel No. 211 appeared on the front page of the Panama Canal Record, celebrated for
moving a record 29,604 cubic yards of soil.9 The addition of more mechanical energy, however,
also added additional challenges, namely, the need to maintain and service more machines. In the
fall of 1907 Shovel No. 222, which was damaged in an explosion. Interestingly, Shovel No. 222
was not described as “damaged” but instead “injured,” anthropogenic terminology which
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suggested a degree of empathy with the machine itself.10 Doctoring these new industrial patients
forced the ICC to broaden its support facilities and the energy they consumed.
The Division of Municipal Engineering, Motive Power, and Machinery expanded its
facilities to deal with this task. The principal facility on the Isthmus remained in Gorgona (or as
it was known prior to December 24, 1906, Bas Matachin); however, the Division began
renovating its facility at Empire to deal with the influx of new shovels. The installation of an
expanded power station formed a key component of this overhaul. The power facility contained
two 100-kilowatt generators direct connected to a 160-horsepower tandem compound ball
engine, as well as a 200-kilowatt generator connected to a Harrisburg engine, all of which were
fueled by oil.11 In fixed locations like the Empire shop, it was far easier to use oil-fueled
generators to create electricity and rely on wiring to deploy the electricity to machines as it was
needed. The same principle held true for providing the power to light the townsites constructed
throughout the Canal Zone.
Powerplants were springing up throughout the Isthmus in 1907, providing a more stable
and accessible form of energy for those individuals working in fixed facilities. Of particular
importance during 1907 was providing lighting for the townsites constructed in the Panamanian
interior. In addition to powering the Empire shop, the power plant at Empire also provided
enough electricity to power roughly 4000 lights. Ten miles of transmission lines ran from the
Empire station, powering nearly all the lights in Empire and in the surrounding communities of
Culebra, Rio Grande, Enterprise, Cerro, and Lirio. Meanwhile, the ICC constructed a
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supplementary lighting plant at Gorgona which was placed in operation in May of 1907. This
plant sustained 2000 lights and was connected to a three-mile transmission line which provided
lighting throughout Matachin and Gorgona.12 While these two shops were modest, they pointed
to a broader trend of energy diversification in Panama.
This is not to suggest, however, that the energy proliferation in Panama was relegated to
fossil fuels and electricity. The adoption of novel sources of energy in Panama was predicated on
expanding organic energy sourced as well. In addition, the previously discussed human labor that
came to the Isthmus in 1907, pack animals grew increasingly commonplace. In June of 1907, a
force of 600 mules and horses provided a reliable means of transportation across the Isthmus.
Pulling wagons, carts, and even ambulances, these animals engaged in tasks ranging from the
transportation of goods and materials to the construction of roads and other public utilities.13
While their labor was highly specialized and far less voluminous than the power provided by
mechanical prime movers, horses and mules remained integral to the broadening energy regime
at work in the region. The fact that they remained relevant while oil and coal consumption
increased suggests that they were not subsumed by the energy proliferation taking place in
Panama, but rather were part of it.
The growth of oil, electricity, and animal labor between 1906 and 1907 was modest. Coal
and human labor dwarfed these initial forays into energy diversity, and yet they served as a
harbinger for what was to come. The economic benefits of oil made themselves readily apparent
by early 1907 and the ease of deploying and utilizing electricity suggested that it too had a key
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role to play in the coming years. While a bit of a statistical outlier, animal muscle also fulfilled
specific tasks along the Canal Zone. As the work expanded over the summer of 1907 so too did
the consumption of oil and electricity. Indeed, these two forces played crucial roles in the
completion of the Canal, particularly as construction became more prevalent.
Tipping the Scales: 1908-1909
When George Washington Goethals took charge of the work on March 31, 1907, he was
focused on only one thing: growth. Starting in June of 1907, the Isthmus saw a marked uptick in
energy consumption across all fronts as coal, oil, electricity, and human labor were brought to
the Isthmus in remarkable quantities. Stevens had crafted an infrastructure that could excavate
the Canal. Goethals initiated an energy explosion that expanded excavation and constructed the
facilities that would make up the Canal. The early years of this process were still dominated by
coal energy, but electricity and oil left their mark in increasingly tangible ways as electrical
lights, fixed motors, and the expansion of electrically powered facilities brought modernization
and convenience to workers on the Isthmus.
Goethals’ appointment to the position of Chief Engineer was emblematic of Roosevelt’s
frustration with his inability to maintain consistent leadership. While Stevens’ tenure as Chief
Engineer had been quite successful, Roosevelt took his decision to leave the work as a personal
affront. Goethals, a Colonel in the Corps of Engineers, already had a distinguished career by
1907, having overseen coastal construction projects for nearly two decades before being named a
member of the inaugural General Staff in 1903. Goethals’ keen unyielding resolve and
consummate professionalism drew the attention of William Taft who recommended the young
officer to Roosevelt. Roosevelt, impressed by Goethals directness and sheer force of will, and
still smarting from what he perceived as Stevens’ betrayal, believed he had found in Goethals the
124

man who could complete the Canal. Goethals possessed a singular vision and an incessant
demand for perfection, and while he was an engineer first and a soldier second his organizational
skills were remarkable. Perhaps most importantly, Goethals wasn’t a civilian. Unlike Stevens, he
could not leave Panama even if he wished to. The work was now his for better or worse.14
Goethals quickly put his logistical prowess to work, radically increasing the energy stores
available on the Isthmus. Over the course of his first year as Chief Engineer, he nearly doubled
the volume of coal consumed on the Isthmus and began gradually relying more on oil as a source
of fuel.15 While Goethals never explicitly stated a desire to specifically increase Panamanian
energy reserves, he actively increased both the size and scale of the work. That energy would
increase simultaneously was a foregone conclusion. This drastic escalation marked the initiation
of several years of energy expansion in Panama. From the time Goethals took charge of the
work, the total amount of energy imported to the would continue to rise before declining as work
approached its conclusion in late 1913.
The escalation in energy use was unsurprising. Coal, which remained the most common
source of energy on the Isthmus throughout the Canal’s construction, was crucial to the
successful removal of material and by the end of 1907 there were over 100 shovels at work on
the Isthmus.16 Over the course of the year shovels removed nearly 14,000,000 cubic yards from
the canal bed while dredges at work on the Atlantic and Pacific terminals were able to remove
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nearly 11,000,000 cubic yards for a collective total of 24,792,703 cubic yards.17 While these
figures were impressive, the increased scale of earthmoving also made instability far more
problematic and pervasive than it had been in previous years. Issues started in early October
1907, when the Cucaracha slide slid nearly fourteen feet in a single day. While the slide
eventually slowed to a rate of roughly four feet per day, the increased entropy unleashed by more
invasive excavation presented a continual challenge.
The sheer scale of the slide made it difficult to deal with, spanning over 34,000 square
feet and containing over 600,000 cubic yards of material. D.D. Gaillard, the head of the
Department of Excavation and Dredging, went so far as to install electric lights at the slide so
that steam shovels could work 24 hours a day to remove the material that slid into the cut.18 Nor
was the Cucaracha slide an isolated incident. A more concentrated slide of 140,000 cubic yards
of material took place at Paraiso in April of 1908 and smaller slides at New Culebra and Las
Cascadas complicated cleanup efforts further. The most troubling issue with these slides was that
they took place in the dry season, a period when slides had previously been a rarity.19 If the ICC
wished to contain the increasing entropy it unleashed it needed to import and direct increasing
amounts of energy at the landscape in hopes of establishing stability.
Excavation was also expanding at the terminal facilities by late 1907. The decision to
commit to a lock canal the previous year had given construction a degree of direction that it had
lacked, but it also created new issues. First and foremost, among these challenges was finding
terrain suitably stable for the creation of the locks. To this end, coal-fueled drills made dozens of
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exploratory drillings at both the Pacific and Atlantic ends of the Canal.20 At Gatun, the site of the
Atlantic terminus, the work progressed well, and despite and despite some minor tinkering to
determine the best possible site for the locks, steam shovels and dredges removed 1,769,115
cubic yards of material from the lock site.21 In addition to the material removed from the lock
site, Two French ladder dredges, two dipper dredges, a sixteen-inch suction dredge, and the seagoing suction dredge Ancon all worked in concert to remove 5,087,623 cubic yards of material
from the waterways near the Atlantic locks.22
The ICC was not as lucky at La Boca, the planned site for one of the two sets of locks on
the Pacific terminus. The underlying material at La Boca was too soft and shifted considerably
whenever weight was applied to it. The engineers at the site described it as, " an unctuous blue
clay without grit, possessing very little supporting power, instead of a stiff clay as indicated on
the profile."23 Structures in the region would simply sink into the muck, so the site of the locks
was shifted to Miraflores.24 By January 1908, two steam shovels arrived at Miraflores and began
excavation in earnest.25 As was the case in the Atlantic, it was the dredges however that were the
main source of landscape alteration at the Pacific locks as well. Here four French ladder dredges
and the sea-going suction dredge “Culebra” worked together, removing 5,273,369 cubic yards of
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material.26 While completion of the Canal was still far away, coal provided the energy to bring it
closer to reality.
Despite its primacy, coal alone did not account for the exponential increase in energy that
swept through the Isthmus in late 1907 and early 1908. Newly initiated construction projects
required far less mobility than excavation and didn’t require a highly portable source of energy
like coal. Oil and electricity proved efficient and economical sources of energy for construction
as Goethals endeavored to provide amenities for the laborers working in Panama. In particular,
the expansion of electricity illuminated the working towns of Panama and ensured that workers
could acquire luxury food items from the Commissary.
Illumination brightened the night sky of Panama on an unprecedented scale as 1908
dawned. While this development was not crucial to the completion of the Canal per se, it was
part of a broader campaign of providing modern conveniences to laborers. Prior to 1908, lighting
had been a combination of traditional oil-fueled lamps and electrical lighting. While this worked,
oil lights required more maintenance than electrical lights and during 1908 the electrical
subdivision mandated that all new lights would run on electricity with the exception of those
located in areas that would be flooded by the Gatun Lake.27 This mandate ushered in a rapid
expansion in the lighting of the Panamanian countryside. Concentrating on worker towns in the
interior and at terminal sites in Panama City and Balboa, the ICC installed 13,355 new lights
during the year. This effort quadrupled the 3,381 electrical lights that had been installed on the
Isthmus in prior years, bringing the new total to 17,186.28 The lights comforted workers and their
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families and challenged assumptions about a wild and uncivilized Panama. The potential of this
new technology to breed comfort was infectious and soon spread to other amenities.
Food distribution was also modernized by electrification. Panama had limited resources
and while tropical fruits and plants could be found in abundance, American staples like meat
were hard to obtain. The ICC and Panama Railroad quickly recognized that discontent could be
mitigated with luxury food items that gave laborers a taste of the homes they had left behind. The
ICC looked to the “Commissary” that had been operated by the Panama Railroad Company since
the 1800s to provide American goods to its employees.29 Working with the railroad, the
Commission expanded the Commissary, using electricity to increase its offerings and storage
facilities. The chief thrust of the Commission’s efforts was to provide meat and dairy products
that were difficult to obtain in local markets. Because these items spoiled rapidly it was
necessary to use electrical energy to find ways to create cold storage spaces capable of
processing and storing these valuable commodities. Starting in 1908, the Commissary added a
cold storage facility, an ice making plant, and an ice cream plant. Upon opening, the cold storage
plant handled nearly 1.5 million pounds of meats, vegetables, and fruits monthly, the ice plant
manufactured roughly 1,950 tons of ice monthly and the ice cream plant manufactured roughly
100 gallons of ice cream per day.30
These additions were so popular, and demand so substantial that within a year the
Commissary sought to expand the output and operating capacity of all three plants.31
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Unfortunately for some, the acquisition of a frosty treat created more problems than it solved.
Mitchell Berisford, a Barbadian working on the Canal in 1909, fell victim to dessert disaster
when his wife spent ten dollars on cake and ice cream to host a party for her friends. A dejected
Berisford remembered, “when I went home the evening I saw the ice cream dishes what they use
and the crumbs of cake all over the table, not a crumb leave for me, pots cold, stove cold, and no
dinner, and she was away, hungry killing me and nothing to eat, great experience.” Berisford
deemed the sugary slight so egregious that “I had to make a divorce on her."32
While the number of marriages ruined by desserts on the Isthmus is difficult to track, the
increase in electricity that enabled the Commissary’s expanded culinary offerings is not. The
illumination of the interior and the expansion of Commissary facilities both reflected the greater
emphasis placed on electrical generation in 1908. Facilities at La Boca, Cristobal, and Colon
generated 984,744-kilowatt hours over the course of the year. Increasingly oil fueled the turbines
that generated this power. The La Boca facility was converted to operate on oil during the year, a
decision which yielded, "decided economical operation." Meanwhile the growth of the
Commissary branch at Cristobal forced the electrical plant supporting the facility to more than
double its output through the installation of new motors and generators. The expansion of the
Commissary was so rapid that even the new machines “will be so badly overloaded that it will be
impracticable to supply any current for Gatun, as was previously considered." The only way to
meet the needs of the Commissary was to convert the Colon beach station to run on oil and
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integrate it with the Cristobal facility.33 Luxury food items may have made the Canal Zone a far
more alluring place to laborers, but they also stretched electrical generation to its limit.
By June of 1908, the Canal Zone was a drastically different place than it had been a year
before. During his first full year on the work, Goethals made headway in excavation, particularly
at the lock sites, and made drastic changes to the Canal Zone environment that made it far more
alluring to prospective laborers. Illuminated night skies and luxury food items were now
hallmarks of the Isthmus, a development which led to 18,000 more individuals coming to the
Isthmus than leaving it over the course of the year.34 While the ICC still made a point of
recruiting laborers externally, the massive jump in immigration in 1908 suggested that the
organization's labor issues could be mitigated through the modernization of the Isthmus, a
process catalyzed by electricity and the amenities it provided.
Petroleum in Panama
Goethals continued to reorganize operations on the Isthmus in July of 1908, dividing the
engineering force into three divisions, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Central Divisions, each of which
was responsible for construction and excavation in its geographic area.35 This change indicated
the shifting work on the Isthmus. In the Central Division, excavation remained the chief concern,
but in the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions work was focused on construction. This shift in the
work was accompanied by the continued ascendance of oil as an efficient source of energy for
construction work. Oil had played an important role in the diversification of Isthmian energy
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sources for years; the summer of 1908 saw a far more concerted effort to utilize oil and its
economy. Storage facilities made it more accessible, and engines across the line were converted
to run on it. The energy expansion that had taken place during 1907 expanded in 1908 and 1909
as the ICC set new records in the use of coal, electricity, oil, and human labor in Panama. The
single biggest testament to the expansion of oil on the Isthmus was the fact that while there was a
net increase in energy over the course of the year, the bulk of that difference was made up of
oil.36 While the amount of coal consumed still dwarfed oil consumption overall, oil was growing
increasingly prevalent. As the ICC established more fixed locations and was better able to
transport materials around the Isthmus, oil became increasingly viable as a fuel source for static
processes such as construction and power generation.
Starting in the summer of 1908, Goethals and his division leaders began constructing
facilities to better handle and deploy oil. The Mechanical Division redoubled its commitment to
petroleum during the year, constructing a massive 2500-barrel holding tank and a 500-barrel
auxiliary tank to provide the fuel necessary for the day to day operations at Gorgona. By August
1908 the tanks and pipelines connecting them to the main facility were completed and by
October Gorgona was consuming oil at a rate of 3100 barrels per month.37 The transition
immediately paid dividends, resulting in a savings of $200 per month.38 The adoption of oil then
was both an act of convenience as pipelines to fixed motors required far less labor than stoking a
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coal-fueled engine with firemen, and an act of economy as the savings received from the practice
made it more cost-effective than coal as well.
The expansion of oil consumption on the Isthmus also made itself felt in electrical power
generation where the ICC was conducting a piecemeal installation of new motors and engines.
As was the case in the Gorgona shops, oil was rapidly becoming the dominant source of fuel in
electrical generation. The Commissary continued the expansion of operations it had begun the
previous year, increasing the productivity of its ice cream plant to 500 gallons per day and
adding 2856 square feet of cold storage to its facility at Cristobal. These developments were
enabled by the addition of three new generators.39 Long at the vanguard of oil usage on the
Isthmus, the Panama railroad also began experimenting with the use of oil for fuel in its
locomotives.40
Electricity also expanded during the year. The Electrical Subdivision of the Mechanical
Division took over administration of the Balboa plant in July of 1908, giving them control of all
power plants on the Isthmus with the exception of the remaining railroad plants at Cristobal and
Colon.41 This plant consisted of direct current generators of 125 and 325 kilowatts as well as
alternate current generators of 60 and 200 kilowatts.42 The Division installed another 400-kW
generator at Empire and extended their pole line all the way to Miraflores and outlying labor
camps in the area. At Gorgona the additional 100 kW of capacity allowed for the expansion of
lighting and a new electric crane, and even the powerplant at Gatun received an extra 50 kW of
power to expand lighting in the area surrounding the lock site. All together, these new facilities
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generated 3,703,407 kilowatt hours on the Isthmus, an unprecedented figure that indicated just
how quickly electricity was adopted.43
The highest concentration of electrical expansion was at the lock sites on both the
Atlantic and Pacific terminals of the Canal. By early 1909, Goethals had plans for both sets of
locks and settled on 1000-foot by 110-foot lock chambers contained by miter gates at the ends of
each lock.44 The adoption of this detailed plan allowed both the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions to
begin erecting the construction plants they would use to pour the concrete foundations for the
locks, as well as the powerhouses at Gatun and Miraflores that provided the electricity necessary
to both construct and operate the locks.
Thanks to the early identification of Gatun as a dam and lock site, the Atlantic Division,
under the guidance of William Sibert, found itself ahead of its counterparts in the Pacific
Division. Steam shovels and dredges removed 1,400,000 cubic yards of material from the area
surrounding the locks and five dredges removed nearly 6,000,000 cubic yards of material from
Colon and Mindi harbor and the approaches to the Canal.45 Much of this material was used in the
construction of the Gatun dam. The structure holding back the Chagres River, the dam was
imperative to the success of the Canal by managing the water supply for Gatun Lake. As material
was removed from the cut it was placed in the expanding dam structure which contained a
hydraulic fill core surrounded by trestling and solid fill. By June of 1909, over 2,500,000 cubic
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yards of material were deposited in the dam and, apart from a few minor alterations, the structure
seemed to be well on its way to completion.46
Electricity served little purpose in the excavation at Gatun, but as Sibert redirected his
attention on the construction of locks themselves electricity became increasingly important. The
plant at the lock site was a complex infrastructure of trains, cranes, cableways, and mixing plants
that took rock and sand from quarries at Porto Bello and turned it into concrete.47 The machines
were powered by a massive power plant at Gatun consisting of Three 1500 kW turbo-generators
which provided 3-phase alternate current at 2,200 volts. This energy powered the cranes,
cableways, and trains. Direct current, supplied by two 500 kW and one 300 kW rotary
converters, provided the energy necessary for the mixing plant itself.48 All of this equipment was
housed in a temporary power station that would be moved to the Gatun spillway upon the dam’s
completion.49 While the plant had yet to be fully completed by June of 1909, the structure itself
was completed and the equipment eight-five percent installed.50
Work on the Pacific Locks progressed more slowly. Division chief, S.B. Williamson’s
decision to shift the locks from La Boca to Miraflores had slowed the work, but the Division
moved rapidly to catch up to their counterparts on the Atlantic. The Pacific Division outpaced
the Atlantic Division in excavation during the year, removing over 10,000,000 cubic yards of
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material between steam shovels and dredges.51 Intriguingly, of the seven dredges that worked on
the Pacific terminus and approach during the year, five were converted to run on oil.52 This
diversification of energy paid off and by August of 1909 the Division had nearly completed
excavation at Pedro Miguel and had excavated over 80% of the upper locks at Miraflores.53 Here
too electricity was crucial. During the year, the Division began building a powerhouse at
Miraflores that mirrored the one under construction at Gatun. The intent was for this station to
provide the energy necessary for the construction of the Pacific Locks and to act as a redundant
support for the Gatun powerplant once the Canal opened.54 At both the Atlantic and Pacific
terminals, oil and electricity were usurping the primacy that coal had enjoyed during the early
years of canal construction.
Despite its utility as a source of light and power, the most valuable contribution made by
electricity during the year may have been the adoption of electrical current as the firing
mechanism for explosives in the Central Division. The task of carving a path through the rocky
continental divide invariably required the tremendous energy contained in explosives. Of the
14,325,876 cubic yards removed by the Central Division between July 1908 and June 1909,
12,622,880 cubic yards of material were first broken apart by 3,365 gross tons of explosives.55
The concentration of such a substantial amount of volatile energy created issues, particularly
when combined with the damp conditions of Panama. Heavy rainfalls and damp conditions
wreaked havoc with blasting batteries, resulting in delayed or failed explosions which could
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maim or kill unsuspecting powdermen. To counter these explosive conditions, the Mechanical
Division and Central Division worked together to create a sophisticated but intuitive blasting
system. The Empire plant was connected by transmission wired to the Central Division. When
the current reached the Division’s territory, it was directed into 45 blasting spurs, each of which
was roughly 1000 feet apart and connected to a 5 kW 110-volt transformer. The fuses were
connected to this spur and when a switch on the transformer was thrown the current ignited all
the fuses simultaneously, ensuring that each device detonated.56 The value of this new system
was self-evident as 14,325,876 of the cubic yards of material were removed from the Central
Division alone during the course of the year.57
The increase in energy also had the unanticipated consequence of unleashing Isthmian
entropy. A frustrated George Goethals was forced to admit that, "The slides continue to be a
source of annoyance.”58 Assurances from the previous year that the Cucaracha slide had been
contained proved premature as it grew to cover an area of twenty-seven acres.59 Ultimately, no
fewer than ten additional slides popped up between July 1908 and June 1909, forcing Central
Division chief D.D. Gaillard to oversee the removal an additional 884,530 cubic yards of
material. And yet, in the face of the pervasiveness of these slides, the Gaillard remained naively
optimistic, suggesting that slides would only necessitate the removal of an additional 1,000,000
cubic yards from the cut.60 Fate soon proved this optimism misplaced, but given the amount of
energy at his disposal, Gaillard felt slides could easily be dealt with.
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Landslides continued to complicate the creation of the Panama Canal, but the growth of
energy made them see trivial obstacles. Oil and electricity had grown increasingly important
since July of 1908, and the overall increase in energy on the Isthmus suggested that more energy
could impose order on the entropic environment. It's worth mentioning that it wasn't only fossil
fuels and electricity that made up this increase. By the end of April 1909, the Commission set a
record with over 33,699 laborers on the work.61 By July of 1909, a tremendous amount of
progress had been made in construction, thanks in large part to the adoption of a diverse array of
energy sources, each of which was suited for particular tasks. The flexibility and fluidity that this
system afforded was crucial to construction and helped impose a degree of order on the
Panamanian environment.
Abundant Energies
Under Goethals leadership the work reached a fever pitch by the summer of 1909. The
completion of the Gatun and Miraflores power plants revolutionized lock construction while coal
and oil consumption exploded in the Panamanian interior as D.D. Gaillard’s Central Division
continued to wage war on the entropic tendencies of the Culebra Cut. All these factors coalesced
to usher in the most diverse and prolific energy regime of canal construction. While energy
consumption had been increasing for the last several years, the tremendous jump that took place
between July 1st, 1909 and June 30th, 1910 was the largest of Goethals’ tenure. Consumption
increased across all departments on the Isthmus, and across all energy sources.62 The number of
laborers on the Isthmus ballooned to nearly 39,000 during the dry season of 1910 and was so
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substantial that the ICC stopped recruiting laborers for the Isthmus altogether later that year.63
The abundance of energy even extended to pack animals. C.A. Devol, the head of the
Quartermaster’s Department, noted, "More animals have been available for and more have been
used in construction work than at any other period on the canal work. Teams were used in the
spillways at Miraflores and Gatun, on the reservoirs at Gatun and Toro Point, in the canal bottom
at San Pablo, and on paving and sewer work in the city of Panama."64 This concentration of
energy was unprecedented, dwarfing the volume of energy used in years past, and continuing the
trend of utilizing as broad an array of energies as possible.
One of the chief sources of excitement in the fall of 1909 was the opening of the Gatun
powerplant. In August of 1909, it came online and began providing power for the construction
plant building the Gatun Locks. This process was far from efficient. When the plant opened only
one of its three generators was working, generators number two and three requiring replacement
parts and increased insulation respectively.65 These issues lingered through the end of the year.
In March of 1910 two of the generators again burnt out, but by this point in time they were
quickly replaced and put back to work. Despite these hiccups, the Gatun plant was producing
roughly 850,000-kilowatt hours a month from 6400 barrels of oil by the spring of 1910.66
Consequently the stations output grew as the year progressed. Between August and December of
1909, the station generated roughly 1,000,000 kWh. Between January 1, and June 30, 1910
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production exploded to 4,314,586 kWh.67 Jumps like this resulted in a greater abundance of
energy at a far cheaper cost, a formula for success in Panamanian construction. A few months
after the opening of the Gatun plant, its twin at Miraflores followed suit. The opening of the
powerplants was crucial to attempts to mitigate the flow of entropy at the lock sites. Electricity’s
was a consistent and reliable source of energy that could be directed to a variety of tasks. While
it was relatively fixed in its distribution, the creation of an electricity-based plant at the locks
allowed for regular, measured, and long-term applications of energy capable of creating and,
more important, maintaining human altered landscapes in the fluid Panamanian environment.
These powerplants powered extremely complex infrastructures directed primarily
towards the pouring of concrete, a material that could mitigate entropy by halting shifting soils
and precluding the need for external injections of energy. As much of Panama’s entropy
stemmed from the hydrological conditions of the region and rain’s capacity to erode and saturate
soils, concrete, a fixed and impermeable structure, was essential to minimize the rate of entropy
on the Isthmus and consequently minimize the amount of energy that needed to be infused into
the Canal to maintain it. Concrete production took sand and gravel supplied by massive rock
crushers from quarries near the lock sites and combined them with water and cement. The
resulting concrete created static structures that withstood the erosive forces of Panama far more
effectively than the fluid materials that naturally occurred in the region. As the lock sites were
the lynchpin of the entire canal system it was imperative that they were created with a material
that withstood the entropic challenges of Panama with only minimal injections of energy.
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To this end, a massive plant was installed at the Pedro Miguel locks which mirrored that
already at work in Gatun. Twelve 11.5-ton locomotives ran between storehouses and cranes at
the lock. The locomotives carried two cars which held two buckets capable of carrying 64 cubic
feet of concrete. Berm cranes at the storehouse loaded the buckets onto the locomotives which
carried the concrete to the lock site. There, chamber cranes unloaded the full bucket and gave the
locomotives an empty bucket to bring back to the storehouse to be refilled. The chamber cranes
then poured the concrete where it was needed in the lock foundation.68 This method proved
remarkably efficient and made rapid headway at both the Gatun and Pedro Miguel locks. While
the plant was not fully installed at Pedro Miguel until July of 1910, it paid immediate dividends.
Between September of 1909 and the end of the year, the Pacific division poured 166,868 cubic
yards of concrete at Pedro Miguel.69 Gatun saw even more progress. Between July 1909 and
June 1910 over 500,000 cubic yards of material were poured at the Atlantic locks.70 This process
was so efficient that starting in April of 1910, the ICC began accepting offers from contractors
for the construction of the lock gates and the machines that would control them. Ultimately the
contract was awarded to McClintic-Marshall Construction Company of Pittsburgh, PA at a cost
of $5,374,474.82 for the entire work.71
Electricity powered the plant necessary to lay the foundation for the lock sites, but until
they were complete entropy could still rear its ugly head. Slides and flooding grew problematic,
particularly at the Gatun locks. The search for solid bedrock at the Atlantic terminus led to
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excavation between 30-40 feet below sea-level in the lowest set of locks. The digging
destabilized the surrounding banks and, after substantial flooding on November 11th and again on
November 20th, the shovels at work on the locks were forced to abandon the work.72 Pumps
struggled to deal with the flooded locks and ultimately the work was delayed by these continuing
hydrological issues.73 The delay caused by these slides may have been longer were it not for the
efforts of the six dredges at work on the Atlantic Division. Nearly 5,000,000 cubic yards of
material was removed from the canal prism by these vessels.74
For S.B. Williamson’s Pacific Division, dredging and pumping were crucial to the
creation of the Canal, but traditional excavation played a larger role. The bulk of excavation at
the Pedro Miguel Locks neared completion by June of 1910, despite two small slides.75 As the
cut approached Miraflores, however, more work remained to be done. Shovels moved 99,703
cubic yards from the trough between Pedro Miguel and Miraflores, while several more displaced
285,354 cubic yards from the upper locks of Miraflores.76 These shovels were far less effective
in the lower locks of Miraflores, where the presence of water forced engineers to use the suction
dredge Sandpiper. As excavation shifted into the deeper water south of the Miraflores Locks,
dredges again played a substantial role, removing 7,956,143 cubic yards of material.77
The diverse prime movers at work at the locks suggested the complexity of the task at
hand. Containing and mitigating the entropy of Panama required a broad array of energies and
tools, each of which fulfilled a specific function in various environments around the locks. Given
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the breadth of the local environment, it was unsurprising that this location should be the site at
which energy sources were most broadly distributed. Electricity powered the plant that was
laying the concrete structures of the locks themselves while coal and oil-fueled machines
removed earth on land and on the water. But as one traveled away from the locks and moved
inland towards the continental divide, where the focus of the work was focused almost
exclusively on excavation, the energy regime became increasingly homogenous.
In D.D. Gaillard’s Central Division, the bulk of energetic growth was confined to an
increase in the human labor pool the Division had at its disposal as well as a monumental jump
of nearly 100,000 tons of coal.78 While fossil fuels provided a tangible bellwether for the
expansion of energy in the region, the greatest testament to the fact that the ICC had finally met
its demands for energy may have been the decision to halt the importation of laborers in January
of 1910 after bringing only 2,519 men to the Isthmus.79 The cessation of labor recruitment
stemmed from several factors, the chief among them the fact that immigration outpaced
emigration by 21,114. This glut of human energy precluded the necessity of importing additional
laborers from abroad. Thanks to the influx of laborers the Commission was able to count a
record of 38,767 employees on its rolls in March of 1910.80 The efficacy of mechanical labor had
always been predicated by the availability of human labor. As such, the decision to halt the
importation of laborers was an acknowledgment of the fact that the ICC had effectively met its
perceived energetic needs on the Isthmus. Perhaps the most interesting part of this relationship
was the way in which the growth, particularly in the gold rolls, accompanied the utilization of
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more coal on the Isthmus. Mechanics in charge of the maintenance of machines accounted for
nearly three-quarters of all hourly gold employees on the Isthmus by 1910.81 Their increase in
numbers directly correlated with the expansion of mechanical labor at work in Panama.
The muscles making their way to the interior of Panama found themselves overshadowed
quite literally by the continuing influx of mechanized labor that sought to establish control over
the Culebra Cut. Over the course of the year, the Central Division alone consumed 187,326 tons
of coal.82 This injection of fuel immediately paid dividends as the Central Division removed
17,558,364 cubic yards of the 19,903,000 cubic yards excavated across the Isthmus during the
year.83 This was due in large part to the continuing increase in shovels that the division had at its
disposal. During 1910 the Central Division employed: two 45-ton Bucyrus, fourteen 70-ton
Bucyrus, 32 95-ton Bucyrus, two Marion Model-60s, and 11 Marion Model-91s. Engineers were
also becoming increasingly skilled at maximizing their efficiency, further increasing the
efficiency of the machines. In 1908 shovels had averaged 121.4 cubic yards excavated per hour
under steam. By 1909 that figure had jumped to 150.46, and it climbed again to 155.8 in 1910.84
Increases in coal consumption were in large part responsible for the growth in energy that
dominated the Isthmus during the year, but oil too saw a steady increase in use. It was the
dominant source of fuel at power plants and was also increasingly being used for excavation and
transportation. The greatest testament to the importance of oil was the Mechanical Division’s
decision to create a position for a traveling engineer, who inspected all facilities on the Isthmus
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to provide guidance on the efficient and economical use of oil.85 Indeed the program proved so
successful that by the end of the year a second engineer had been appointed to serve in a similar
function.86
The 100,000-ton increase in coal consumption and the increase in employment that took
place between July 1909 and June 1910 allowed the ICC to finally reach a pool of energy it was
comfortable with. The increase in energy and efficiency suggested that it was possible to break
through the Continental Divide and complete the excavation in the Culebra Cut. While
continuing landslides indicated that Panama’s entropy would remain a problem, the massive
amounts of energy at work in the Isthmus were more than capable of keeping it in check.87 As to
the long-term stability of the region, the creation of power plants at Gatun and Miraflores held
the promise of a steady and continuous supply of energy that could be used to mitigate entropy's
long-term consequences. The ICC had reached its energy apex, now all that was left to do was
divide the Isthmus and unite the world.
Plateauing Power
Given the sheer scale of the increase in energy consumption that had taken place by July
1, 1910, it was unsurprising that energy plateaued in 1911. The stabilization of energy
consumption was most acute in those sources of energy that had been most important to canal
construction up to this point in time: coal, and human labor. In many ways, the decline reflected
the fact that Goethals had finally been able to maximize the ICC’s energy consumption had an
adequate volume of energy to fully realize the vision of interoceanic transit. And yet when
looking at individual energy regimes, 1911 continued the incessant trend of electricity and oil
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slowly laying claim to more of the Isthmian energy network. As excavation wound down in most
areas outside of the Culebra Cut, the ICC turned to the energy sources more efficient and
economic at maintaining and constructing fixed landscapes rather than excavating them. Coal
still dwarfed the utilization of any other source of energy; however, electricity and oil's centrality
to the work was increasingly obvious.88
Despite the relative stability that marked the year, the most marked distinction was the
drastic increase in oil consumption which now accounted for more than a third of the energy
consumed in the Isthmus. More and more Panama Railroad Locomotives used oil as their
primary source of fuel, and the ICC itself saw a drastic uptick in its oil consumption thanks in
large part to the rise in fixed engines and plants.89 Ultimately, oil was simply more economical
than coal. Coal still cost roughly $6 per ton thanks to its substantial shipping costs. At $1.10 a
barrel, the ICC could purchase the equivalent of one ton of coal (four barrels) for only $4.40.
These significant savings led Goethals to prefer oil to coal and warranted more investment in this
source of energy.90
The plateauing of energy sources on the Isthmus also extended to human energy.
Quartermaster C.A. Devol was pleased to note that, "This past year has been the first since the
inception of the work that no contract laborers have been brought to the Isthmus by the
Commission. The last shipment was of men received was in January 1910, over a year and a half
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ago."91 As a result, the number of laborers stayed relatively static, peaking in January of 1911
with a total of 37,271 employees, just below the total from the fiscal year 1910.92 Here too the
ICC had met their energetic needs, however, there were some signs of trouble on the horizon.
Turnover remained problematic for silver and gold laborers alike, forcing the Quartermaster's
Department to constantly be on the lookout for new employees. In previous years this problem
had been irrelevant due to the volume of immigrants coming to the Isthmus; however, 1911 saw
a significant decrease in potential laborers as immigration only outpaced emigration by 4,910
over the course of the year compared to 21,114 the previous year.93 While this trend did not
immediately endanger the work, it did point to the fact that laborers came to Panama only when
there was an established need for their work.
Little had changed in D.D. Gaillard’s Central Division where steam shovels and coal
waged their war of attrition against the entropy of the Panamanian landscape. As the Cut grew
deeper, the material which machines were excavating grew increasingly diverse and varied.
Goethals suggested that this was the chief challenge in creating the Cut, arguing that, “The
geological formation of the Isthmus is very irregular and the character of material encountered in
the Cut is constantly changing, so that it is impossible to determine in advance where slides and
breaks are liable to occur, or when they do occur, the slopes which they will ultimately
assume.”94 This complexity kept engineers guessing and meant that as they altered the
environment they subsequently destabilized it by breaking into materials and formations that
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could not support the banks of the Cut on their own. As a result, the Bucyruses generated more
work for themselves with every shovelful that they removed.
These slides regularly hindered work in the Cut, forcing Gaillard to divert resources to try
to contain them. Despite the fact that the Central Division set a new record by removing
18,552,644 cubic yards between July 1910 and July 1911, they were also forced to add another
4,676,278 cubic yards to the amount of excavation that needed to be done.95 Gaillard attributed
this increase to "the unexpected development of slides beyond the limits assumed when making
former estimates, especially in the two large slides at Culebra."96 During the course of the year
the Culebra slide, which was 7.3 acres at the beginning of the year, had extended to 46.6 acres,
rivaling the 47.1 acres of the Cucaracha slide.97 While slides remained a nuisance in the Cut, the
utilization of 193,977 tons of coal by the Division allowed the mechanical labor force to keep
pace. Indeed, the Division had managed to effectively halt the Cucaracha slide during the year.98
Slides and coal consumption continued to grow in tandem, but the sheer volume of energy
available to the Central Division meant that while slides could hinder the work, they never
fundamentally threatened it.
The development of the harbor facilities that would support the Canal suggested that
coal's importance would linger on well into the future. The fall of 1910 marked the first serious
planning for the development of port facilities at both the Atlantic and Pacific terminals. Among
the chief concerns of engineers was the ability to fuel ships that were making their way through
the locks. Preliminary reports varied in the exact details of what the harbor should look like.
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However, there were several significant points of agreement, most of which revolved around the
facilities’ capacities to store and deploy coal and oil. This desire was expressed in the initial
legislation approving the Canal which decreed "These facilities were to include the storing and
furnishing of coal and other fuel for use both afloat and ashore...".99 The ICC determined that it
should construct two coaling stations, an Atlantic facility capable of holding roughly 200,000
tons and a Pacific facility capable of holding roughly 50,000 tons. In addition, both sites would
each also have storage for roughly 80,000 barrels of oil.100 The commitment to providing energy
at the Canal itself directly addressed concerns that many Canal lobbyists had expressed about
American energy security. Thanks to the administration of the Canal Zone, America could
ensure that her military vessels in the region would always have access to reliable energy stores.
Simultaneously, America could also compete with British coaling stations throughout Central
and South America by allowing many ships to simply bypass them. These decisions showed that
the ICC was acutely aware of the benefits offered by being the “crossroads of the world” and
hoped to harness the energy windfall that could result.
While coal carved up the Culebra Cut and captured the imaginations of energy
speculators, it was oil and electricity that made their presence felt in the fixed engines and power
plants dotting the Canal Zone. The massive growth in oil consumption during the year was
reinforced by the fact that the ICC doubled down on its previous endeavor to ensure more
efficient and economical use of the fuel by hiring another traveling agent to educate employees
on the proper use of fuel oil. The original two employees occupying the post had been focused
on fuel consumption in locomotives before also instructing engineers and firemen on handling
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and properly firing oil. The new engineer had a far broader mandate. His duty "covered steam
shovels, unloaders, spreaders, and all stationary plants, and was subsequently extended to the
marine equipment."101 The increasing oversight on fuel oil consumption yielded immediate
returns. The Las Cascadas air compressor plant showed savings of 3.5 percent, the Mount Hope
pumping plant 22 percent, the Gorgona pumping plant about 15 percent and the Cucaracha
pumping plant about 11 percent. On average the traveling engineers generated savings of roughly
10 percent at nearly every site they visited.102 This increased efficiency only served to reinforce
the economy of oil and suggested the ICC's growing reliance on this new source of fuel was not
an aberration, but rather a sign of the oil's importance on the completion of the work. Oil had
more utility and was far cheaper than coal, and, as a result, it was a more practical source of
consistent energy to keep entropy at bay as the Canal aged.
At the locks and at power plants located in the Panamanian interior, oil produced the
electricity which illuminated towns, helped preserve food, and, at the lock sites, powered the
incredibly complex machines responsible for the erection of the lock foundations. The three
power plants located in the interior at Balboa, Empire, and Gorgona produced 4,911,134 kilowatt
hours over the course of the year, a marked increase over their output from the preceding year.103
Despite the increase in productivity these stations combined produced far less than the 6,797,714
kWh produced at Miraflores and the 12,962,247 kWh produced at Gatun.104 The productivity of
these sites was the result of two distinct factors. Both Miraflores and Gatun were larger than their
counterparts in the interior and, as a result, had more turbines and generators. Additionally, the
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larger size of the facilities allowed Miraflores and Gatun to generate their current from steam
turbines while the powerplants at Empire and Gorgona relied on noncondensing engines and
Balboa on condensing engines.105 This was deliberate. The ICC recognized that upon the
completion of construction the interior would be abandoned, and so it was unnecessary to build
up large permanent plants in this region.
Miraflores and Gatun needed larger facilities to provide the power necessary to operate
the massive construction plants at work on the canal locks. While minor slides continued to
complicate work at both sites, excavation was ending. William Sibert was quick to point out that,
at Gatun, shovel excavation was completed in the forebay, upper lock, middle lock, and lower
lock during the year and by July of 1911, 2,085,000 cubic yards of concrete (68.34% of the total
work) had been poured.106 S.B. Williamson was similarly bullish on their progress at Pedro
Miguel. Here excavation was also effectively complete and 665,055 cubic yards of concrete had
been placed. This progress was so substantive that the Division made the decision to break up
some of the plant at Pedro Miguel and move it to Miraflores In December of 1910. By June of
1911, 272,933 cubic yards of concrete had been laid at Miraflores, the bulk of it by the auxiliary
plant.107 Perhaps the best testament to the efficacy of this process lay in the fact that in the spring
of 1911 the ICC made the decision to begin on-site work on the lock gates themselves. In
January, contractors commenced work on the gates at Gatun, and in March they began at Pedro
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Miguel.108 These developments suggested just how effective the plants at Gatun and Miraflores
were and hinted at the impact they would have in the Canal Zone moving forward.
Miraflores and Gatun were constructed to last, and to play considerable roles in the longterm operation of the Canal. By 1911, the ICC turned its attention to the question of how the
massive locks would be opened and how ships would travel through them. Recognizing the
resources already at his disposal, H.F. Hodges, the head of the First Division (which oversaw
lock construction), sought to use the existing power plants at Gatun and Miraflores to provide the
power necessary for both these tasks. Hodges suggested that the existing power plant at Gatun
should gradually be replaced by a hydro-electric station constructed on Gatun Dam.109 While a
hydro-electric plant was proposed as a means to provide power in the region as early as 1904, the
tremendous progress on the Gatun Dam, made the proposal viable for the first time.110 If it could
be brought to fruition, the hydroelectric plant would turn one of the greatest obstacles to the
construction of Isthmian transit, the Chagres River, into an essential source of power for the
operation of both sets of locks.111
The ICC's emphasis on the hydroelectric plant was indicative of the organization’s
shifting priorities. Coal was still imperative to the completion of the work in Culebra, but the
terminals were increasingly relying on oil and electricity to meet their energetic needs. Shifting
energy consumption served as an indicator of the shifting nature of canal excavation itself. The
plateauing of coal consumption and the substantial rise of oil and electricity suggested that the
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era of excavation was over. As July of 1911 dawned, the Canal had been transformed from an
excavation to a construction project, one with a myriad of energies at its disposal.
The Beginning of the End
Starting in July of 1911 the energy decline that began during the previous year became
even more pronounced. While the ICC still possessed a considerable volume of energy, coal
consumption was dwindling. Oil and electricity meanwhile were constituting a far greater
percentage of Panamanian energy.112 As excavation was completed throughout the Canal Zone,
with the exception of the Culebra Cut, steam shovels and locomotives became less central to the
creation of the Canal, and while dredges were still essential to the preparation of terminal
facilities and lock approaches, the overall mechanical labor force of the ICC decreased over the
next twelve months. Goethals’ focus was increasingly placed on the preparation of harbor
facilities, the locks themselves, and the power plants that would support them. The disassembling
of the mechanized labor force that had been so integral to the removal of earth and rock
suggested that the end of the enterprise was rapidly approaching and by the following summer
oil was making up over a third of the fossil fuel energy consumed in Panama.113
The chief factor for the decline in coal was the tremendous progress that had been made
in excavation. By July of 1912, estimates suggested that of the projected 125,735,000 cubic
yards of dry material that needed to be removed to create the Canal, 108,309,364 cubic yards or
roughly 86% had successfully been removed.114 This remarkable productivity rendered steam
shovels, and the energy infrastructure supporting them, increasing irrelevant beyond the bounds
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of the Culebra Cut. Sibert’s Atlantic Division announced that they had completed its excavation
near Mindi and was going to rely primarily on dredges going forward.115 While minor slides at
Pedro Miguel and Miraflores forced the Williamson’s Pacific Division to use steam shovels
more heavily than the Atlantic Division, here too the bulk of dry excavation had been
completed.116 In both cases, steam shovels were responsible for little more than mitigating slides
and ensuring the stability of the landscape surrounding the locks. Actual work in the canal prism
itself was almost exclusively the work of dredges.
Gaillard and other leaders of the Central Division also made the tactical decision to
gradually diminish their mechanical force. As the central part of the Isthmus was to be flooded
upon the opening of the Canal, the Central Division needed to be able to remove its material as
quickly as possible when the work ended.117 Much of this effort focused around limiting the size
of their mechanical labor force. The Central Division took six shovels out of service during the
fiscal year 1912 dropping the total number employed by the division from 52 to 46.118
Simultaneously they removed 21.7 miles of auxiliary railroad tracks from the Cut.119
Despite its dwindling mechanical labor force, Panamanian entropy remained a fierce
obstacle to Gaillard and the Central Division in the Culebra Cut. The Division removed
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16,476,769 cubic yards of material between July 1911 and June 1912, but it once again had to
direct a significant amount of its resources to countering slides. 35.9% of the total amount of
material removed had been deposited by slides, a figure significantly higher than the 30.07% that
had been removed due to slides during the previous year.120 Entropy remained far from contained
in the Culebra Cut.
It was unsurprising that slides became more prevalent as the Cut deepened. Gaillard
noted that this outcome “was anticipated”, but that it nonetheless proved extremely detrimental
to the work as, “No plan of treatment for slides has proven thoroughly effective once they have
developed, except that of excavating and hauling away the material composing the moving mass
until the slide comes to rest upon reaching the angle of repose for the particular material in
motion.”121 In principle, this approach seemed easy, but the inconsistent formations underlying
the Cut meant that angles of repose could vary radically from one area of the Cut to the next.122
The only way of adequately dealing with slides was an incessant process of trial and error as
shovels simply removed material until banks stopped moving. While not an elegant solution, the
tremendous amounts of coal still at work in Culebra afforded Gaillard an abundance of energy
capable of mitigating the impact of these slides. While they were troubling, Gaillard suggested
that slides were given "sensational importance" whenever they occurred and that, in reality, they
were little more than inconveniences to the work.123
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Goethals seemed equally confident in the progress of the work at the Canal's terminals.
The Commission refined its plan for the creation of terminal facilities for fueling of ships and
began constructing the coal pits and fuel tanks that would store energy for ships transiting the
Canal. Cristobal, near the Atlantic terminus of the Canal, was dredged to hold a 200,000-ton
coaling station. Two 40,000-barrel storage tanks were under construction on the mainland and
pipes were created to transport the oil from the tanks to waiting ships. The plan for the Pacific
terminus was slightly changed as the capacity of the facility at Balboa doubled from 50,000 tons
to 100,000 tons to deal with the increased traffic expected from the West Coast. Here too, two
40,000-barrel storage tanks were under construction to deal with ships relying on oil.124
Miraflores and Gatun continued to provide the energy necessary for construction at the
lock sites. The Gatun steam plant saw another massive jump in its energy output as it produced
16,263,510 kWh, a jump of nearly 4,000,000 kWh over the previous year. The Miraflores plant
also saw a modest increase in output as it generated 9,552,400 kWh for construction at the
Pacific locks.125 At Gatun, construction on the locks was largely done and progress focused on
the flare walls along the canal approach.126 Construction at Pedro Miguel met with similar
success and more of the auxiliary plant was transferred to Miraflores to focus on the construction
of the lock foundations there. The result was the most productive year of construction yet as
751,540 cubic yards of concrete were poured at Miraflores.127 While there was still work to be
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done, the rapid progress at the locks redirected the attention of Sibert and the Atlantic Division to
developing the Gatun Hydro-electric plant that would power the locks themselves.
The key to constructing the Gatun hydro-electric plant was completing the Gatun Dam.
Material removed from the lock sites was used as fill for the massive structure, and by the end of
the year nearly 20,000,000 cubic yards of material had been pumped and carried to the
structure.128 Largely this work progressed without incident. The lone challenge facing the dam's
completion was increasing concern that the angle of repose for the dam was too steep and could
shift if the Chagres ran particularly strongly. In response, Sibert and his engineers lowered the
dam's height while simultaneously making the slopes supporting it more gradual.129 These
decisions provided a degree of stability for the dam and made it far more conducive to the
creation of the power plant and by May of 1912, a steam shovel began working on gouging out
the spillway where the hydroelectric plant would be located.130
While undoubtedly important, selecting and preparing the site for the dam was only one
part of the equation. In September of 1911, H.F. Hodges, head of the Engineering Division,
shared the specifications for the electric equipment and explained how it would be connected to
the dam. The main generator consisted of three 2,000 kW units powered by three 2250 kW
turbines located along the spillway.131 The current would be conveyed by transmission lines to
the locks themselves where a total of 36 transformers (sixteen at Gatun, eight at Pedro Miguel,
and twelve at Miraflores) converted the 2,200 volts received from the power plant to 220
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volts.132 This voltage powered 966 motors spread across the three locks that handled tasks
ranging from opening and closing the lock gates to powering the electric locomotives that carried
ships through the Canal. This complex network of wires, motors, and transformers ran
throughout the foundations of the locks, forming copper arteries that would allow ships to transit
the locks.133 While construction on these systems didn't begin in earnest until the summer of
1912, the ICC awarded contracts for the hydraulic equipment to the Pelton Waterwheel
Company, and the electrical equipment to General Electric in November of 1911. Delays in the
delivery of the equipment prevented the ICC from beginning electrical work in earnest, but the
decision to rely on electricity as the dominant source of power for the operation of the locks
marked yet another example of the declining utility of coal. The electricity produced by the
Chagres River was more efficient, economical, and theoretically reliable than what coal could
produce.
As the summer of 1912 arrived, dry excavation was complete nearly everywhere except
for the Culebra Cut. Coal remained the chief source of fuel in the Cut where steam shovels
continued to deal with the entropy of the Panamanian environment, but as the Canal approached
completion, oil and electricity were increasingly dominating energy production and consumption
throughout the Isthmus. The low cost of these energies and their capacity to provide consistent,
economical sources of energy rendered them far more practical for long-term utilization. The
chief development of the year, the acquisition of the materials for the Gatun hydroelectric plant,
suggested that Panama would become an electrical Isthmus rather than a canal of coal.
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Marshaling Maintenance
The summer of 1912 brought with it a tangible decline in the overall consumption of
energy. While human labor and animal labor both increased over the next year, thanks in large
part to efforts to install the lock gates, coal consumption dropped significantly as the Gaillard’s
Central Division approached the end of their work. These developments reflected the changing
objectives of the ICC The Commission had largely completed the extensive landscape alteration
necessary to create an aquatic passage across the Isthmus. The focus now was on adopting an
energy infrastructure that could hold the entropy of the Isthmus at bay and maintain the
consistent operation of the Canal itself. To this end, work focused on the construction of the
Gatun hydroelectric station and the transmission line that would carry current between the
Atlantic and Pacific terminals. This transition was also defined by an aggressive attempt to
remove resources and laborers from the interior of the Canal Zone which would soon be the site
of Gatun Lake. The emphasis placed on the creation of an electrical landscape and the attempts
to eradicate the excavation infrastructure that had helped carve out the canal prism defined the
final era of canal construction and paved the way for the opening of the Canal itself.
The single greatest testament to the changing nature of work in the summer of 1912 was
the first decline in the overall consumption of energy since the commencement of the work.134
The overall decline in energy was fairly modest at only a little over 20,000 tons over the previous
year, and yet the fact that energy consumption declined at all was a substantial but inevitable
change. There were a variety of factors that contributed to this trend but particularly important
was the fact that many of the machines that remained in service were relying on oil as their chief
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source of fuel. By July of 1913, fifteen of the sixteen Panama Railroad Locomotives in mainline
service had been converted to run on oil rather than coal.135 This, in conjunction with the
declining importance of steam shovels, substantially cut into coal usage.
Ironically, the decline in coal was accompanied by a slight resurgence in the value of
human and animal labor. In March of 1913, as work on the lock gates reached its peak, 44,733
human laborers were at work on the Isthmus.136 This influx of labor pointed to one of the
complications faced by the ICC during the final phase of construction. The installation of locks
required a tremendous number of skilled craftsman capable of driving rivets and installing
electrical equipment that required a level of prevision beyond the scope of mechanical labor.
Intriguingly, it wasn’t just on the Canal that human labor increased. The Public Works
Department on the Isthmus constructed roads to connect isolated townsites on the Isthmus with
significant locations like Empire. Animal labor proved valuable to this task and, for the first time
in five years, the ICC found itself purchasing pack animals to help pave roads and transport
people and items.137 More difficult to obtain were human laborers willing to lay roads through
swampy jungles. In response the Public Works department relied on a novel source of labor:
convicts. While convict labor never became prevalent in Panama, the fact that it was used at all
suggested that the ICC certainly still needed human energy even though construction was rapidly
approaching its conclusion.138
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The number of laborers may have been growing at terminal facilities, but it was
dwindling just about everywhere else. Even Gaillard’s Central Division saw a substantial decline
in its energy consumption, labor force (both human and mechanical), and progress during the
year. The Central Division managed to remove 12,828,086 cubic yards during the year, a figure
considerably lower than that removed the preceding year. This decline in productivity was
partially intentional as the Division shrank its mechanized labor force down to only 42 steam
shovels.139
And yet this optimism may have been somewhat premature. Slides continued to increase
projections for the amount material to be removed. By July of 1913 engineers estimated that they
needed to excavate an additional 9,280,237 cubic yards of material. Gaillard suggested that this
substantial increase was "due to the development of new slides as the depth increased and to
increased activity of slides already existing at the beginning of the fiscal year."140 Perhaps the
most compelling argument for the lingering impact of the slides was the fact that of the
12,828,086 cubic yards removed during the year, 5,899,200 cubic yards or 46.67 percent of the
material removed was the result of slides.141 At the end of the previous fiscal year, the division
had been confident that many of the slides, particularly the incessant Cucaracha slide had
reached a stable angle of repose, but an increasingly perturbed Chief Engineer Goethals
concluded simply that this, "had not been realized."142
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The continuing slides were little more than a nagging thorn in the side of construction
until January 20th, 1913. On that day, "the basalt rocks broke and there slid into the Cut
approximately 2,000,000 cubic yards of material extending completely across the Cut, topping
the tracks on the 67-foot level and completely stopping the passage of trains from the north."143
Gaillard attempted to deal with this issue by installing pipes to remove hydraulic material, but
heavy rains in the days following saturated the soil, shifting it further, and snapped many of the
pipes. To finally deal with the slide and remove the material the Division developed a split shift
policy in which shovels worked in both the Cut and on slides for twelve-hour days. This
approach allowed them to make headway but by the end of the year, they still anticipated the
removal of nearly 6,000,000 cubic yards of material from the Culebra and Cucaracha slides
alone.144
These developments indicated that a new course of action was needed. Frustrated with
the challenges presented by the continued reliance on dry excavation, in February of 1913,
Goethals and his engineers proposed flooding the Cut the following October in hopes that slides
would be easier to manage. Some viewed this plan with apprehension. Goethals noted that, "It
has been the general belief that the effect of the water in the Cut would tend to retard slides and
the experience below the Gatun locks in the sustaining power of water against slides fully
justifies this belief; on the other hand the geologist is of the opinion that the water may to some
extent develop new slides."145 Despite the risks, the incessant slides had substantially delayed the
work in the Cut and suggested that a new tactic was needed to deal with Isthmian entropy.
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Considerable work remained to be done before this ambitious plan could be put into
action. Both the Pacific and Atlantic Locks were far from complete and the terminal facilities,
which were now under construction, raised new questions about how the United States would
determine who would have access to these potentially lucrative energy markets. Before the
Commission could consider the completion of the work and the passage of ships through the
locks they had to deal with these issues.
The first issue that the ICC dealt with wasn't physical, but instead political. The
construction of the fueling facilities at the canal terminals had garnered the interest of energy
speculators looking to capitalize on the opportunity to distribute their fuel.146 The ICC was
bombarded by requests from coal dealers who wanted to lease space to supply their coal to ships
refueling at either facility. And yet there was no legislation that gave the United States authority
to lease land apart from a 1909 ordinance allowing land to be used for agricultural purposes. The
government was careful to note however that it did not intend to “exercise a monopoly of the
coal business on the Isthmus.”147 To this end, they decided to allow companies and individuals to
rent out space at the two handling facilities for a reasonable rental fee and a merchandise tax of
five cents for each ton of coal sold.148 This policy mitigated their issue, but also pointed to the
substantial energy markets created by the Canal’s opening.
In addition to questions over the energy trade, the ICC also faced the task of completing
the construction of its terminal facilities. Electricity still provided the dominant source of energy
for the construction and maintenance of these facilities. The Miraflores powerplant remained
productive, generating over 9,000,000 kilowatt hours between July of 1912 and June of 1913, but
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the Gatun plant only produced 10,315,790 kilowatt hours during that same period.149 While this
was a substantial decline in productivity, it pointed to the fact that much of the work being done
by the construction plant at Gatun was effectively done. Simultaneously, the Gatun hydroelectric plant was close to coming on line and the Atlantic division began transferring equipment
to that facility.
The major challenge facing the Pacific Division was the fact that it no longer existed.
S.B. Williamson resigned in December of 1912 claiming that he had completed enough of the
work to render a full division unnecessary. Goethals disagreed. The Chief engineer was incensed
by what he saw as Williamson’s betrayal and reluctantly created the Fifth Division to finish the
remaining construction.150 In some ways, Williamson may have been correct. During the
remainder of the year, the Fifth Division poured an additional 58,262 cubic yards of concrete at
Pedro Miguel, bringing the total to 906,187 cubic yards and leaving only specialized structures
such as lighting towers and control sheds left to build.151 Miraflores faced some challenges with
slides, particularly along the western wall, but here too construction progressed rapidly and by
July 1913 the Fifth Division had nearly completed concrete work at Miraflores.152
Sibert’s Atlantic Division operated far more smoothly than the Pacific Division. The
advanced state of work on the locks meant that, except for cleaning up some slides and finishing
a bit of the foundation, the Atlantic division focused on the completion of the Gatun Dam and the
construction of the hydroelectric power plant that would provide the energy necessary to operate
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both sets of locks. By July of 1913, the dam had been entirely filled and the concrete at the
spillway was 98% completed.153 The quick work on the dam and the spillway opened the door
for the creation of the power station itself. Sibert initially focused on creating the superstructure
in which the equipment would be housed. Work on this front moved swiftly and on May 16th,
1913 erection of the superstructure began at the site. Over the course of the month, the Division
installed 65% of the steel, cased the penstocks in concrete and completed much of the structural
work for the generators.154
Delays in the delivery of steel meant that electrical equipment was not installed until the
summer of 1913. In the meantime, the ICC focused its attention on preparing the infrastructure
that would carry the current from the hydroelectric station to the locks at both the Pacific and
Atlantic terminals.155 At the Atlantic Locks, the Electrical Division began installation of the
motors, switchboards, and breakers that distributed the power coming from the hydroelectric
plant. By the end of the year, all electrical equipment necessary for the operation of the gates was
delivered and nearly 25% of it was installed.156 This work was supplemented by a tremendous
amount of ductwork at both facilities. The ICC placed orders for 2,372,110 feet of insulated
wires to convey electricity through the facilities. By the end of the year, the order had been filled
and the Division had already run over 400,000 feet through ducts at the lock sites and
hydroelectric station.157 The massive amount of electrical work done suggested just how close
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construction was to concluding and also reinforced the central role the hydroelectric station and
Miraflores plant would play in the operation of the Canal.
All the duct work and cabling in the world was useless however without access to the
electricity being generated at the hydroelectric plant. Arguably the most important development
during the spring of 1913 was the decision to construct a 44,000-volt transmission line between
Balboa and Cristobal, connecting the Gatun and Miraflores plants.158 This transmission line was
crucial to the successful operation of the Canal as it provided redundancy should either of the
power plants go offline. The line consisted of duplicate 3-phase lines draped atop 40-foot steel
towers spaced in 300-foot intervals (200 feet along curves) alongside the Panama railroad. This
line connected four substations located at Cristobal, Gatun, Miraflores, and Balboa, allowing the
ICC to distribute power to each of those sites.159 Once this transmission line and the
hydroelectric power plant were connected, the Canal Zone would have a steady reliable source of
power that could both ensure the continued operation of the Canal itself and provide power and
light throughout the Canal Zone.
The creation of the transmission marked the energetic shift taking place in Panama. As
energy consumption on the Isthmus decreased, the dream of connecting the oceans neared
realization. Slides remained problematic, but the decision to flood the Culebra Cut in October of
1913 suggested that the era of dry excavation was coming to an end. Meanwhile, a massive
human labor force directed its substantial, and specialized energy at the tasks of erecting the
locks gates and the electrical subsystems that controlled them. Perhaps most importantly the ICC
made considerable progress on the installation of the Gatun hydroelectric station, and the
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network of poles and wires that would carry its current throughout the Canal Zone. In this sense,
1913 marked a passing of the torch. Coal still provided valuable energy to ships looking to refuel
on their way through Panama, and still was essential to the operation of dredges and a few
remaining steam shovels, but electricity and oil had established themselves as equally important
in the energy network that powered the Canal Zone.
The End of an Era
Woodrow Wilson's electrifying detonation of the Gamboa Dam and the subsequent
flooding of the Culebra Cut may have been the most dramatic moment of the fall of 1913, but the
most important development was the completion of the locks and the creation of the electrical
infrastructure that operated them. Completing the Gatun hydroelectric station, and the
transisthmian transmission line, as well as installing electrical equipment at the locks themselves
soon became the primary focus of the work. In addition, the Commission expanded efforts begun
during the previous fiscal year to remove material and manpower from the Isthmian interior in
anticipation of the Canal's opening. For arguably the first time the ICC had to reckon with an
overabundance of energy rather than a shortage of it.
The dwindling nature of the work on the Isthmus was reflected in the sharp decline in
energy consumption that started in July of 1913. This trend impacted nearly all facets of the
Isthmian energy regime but was most prevalent in the coal and human energy that had been so
crucial to excavation. The ICC made the decision to abolish Gaillard’s Central Division on
October 10th, 1913, the same day the Gamboa Dam was blown.160 The closure of the
Commission’s last major dry excavation force coincided with a stark decline in coal usage during
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the next twelve months as coal consumption dipped by over 130,000 tons.161 The end of
excavation and the near completion of the locks also catalyzed a decline in human labor on the
Isthmus as well. At the beginning of July 1913, the labor force stood at 43,350 men; a year later,
in July of 1914, it had dropped by nearly a third, down to 29,673, the lowest total since
December of 1907.162 Whether tracked in manpower or machinery the trend during the fiscal
year 1914 was the same, energy was leaving the Isthmus.
Disassembling the massive network of muscle and machine that had driven Isthmian
excavation for the last decade was a formidable task. The Supply Division noted that "To meet
these changes, it has been necessary to transfer thousands of employees and millions of dollars'
worth of material."163 The Division had to transport these men and material from the interior to
port facilities and from there either back to America or other ports where they were in demand.
The Mechanical Division and its primary repair facility at Gorgona were gradually taken out of
service. Meanwhile the Division retired nearly 80 locomotives and 800 cars while losing
manpower and closing facilities.164 Where it could, the ICC sought to get a return for its
equipment. During the year they managed to sell eighteen of their steam shovels and 24 of their
locomotives.165 The era of the steam fueled behemoths was ending.
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Managing excess human energy also proved troubling. The sharp decline in employment
on the Isthmus garnered a substantial emigration from Panama. For Americans, this was simple,
as the ICC furnished them with tickets back to the States, but many West Indian laborers were
either loath to return to the poverty-stricken islands they had left behind or simply couldn't afford
passage back home. Seeing an opportunity to acquire cheap labor, the United Fruit Company set
up a labor agent in the Canal Zone to recruit from the ranks of silver laborers. Roughly 2,000
others made their way to Honduras in search of opportunity and thousands of others ventured to
Costa Rica. Thousands more attempted to stay in Panama in hopes of obtaining long-term
employment on the operation of the Canal.166 This created a challenge for the ICC which lacked
adequate housing at the canal terminals. In response, the Commission created the village of La
Boca. To keep the costs of construction down, the ICC simply removed buildings and homes
from retired silver townsites and reassembled them at La Boca.167 The speed with which this
allowed the ICC to construct the townsite was imperative given the brief timetable in which La
Boca had to be ready to accommodate laborers.
Despite the considerable resources invested in removing unnecessary components of the
energy network in Panama, the chief focus during the year was the erection of the gates and
locks, and the hydroelectric station and transmission line that supported them. Excavation
continued after the Culebra Cut was filled in October, but dry excavation was conducted by only
a small force of five shovels which worked mitigating the Culebra and Cucaracha slides.168 The
heavy lifting fell mostly under the purview of the dredges, which now worked not only in the
locks and approaches but also the Culebra Cut. The fleet had grown from a handful of ships to
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upwards of twenty dredges of various makes and models. During the year they became the chief
source of earthmoving for the ICC and removed 15,341,371 cubic yards of material.169 This
substantial contribution effectively cleared the Canal. The only obstacle remaining in the way of
the opening of the Isthmus was now the work being done at the locks and the hydroelectric
station that supported it.
Work on the electrical energy network continued to progress. Slow deliveries of steel and
challenges in erecting the powerhouse on the Gatun spillway prevented the installation of
electrical equipment at the hydroelectric station, but H.F. Hodges, the head of the First Division,
was confident that as soon as these logistical obstacles were overcome things would progress
rapidly.170 In the meantime, the Division directed its attention to constructing the transmission
line and installing electrical equipment at the locks. In August of 1913, a group of 16 gold
laborers and 305 silver laborers began drilling holes for the transmission towers and laying the
concrete foundations. Simultaneously they distributed materials across the interior so that once
these foundations were laid, they could be easily completed. By the end of the month they had
finished 92 of the foundations and within just two months that number ballooned to 379.171 The
rapid pace of the transmission line construction was cause for optimism and pointed to how far
construction work in Panama had progressed.
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The ICC had another reason to celebrate at the locks themselves. In January of 1914, the
lock gates were fully installed at each of the three sets of locks. The Pedro Miguel gates were
completed on the 8th, Miraflores on the 19th and Gatun on the 26th. The installation of the
electrical equipment at the locks also progressed nicely. At Gatun, 88% of the equipment was
installed and both Miraflores and Pedro Miguel sat at 86%.172 The concrete work was completed
at all three locations during the course of the year with the exception of minor structures and
finishing work necessary for lighting fixtures.173 Finally, the installation of the machinery and
electrical system necessary for the operation of the miter gates also progressed well. All required
equipment had been installed at Gatun in February of 1914, at Pedro Miguel in March of 1914,
and at Miraflores in May of 1914. The locks were ready, the only question was when the
electricity necessary to power them would be available.
By March of 1914, the hydroelectric station was taking shape. The Hodges believed that
the First Division had completed roughly 85% of the work on the station and was so optimistic
that they could begin small-scale tests in April or May.174 This development accompanied by
news that the transmission line was being constructed at a rapid pace. By the end of March,
laborers had laid the foundations for 793 transmission towers and only 16 remained to be
completed. Additionally, they had strung over 33 miles worth of transmission lines. Hodges was
so enthused by this progress that he noted, "At the present rate of progress, the indications are
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that the construction work on the transmission line will be nearly completed before the end of the
month in April."175
Despite a few hiccups, by June of 1914, the hydroelectric plant and the transmission line
connecting it with the Miraflores plant were completed. The Transmission line ran 44.46 miles
and consisted of 266 miles of 2/0 copper stranded wire and 88 miles of copper grounded wire.176
The Gatun hydroelectric plant was completed. In anticipation of the plant’s opening, the ICC
transferred one 1,500 kW turbo-generator sets and two water boilers from the Gatun steam
power plant to the Miraflores power plant and finished installing them on June 1st. As a result,
the Miraflores plant outproduced the Gatun plant for the first time, generating 16,352,732
kilowatt hours compared to the Gatun plant's 6,824,556 kilowatt hours.177 While this
arrangement was temporary and the hydroelectric plant was expected to begin supporting canal
operations in July of 1914, the month of June suggested that both the transmission line and the
Miraflores powerplant were up to the task of powering the Canal if necessary. The energy to
power the gates was in order and the Panama Canal was ready to be unveiled to the world.
The first vessel to make the voyage across the Panama Canal got little press. The
Cristobal made the journey back and forth across the Isthmus on August 3, 1914, without any
pageantry or prestige. This was intentional. The Cristobal was the sister ship to the Ancon, the
War Department steamship set to make the official inaugural trip across the Isthmus two weeks
later. Yet if the enthusiasm which greeted the Ancon as it set off on August 15th was any greater
it was difficult to tell. While the Ancon held numerous dignitaries, it generated little press
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internationally. In many newspapers, the Ancon's voyage fell to the bottom of the front page, or
off it entirely. By August of 1914 papers in America looked east rather than south as the most
powerful nations in the world prepared to fight and die on the fields of Europe. The opening of
the Panama Canal, heralded by some as the greatest man-made structure ever, was relegated to
little more than an afterthought.178
Locked into Energy
World War One may have drawn the public gaze away from the Canal, but the path
between the seas still occupied a place of prominence on the global stage. Ships laden with coal,
oil, food, metals and countless other materials soon flowed en masse through the towering locks
of Gatun, Pedro Miguel, and Miraflores. The dream of interoceanic transportation had finally
been realized. Over the course of a decade, the energy regime of the Canal had diversified,
shifting from a reliance almost exclusively on human energy and coal to also include oil and
electricity, sources of energy that were far more economical and efficient for fixed landscapes
and power plants. The addition of these new energies also contributed to the massive
proliferation of energy in which the sheer concentration of a broad array of energy sources
provided enough power to finally mitigate the entropic tendencies that had defined the Isthmus
for decades. As excavation wound down and the ICC focused its attention on the process of
construction, oil and electricity became particularly significant as their steady, reliable, and
economic energies proved perfect for the construction and operation of the locks. The flexibility
afforded by the variety of energy sources employed by the ICC allowed the Commission to wield
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whatever source of energy was best suited to tasks ranging from dredging harbors, to detonating
rock formations, to constructing roads, housing, and power lines.
And yet, while the entropic tendencies of Panama’s climate were mitigated, the fixed
landscape of concrete and steel that was left behind faced its own limitations. The tension
between energy’s capacity to impose order over the Panamanian landscape and the fixed nature
of the order it imposed created challenges for the long-term viability of the Canal. Ironically, the
limits of the Canal’s efficacy were foreshadowed by the events surrounding its opening. While
World War One didn’t fundamentally challenge the role that the Canal played in international
commerce, it did fundamentally change the nature of war. The growing importance of aerial
combat created a new set of concerns for Canal security and suggested that as war became more
complex so did threats to the Canal.
Additionally, the energy proliferation that helped construct the Canal also hinted at its
limitations. The growing importance of oil as a source of fuel was not isolated to the Canal. As
the 20th century progressed oil was found to be increasingly abundant and efficient as a source of
fuel for a variety of machines. The technological explosion that took place during WWI and the
rise of the automobile in the first decades of the 20th century helped reinforce the growing
primacy of oil and dictated that the transportation of substantial amounts of oil was imperative to
international commerce. To most efficiently transport this new commodity, merchants
recognized that it was far more economical to maximize the size of their vessels to carry as much
petroleum as they could. The massive locks were by no means in danger of imminent
obsolescence, but the increasing size of ships progressed far more rapidly than canal lobbyists
had ever imagined.
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In this sense energy proliferation took place far more rapidly than the landscape it created
could hope to keep pace with. The creation of the Canal required a monumental marshaling of
energies of all sorts, at no small cost to the United States government. And yet as ships became
bigger and threats to the Canal began to come not only from the sea but also from the air,
questions of the Canal's longevity soon emerged. The lack of available energy following the
completion of the Canal, a product of entropy and an unwillingness on the part of the US
government to continue their considerable investments in Panama, made alterations of the
waterway impractical both energetically and economically. As war once again loomed on the
horizon, new energy sources, security, and ship size combined to present a unique challenge to
the Canal's operation. These factors suggested the U.S. needed to explore expansions to the
Canal or even the possibility of constructing a new canal. As scientists, engineers, and politicians
grappled with these problems they found that energy once again shaped the Canal and its future.
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Chapter IV: The Canal, Fixed: The Limits of the Panama Canal: 1914-1947
Roughly eight inches separated the hull of the USS Missouri from the concrete sides of
the Miraflores Locks. On October 13, 1945, the battleship transited the Panama Canal, traveling
from the Pacific en route to New York City where it was to take part in Navy Day celebrations.
Commissioned in June of 1944, the Missouri became a symbol of American victory in WWII
when Japanese officials signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender on board the vessel on
September 2, 1945. And yet the battleship was also a symbol of the challenge faced by the
Panama Canal. The 887 by 108 foot battleship was one of the last US naval vessels specifically
designed with the utilization of the Panama Canal in mind and reflected just how dramatically
World War II had altered warfare.1 The Canal proved itself an invaluable asset to the American
war effort. In 1945 alone, over 6000 American military vessels transited the Canal, constituting
nearly 62% of total traffic for the year.2 And yet Canal Zone Governor Joseph Mehaffey was
careful to point out that, "The services rendered by the Panama Canal in support of military
operations were possible only because the Canal was never attacked or damaged."3 The
emergence of aircraft carriers, saturation bombing, and atomic weaponry constituted an
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existential threat to the Canal and pointed to a growing perception of obsolescence surrounding
the only three-decade-old waterway.
These developments were a result of the steps Canal engineers had taken to establish
permanence and stability over the unstable environment of the Canal. If entropy worked to
disrupt that which energy had made possible, permanent structures made from concrete could
mitigate landslides and siltation that would require considerable injections of energy to counter.
Ironically, their success presented a fundamental challenge to the long-term utility of the Canal.
The fixed Canal proved difficult to adapt and required an unprecedented investment of capital
and energy to modernize. As ships grew larger, traffic more voluminous, and weapons more
destructive, the rigidity of the Canal complicated both interoceanic commerce and American
national security.
These limitations did not arrive without warning. From its very opening, the Canal faced
difficulties. Landslides remained problematic in the years following its opening, halting traffic
for considerable periods. Perhaps more significantly, the first few decades of the Canal's life
were defined by global upheavals and economic instability. The Canal had the misfortune of
opening alongside the outbreak of World War I. As chaos and conflict tore through Europe,
international shipping waned, and the Canal failed to attract as much traffic as lobbyists had
anticipated. The 1920s presented a golden age of sorts for the Canal. Booming markets in the
United States led to growth in intercoastal shipping and Americans relied on the Canal to
expedite this process. Globally, recovering European markets and expanding Asian markets also
found the Canal an asset. This increase in traffic outpaced predictions of canal usage and raised
uncomfortable questions about the Canal's capacity.
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The global depression of the 1930s mitigated these concerns somewhat but came with its
own difficulties for the Canal as traffic again dropped.4 Global instability in the 1910s, ’20s, and
’30s made predictions of the Canal's viability imprecise and generated more questions than
answers. While they never presented an existential threat to the Canal in the same way that
WWII did, WWI, the ’20s, and the Depression emphasized that the Canal didn’t exist in
isolation, but instead was intimately interconnected with global markets and politics. As these
forces collided in 1939 and the world found itself again drawn into an unprecedented conflict,
the Canal’s fate seemingly hung in the balance.
Emphasizing the shifting place the Canal had in the minds of Americans complicates the
notion that the Canal was completed in 1914 and had a static existence from that point onwards.5
Nothing could be further from the truth. Little over a decade after its completion, economists,
engineers, administrators began to wonder about the lifespan of the path between the seas. As a
result, the Canal was constantly being both ideologically and physically altered. Studies
suggested fixes to the Canal's long-term viability issues, and the Panama Canal Company
conducted repairs and maintenance to keep its waterway in working order.6 These attempts at
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themselves in the lock overhauls that were scheduled every four years. Some projects, however, were
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maintenance of a suitable amount of water to operate the locks. The creation of Madden Dam in the
1930s was a direct response to this and suggested the sort of renovations necessary to maintain the
Canal's efficacy in a rapidly changing world. For the most complete account of this process see Ashley
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imposing order and realizing the Canal’s promise of restructuring global trade were reflective of
the ongoing issues that pestered the waterway during its first few decades of operations and
pointed to the need for continual maintenance and injections of energy to keep it running
smoothly.
At their core, these issues all stemmed from the same reality. The Canal's builders had
met their task of imposing order on an entropic environment far too effectively. In hopes of
keeping the shifting soils and mucks of Panama at bay, they relied on the stability afforded by
concrete and steel. These materials fixed the Canal against the unwanted entropy of the Isthmus,
but also fixed it against desired changes. It was impossible to increase the capacity of the entire
canal without first overcoming the limitations placed on ship size and transit time imposed by the
locks. This reality was troubling in the 1910s, ’20s, and ’30s when war and global upheaval
suggested that the demands of global commerce may be just as fickle, if not more so, than the
Panamanian environment. Changes in technology, ship size, and global trade occurred more
rapidly than the canal locks could accommodate and foreshadowed the threats looming in the
Canal's future. World War II manifested these threats as the dramatic implications of mechanized
warfare and atomic technology were laid bare. These technologies presented an existential threat,
both physically and ideologically, to the Canal. The waterway needed to adapt to remain
relevant. The only question was whether the Panama Canal Company and the US government
could overcome the fixed nature of the Canal itself.

Carse, Beyond the Big Ditch: Politics, Ecology, and Infrastructure at the Panama Canal, (Cambridge, US:
The MIT Press, 2014).
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Sliding out of the Gate: 1914-1930
When the Canal opened in August of 1914, it was heralded as the arrival of a new epoch.
Canal advocates believed that the interoceanic passageway would usher in a new era of wealth
and opportunity the world around. William MacCorkle, ex-governor of the state of West
Virginia, expressed the enthusiasm of many, arguing that, thanks to the Canal, peoples “yellow,
brown, and white- filled with the desires of new commerce, fired with new hope by the touch of
the West, thrilled with new ideas of government and religion are all mingled in one tremendous
combat for the mightiest markets vouchsafed to man since the stars sung together.”7 The
implications were clear. Bridging the Isthmus had reorganized the world. Now it was time to
capitalize on the opportunities the waterway offered.
And yet the Canal's promise of wealth proved elusive. It was an old adversary that
initially laid low the hopes of speculators. The incessant entropy of Panama once again caused
slides in the Culebra (or as it came to be known "Gaillard") Cut. Throughout 1914 and early
1915 the slides, while problematic, never halted traffic for more than a week. While this was
frustrating, it didn't undermine the utility of the Canal. That changed on September 15, 1915,
however. A massive slide in the Cut sent tons of material crashing into the Canal itself.
Ultimately the Canal was practically inoperable until April of 1916, over six months after the
slide had initially taken place.8 The slide served as a sobering reminder that while the
Panamanian environment could be altered, it could never truly be controlled. This point was
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reinforced by the continued occurrence of small slides over the coming years. Fortunately for the
Panama Canal Company, future slides never halted traffic for more than a few days. This was not
the end of the Canal's challenges, however. Warfare proved a far more difficult obstacle to
overcome.
World War I’s capacity to overshadow the Canal went unmitigated in the years following
the Canal’s opening. The spread of warfare dramatically impacted international commerce and
prevented the Canal from asserting itself as dramatically as MacCorkle and others anticipated.
Between 1914 and 1918, traffic through the Canal averaged between 1000 to 2000 vessels
annually, peaking in 1918 when 2,460 ships transited the Canal carrying 7,526,000 tons of
material.9 These modest numbers reflected the dramatic consequences that global instability
could have on canal traffic. The fact that conflict was focused in Europe and that American
manufacturing was primarily rooted on the East Coast at the time meant that interoceanic travel
waned next to the centrality of Atlantic shipping. The Panama Canal had been built on the hope
that global trade routes were dynamic and would evolve to meet demand, its architects hadn't
assumed that those forces could route traffic away from the Canal as well. The silver lining,
however, was that, apart from the slides, the fault lay not with the Canal itself, but rather with the
powers utilizing it. Global conflict focused traffic elsewhere, but in the recovery that followed
World War I, the Canal stood poised to be a crucial part of the global economy.
The 1920s saw the value of the Canal asserted with remarkable efficacy. Americans
accounted for over 30% of the traffic flowing through the Canal during the decade, and as the
American economy ballooned in the 1920s so too did Canal traffic.10 But it wasn’t the United
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States alone that was responsible for the glut of vessels pouring through the Isthmus. The
postwar recovery saw Europe using the Canal extensively to access raw materials in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, Japan’s emergence on the world stage was accompanied by an increase in vessels
seeking Asian markets.11 All of these forces coalesced to consistently increase traffic during the
postwar years. Between 1920 and 1930 net vessel tonnage increased by nearly 20,000,000 tons
and traffic increased threefold, peaking in 1929 when 7,800 ships used the Canal. Growth was so
dramatic that, only 15 years after the opening of the Canal, many began to wonder when
additional facilities would be required to handle the increase in traffic.12
The emergence of the Panama Canal was tied as much to energy as it was to postwar
economic booms. While many commodities made their way between Atlantic and Pacific during
the decade, petroleum dominated international shipping throughout the decade. Rich oil fields in
California catalyzed an economic boom in which tens of millions of tons of oil were shipped
from the Pacific to the Atlantic.13 11,000,000 tons of petroleum crossed the Isthmus in 1924
alone. While it dwindled as the decade progressed, petroleum remained the single biggest
commodity in Panama Canal traffic.14 Indeed, oil was so central to the Panama route that when
studies were made to predict future traffic trends, most projections analyzed oil independently as
they were concerned that integrating it with other commodities would skew their projections.15
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Oil provided the energy to fuel these booming economies and helped the Canal attain a central
place among the trade routes of the world.
As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s and the global economy collapsed, the Canal found
itself once again at the mercy of forces beyond its control. Traffic through the Canal declined,
and those ships that did make their way through the locks seldom carried a full load of cargo.
Traffic fell precipitously during the first few years of the 1930s, bottoming out at 5,490 transits
in 1933.16 At no point during the Depression did traffic drop to the anemic levels it had been at
during World War I but the substantial drop in utilization did shake faith in the Canal’s economic
stability. As the 1930s went on, traffic recovered, nearly reaching the levels it had been at in the
late 1920s by 1939.17 The Canal had once again managed to weather the storm.
And yet instability was the defining characteristic of the Canal's first two decades of
existence. The slides that had halted traffic in 1915 and 1916 pointed to the need for continual
maintenance of the waterway to retain its utility. Diplomatic and economic entropy in the form
of warfare, economic booms, and relapses all pointed to the tenuousness of the Canal's position
on the global stage. Thanks to this chaos, it was difficult for administrators to determine how
effective the Canal truly was. If the Canal were going to see the rapid expansions in traffic that
had characterized the 1920's, then it was imperative that studies be made into potential
expansions and additions immediately. If, on the other hand, the 1920s were an aberration and
the 1930s were indicative of the future the Canal could handle traffic for the foreseeable future.
Starting in the 1920s, economists, military officials, and policymakers sought to unravel the
enigma that was the Canal's place in the world. In the process, they restructured the Canal,
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generally ideologically as the Canal's concrete structure resisted change, but at times even the
waterway itself was altered in the name of increasing capacity.
Damming Studies and New Locks
Thanks in large part to the unpredictability of the interwar years, the Panama Canal
Company and the US Government spent a considerable amount of resources trying to understand
the role the Canal was destined to play in international commerce. Starting in 1924, the Canal
was the subject of regular studies to determine its capacity and develop plans for its expansion.
Thanks to the volatility of the data academics had at their disposal, the bulk of these studies
failed to accurately predict traffic trends and, as a result, few tangible steps were actually taken
to expand the Canal. More often than not, the only alterations made to the Canal were regularly
scheduled lock overhauls conducted every four years. As the 1930s emerged, however, the
government became more proactive in restructuring the Canal, providing the funds and resources
to carry out two substantial Canal alteration projects: the Madden Dam, and the Third Locks
projects. These two projects sought to expand the capacity of the Panama Canal in anticipation of
the larger ships, and greater volume of traffic that loomed on the horizon. The world was
changing, and the Canal struggled to change with it.
Long-term traffic projections were initiated as early as the construction of the Canal.
Emory Johnson, an economist contracted by the Isthmian Canal Commission was the first to
compile a projection for future canal traffic in 1904. Johnson revised his estimates in 1912,
closer to the Canal's opening to account for the adoption of a lock-style level canal. A decade
later Major Clarence Ridley, an engineer working on the Canal, applied the rate of growth in
traffic from the Suez Canal to the Panama Canal. Finally, a paper by Lieutenant Hans Kramer
was published in the Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers in August of
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1928.18 While important, these initial estimates tended to shy away from the topic of when the
Canal would reach its capacity. They suggested the Canal would not approach this problem until
some amorphous date in the 1960s or later. As a result, while they were valuable, they didn't
constitute a call to action, but rather a more detached analysis of the Canal's value.
As the true scope of the expansion of interoceanic commerce made itself felt during the
1920s however, studies into traffic became far more concerned with the need to expand Canal
facilities. In 1929 Congress passed a Joint resolution to conduct a study into the capacity of the
Canal and the potential development of Canal facilities to accommodate growths in traffic.19 The
studies explored a variety of topics surrounding the Canal's utility, including the most substantial
projection of future canal traffic yet undertaken. Sydney Williamson's 1931 study was the first
written with a stated objective of assessing the potential need for expanded facilities. Williamson
combined the relationships of Panama shipping to world trade, the past growth of Panama traffic,
and the relation of Panama traffic to Suez traffic to determine the potential growth of Canal
traffic. Using these three measurements Williamson concluded that the Canal would see
74,145,000 net tons of traffic over 16,757 transits by the late 1960s, a level of traffic that
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exceeded the Canal's capacity.20 The implication was clear. If action was not taken, the Canal
would effectively be obsolete in a few decades time. This study helped catalyze the first major
canal alteration since the waterway’s construction: the creation of Madden Dam.
By the 1930s, ship size was not a pressing concern. Instead, the major limitation faced by
the waterway was maintaining an adequate water supply. The genius of the lock canal was that it
was operated by gravity. Gatun Lake, created by the damming of the Chagres River, provided the
water to fill the locks. Culverts running through the concrete substructure of the locks themselves
were opened to allow water to flow from the lake into the locks. This process was repeated for
each set of locks, allowing ships to rise to the height of Gatun Lake as they entered the Canal,
and gradually return to sea-level as they exited it.21 Panama’s rainy climate allowed this system
to work, generally, but in years of light rainfall traffic occasionally needed to be slowed or halted
due to a lack of water.22 As traffic increased in the 1920s, the water level of Gatun Lake came
under increased scrutiny as the biggest threat to canal operation. The building of Madden Dam in
1935 created Madden Lake (known as Alajuela Lake after control of the Canal reverted back to
Panama), a reservoir that provided an emergency supply of water in case of a drought, and also
served as the perfect site for an additional hydroelectric station.23 For the first time, Canal
administrators dealt with the limitations of the Canal with substantial alterations to the physical
canal, setting a precedent that spanned decades.

20

Bourquard, Summary of Panama Canal Traffic Projections, pg. 3.
Carse, The Big Ditch, pg. 4.
22
Carse’s The Big Ditch provides a far more thorough account of the unique challenges presented by the Canal’s
demand for water and is essential reading on the topic. Carse doesn't focus extensively on Madden Dam but
instead examines how the Dam was just one of many projects which attempted to deal with the hydrological
needs of the Canal as a viable waterway.
23
Bush, Richard (Mechanical-Electrical Section). “Isthmian Canal Studies (I.C.S.) Memo No. 64 Existing Power
System of the Panama Canal,” October 14, 1946. USNA, RG 185, Collection A1 124 Isthmian Canal Studies
Memorandums and Meeting Minutes 1946-1948, Box 2: Folder: ICSM 64-69, pg. 11.
21

186

Spurred on by the success of the Madden Dam, Canal administrators showed an interest
in undertaking additional concrete changes to the Canal's capacity by tackling the limitations of
the locks themselves. Lock dimensions were an increasing topic of conversation during the
1930s as ship size steadily increased. The Navy had long held the view that the locks afforded a
reasonable cap on ship size. But in 1930 and 1931 military officials began advocating for larger
locks. In 1930 and 1931 the Navy Department and U.S. Army Interoceanic Canal Board
submitted reports recommending expanded lock dimensions of 1300 feet by 145 feet and 1200
feet by 125 feet respectively.24 These security concerns soon spilled over into commercial
shipping as well. While Madden Dam was approaching completion in 1935, the Normandie was
constructed. At 1029 feet long and possessing a beam of 117.9 feet, the Normandie was the first
commercial vessel incapable of navigating the locks. Within five years it was joined by the
Queen Mary (1936) and Queen Elizabeth (1940).25 The once gargantuan locks seemed to be
shrinking next to the huge new vessels making their way around the world's oceans.
There were only a small number of vessels too large to fit in the concrete locks, but the
rigidity of the Canal was becoming increasingly problematic thanks to the fact that ship size was
impacting the Canal’s capacity to undertake double lockages. Ultimately, the Canal's capacity
was controlled by the speed at which ships could pass through the locks.26 An obvious way to
increase the efficiency with which ships could traverse the Isthmus was to have two ships
journey through the locks in tandem. In the late 1930s, the Canal averaged roughly 1.08 ships per
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lockage, meaning that the vast majority of ships transiting the Canal were locked individually. It
was suggested that in order to meet the capacity for expanding traffic it might be necessary to
accommodate 1.77 ships per lockage.27 Consequently, it wasn’t necessarily massive vessels of
over 1000 feet that concerned engineers as much as the growing percentage of vessels between
500-600 feet which were unable to pass through the existing locks in tandem.28 The combined
pressure presented by the expansion of naval and commercial vessels too wide to transit the
locks, and an increasing number of ships which were too long to make tandem lockages
highlighted the need for larger locks themselves.
The challenge of expanding the locks was obvious. The concrete locks at Gatun,
Miraflores, and Pedro Miguel had been constructed to last. As a result, it was prohibitively
expensive to expand them. The mechanical infrastructure behind the Canal's operation needed to
be entirely removed and rebuilt to accomplish such a task, a proposal which necessitated sharp
restrictions in traffic in the Canal. While the concrete locks mitigated problems stemming from
entropy, their utility was undermined and constricted by the expansion of ship dimensions.
Congress acted quickly in hopes of heading this problem off at the pass. In 1929, early in the
discussions for Canal expansion, Congress passed Public Resolution 99, which charged the
President to determine the practicality and potential cost of, "such additional locks and other
facilities in the Panama Canal as may be necessary to provide for the future needs of interoceanic
shipping."29 The study lasted several years and while it did suggest that the government consider
the creation of a new set of locks 1200 feet long by 125 feet wide and 42.5 feet deep, when
27
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Governor Julian Schlay submitted his final report in 1934, he determined that the creation of the
Madden Dam had rendered a third set of locks unnecessary until at least 1970.30
The Governor’s optimism proved less than contagious. Less than two years after Schlay
submitted his report Congress passed Public Resolution 85 which authorized the Panama Canal
Governor to investigate a means of expanding the capacity of the Canal for international
shipping. The report, submitted in February of 1939, argued that the United States should begin
construction on a third set of larger locks within the next ten to twelve years at a cost of
$277,000,000. Not content to delay any longer, Congress passed Public Resolution No. 391 in
August of 1939 which granted the Third Locks project an initial budget of $15,000,000 dollars to
begin surveys and excavation. Less than a year later, on July 1, 1940, the dredge Cascadas began
subaqueous dredging on the Atlantic approach.31 The expansion of the Panama Canal was
underway and the potential of overcoming the limitations of the locks was the closest it would be
for half a century.
Construction progressed rapidly in 1940 and 1941. The Special Engineering Division,
created in 1939 to oversee the construction of the Third Locks Project, settled on lock
dimensions of 1200 feet by 140 feet by 45 feet and began excavation at the lock sites.32 The
locks were positioned adjacent to the existing locks and were expected to use similar machinery.
The planning completed, excavation was carried out at a rapid pace in hopes of meeting a
condensed construction timetable of five years.33 By 1942 excavation and dredging at the
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Atlantic Locks and approach were complete and the Pacific Locks had only 1,345,000 cubic
yards left to excavate. What the Third Locks Project could not have anticipated however was the
speed with which WWII would spread. Pulled into the war by the Japanese attack at Pearl
Harbor, the United States militarization necessitated cuts to the Third Locks Project.34 On May
25, 1942, the Secretary of War effectively halted the project, allowing excavation of the Lock
sites to continue, but preventing the construction of the lock facilities themselves.35
Initially, the intention was to continue the work upon the cessation of hostilities, and yet
WWII resulted in such drastic developments in warfare that the Third Locks Project was itself
deemed an imperfect solution to the long-term viability of the Canal. The Third Locks Project
then was the last gasp of a dying world, one in which vessels with beams of 110 feet were a
rarity and threats to the Canal resided primarily in naval vessels and invading armies. While
there were whispers of the Canal's obsolescence in the 1920s and 1930s, there were no
existential threats to its existence. World War II ushered in a dangerous new world in which
aerial combat became a crucial component of warfare. This development presented new
challenges to the lock canal. The concrete locks and dams that had mitigated the entropy of
Panamanian environment and made the interoceanic highway possible were incredibly
susceptible to a new form of energy, one which could shatter concrete, bend steel, and render the
Canal impassible for years at a time.
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Aircraft Carriers and Atoms
As oil-fueled war machines spread around the world in the early 1940s, it became
increasingly apparent that warfare had fundamentally changed. The prevalence of mechanized
warfare ushered in a faster, more mobile, and increasingly aggressive style of conflict that
seemed alien to the static fortifications and trench lines of World War I. A fixed concrete and
steel structure dotted with immobile fortifications; the Panama Canal found itself woefully
unprepared for this development. The locks of the Canal had been constructed to withstand
attack from naval shellings and invading armies. It was completely unequipped to deal with the
prevalence of aerial combat and the aircraft carriers and atomic bombs that accompanied it. The
complexity and the rigidity of the locks, once the source of the Canal’s salvation, had become its
single greatest vulnerability. James Stratton, the Chief Engineer of the Special Engineering
Division of the Panama Canal, admitted that, in light of advances in aerial warfare, “no
reasonable amount of structural alteration would greatly decrease the vulnerability of the present
locks."36 The efficacy of the Panama Canal was once again under siege, this time however
obsolescence didn’t reside in a vague future date; it had arrived.
The first challenge to the Canal's utility was one that had been foreseen but had arrived
far earlier than anticipated: the arrival of military vessels that could not transit the Canal. In a
report to Congress, Governor Mehaffey noted that "Until World War II, the present lock
chamber width of 110 feet and length of 1000 feet were accepted as a rigid limitation on the
design of U.S. Navy ships. However, several U.S. warships constructed during the war exceed
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the dimensions of the present locks and are therefore unable to utilize the Canal."37 The warships
guilty of ignoring the confines of the Canal were the aircraft carriers that proved so crucial to
combat in the Pacific. The unique demands of island hopping, namely the need to deploy shortranged aircraft with radical mobility in a theater where land was sparse and airfields practically
nonexistent, catalyzed the shift towards aircraft carrier battlegroups. The US quickly recognized
the utility of these vessels and Essex- and, towards the end of the war, Midway- class carriers
became the backbone of the American Navy.38
While older Yorktown class carriers could transit the locks, the newer carriers dwarfed the
locks. The massive CVB class had a length of 1190 feet and a beam of 130 feet, and its flight
deck and gun emplacements led to an actual width of over 150 feet. While smaller, with a length
of only 962 feet and a beam of 106 feet, the C-2 couldn't transit the locks thanks to the 160 foot
width of its flight deck.39 These carriers were among the first ships incapable of utilizing the
locks, but the Navy acknowledged that larger ships would likely become increasingly prevalent.
A 1946 Navy Department report stated that "The size of future naval vessels is of necessity a
matter of conjecture. The trend in design may well develop towards holding to present sizes or
even to smaller vessels and lead away from mammoth ship construction, but at the present time,
a tendency towards smaller vessels has not actually developed. In fact, the trend towards
increased dimensions still continues."40 In this context, the limited size of the locks grew
increasingly problematic.
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The concrete foundation of the locks and the proximity of the lock lanes meant that it was
impossible to accommodate aircraft carriers and other large vessels without completely
rebuilding the locks themselves. But military officials felt that maintaining the status quo was
equally unacceptable. WWII had both laid bare the Canal's limitations and reinforced the need
for expedited transit between the seas. Governor Mehaffey expressed this tension explicitly,
writing, "Transportation facilities were a limiting factor during World War II, and the loss of the
Canal might well have resulted in grave consequences. It probably would have restricted military
activities and no doubt would have prolonged the war."41 Ultimately the Canal presented the
American military with a sort of catch-22. The Canal had proven itself invaluable to the war
effort, so much so that during the war years the bulk of traffic utilizing Canal facilities was
military in origin. And yet simultaneously, the Canal seemed incapable of dealing with the
changing nature of military combat.
Aircraft carriers may have pointed to the practical limitations of the existing Canal, but
the rise of unprecedented bombing campaigns, both conventional and atomic, could eradicate the
Canal altogether. Mehaffey cautioned that "The vulnerability of the present Canal to any modern
weapons is so marked that dependence cannot be placed on its use in war, and for this reason, the
Canal as it exists today cannot be considered as meeting the future needs of national defense."42
The Canal’s susceptibility to aerial attacks came from the vulnerability of two crucial features,
the locks and dams. While these structures contained the entropy of the Panamanian
environment, they were fragile in the face of the explosive power of bombs. Mehaffey didn’t
mince words when expressing his concerns, writing, “Irreparable damage to a lock canal could
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be inflicted by the hit of a single atomic bomb. Multiple attacks with this weapon, or with
conventional weapons in combination, would mean the loss of use of the Canal for four years."43
Both the locks or the dam could be damaged beyond repair, taking years to rebuild. In the case of
an attack on the dam, it would also drain the artificially constructed summit lake, meaning that
before the Canal could be used again the dam needed to be rebuilt and the lake refilled. The
result would be years without an interoceanic passage, an unacceptable reality.
While atomic bombs constituted the chief threat to the Canal, conventional bombs still
held the potential to destroy the Canal. Conventional explosives expanded in destructive capacity
during the war. New explosives like the ten-ton "blockbuster" were more than capable of
shattering concrete and shredding steel.44 Additionally, aircraft carriers allowed hostile forces to
mobilize considerable numbers of aircraft in areas previously thought isolated and inaccessible.
This meant that a hostile force could theoretically carry out sustained bombing in nearly any
location including the Canal Zone.45 The Canal, while it was equipped with fortifications and
defensive structures, could not withstand such a substantial attack. Conventional explosives
could create craters hundreds of feet wide, more than wide enough to encompass both lanes of
locks.46 While these conventional bombs were dangerous, however, they paled in comparison
next to the destructive capability of nuclear weaponry.
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The dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki pulled the world into a
frightening new era. Fission energy was radically more powerful than any source of energy
humanity had previously harnessed and when applied to the task of destruction it became, in the
words of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, "the destroyer of worlds." Oppenheimer's description
proved prophetic, if perhaps a bit too sophisticated to describe the brutal efficiency of nuclear
explosions. Conventional explosions could crack concrete and bend steel, atomic explosions
could shatter or vaporize concrete and melt steel, leaving thousand-foot craters in their wake.47
What chance did the Canal have in the face of the destroyer of worlds?
The short answer was none. While it was possible that the Canal could recover from the
damage rendered by a conventional bomb, engineers were resigned to the fact that, "the damage
caused by the atomic bomb crater would be so extensive that it would be improbable that any
attempt would be made to repair the lock for further use during the time of war."48 Advances in
the offensive capacity of warfare had advanced more rapidly than the fixed Canal and its
increasingly modest locks could accommodate. This pointed to the tension that stalked the Canal
throughout the decades following its development. Restructuring the Panamanian landscape to
create a canal had taken a decade, millions of dollars, and unprecedented volumes of energy, yet
left in its wake a fixed and static waterway. This meant that alterations to the Canal were
impractical to the point of requiring an equally, if not more extensive investment of energy than
had been required to construct the Canal in the first placed. As a result, the Canal that faced the
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prospect of nuclear annihilation in the aftermath of WWII remained a structure created for an era
in which, “critical forms of attack were envisioned as naval gunfire directed against the locks and
enemy forces moving overland to capture the Canal intact."49 The Canal needed to be
modernized, and the unique challenges presented by WWII laid the defects of the waterway bare.
In response, the government mobilized its resources to try to conclusively deal with these
limitations and overcome the fixed limitations of the Canal that had hindered it over the past
three decades.
Reimagining the Canal
The passage of Public Law 280 on December 28, 1945 was the culmination of the studies
initiated in the 1920s and 1930s. Building on those studies, particularly the 1929 and 1939
studies that paved the way to the Madden Dam and Third Locks projects, Public Law 280 sought
to modernize the Canal. The role that WWII played in impacting this process was undeniable.
When construction on the Third Locks was halted in 1942, it was assumed that work would
resume at the end of the war. And yet due to the development of aircraft carriers, saturation
bombing, and atomic weaponry, it was decided that "The requirements of capacity and security
have changed radically since 1939 when the Third Locks project was conceived."50 The new
studies would need to completely reimagine the Canal in order to ensure its relevance and utility
in the coming decades. To this end Congress charged Governor Joseph Mehaffey, under the
guidance of the Secretary of War, with examining plans to improve passage between the oceans
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either by renovating the existing Canal, constructing a new canal in Panama, or finding another
route that could be used to facilitate interoceanic shipping.51 The quest for a new canal had
commenced.
Mehaffey was well suited to this task. Born in Ohio in 1889, Mehaffey attended West
Point before continuing his education at the Army’s Engineering School. After completing his
degree in 1913, Mehaffey was posted around the world, overseeing engineering projects in
Alaska, France, and Panama over the decades before being promoted Brigadier General in 1942.
Mehaffey’s broad-ranging experience and history with Panama made him well suited to serve as
Governor of the Canal Zone, a post to which he was appointed in 1944.52 While talented,
Mehaffey, busy with the administration of the Canal, couldn’t dedicate all his time to the Canal
Study. To this post was appointed a talented Army Officer, Colonel James Stratton. Stratton’s
career trajectory paralleled Mehaffey’s in many ways. Born in Connecticut in 1898, Stratton
attended West Point during WWI, enlisting in the Army Corps of Engineers after graduating.
During the interwar years, Stratton worked on a variety of projects around the nation but showed
a natural proclivity towards lock and dam engineering, helping build such structures in New
Hampshire, Colorado, and on the Mississippi River. Stratton served with distinction in WWII,
earning both the Legion of Merit and Distinguished Service Cross. After a brief stint
reorganizing the Civil Works Program of the Corps of Engineers, he was transferred to Panama
to take the lead on the studies for a new Isthmian canal in early 1946.53

51

Mehaffey, Joseph. “Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal under Public Law 280, 79th Congress, 1st
Session,” pg. i.
52
Panama Canal Authority, “Joseph C. Mehaffey Biography”, retrieved from
https://www.pancanal.com/eng/history/biographies/mehaffey.html retrieved on 1/2/19
53
Wilson Binger, “James Hobson Stratton” in Memorial Tributes: National Academy of Engineering Volume 3,
National Academies Press, 1989, retrieved from https://www.nae.edu/189327.aspx retrieved on 1/2/19

197

Under the leadership of Stratton, the studies began in earnest. Stratton unified civilian
and military personnel from a variety of backgrounds to carry out an extensive review of the
literature on the Isthmus and to conduct studies to determine the feasibility of a new canal. While
the sheer abundance of personnel led to competing visions of how the studies should progress,
they eventually settled on four key criteria that would shape their quest for a new canal. After
extensive study they determined,
A. At no stage of the operation should we have less canal capacity that at
present. B. The canal capacity should be increased as quickly as possible to
accommodate the largest naval vessels. C. At no stage should the security of the
canal either from a structural or military point of view be less than at present. D.
The sequence of operations should be such that work could be terminated at any
time without jeopardizing the capacity or security of the canal.54
With these four criteria in place, the engineers began an extensive program of study including
experiments into the security of the Canal, reviews and comprehensive estimates of future traffic
patterns, potential construction plans for lock and sea-level canals, plans for alternative sites for
an Isthmian canal, and analyses of the costs of each route. Over the next two years, scientists and
engineers from universities like Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania came together under
the umbrella of Public Law 280 to attempt to deal with the shortcomings of the existing Canal,
and finally, find a way to restructure the fixed locks that had remained unchanged over the
previous three decades.
Understanding Atoms
Unsurprisingly, one of the challenges that Stratton directed the bulk of his resources
towards, and personally involved himself in, was the determination of the threat presented by
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atomic and conventional explosives. While there was ample data on the destructive capacity of
conventional weapons, the increase in the explosive yields of conventional weapons raised
questions about the accuracy of scaling models when applied to new bombs. More concerning
was the complete lack of information on the impact of an atomic attack. To better understand
these phenomena Stratton appointed a Board of Consulting Engineers, who conducted a variety
of tests to determine not only the destructive capabilities of these new weapons but also how they
would impact the unique Panamanian environment. Explosive tests, sandbox studies, scaling
models, slope stability analyses, and data from larger explosions in the United States all helped
scientists gain a better understanding of these weapons and the threat they presented to the Canal.
The Board held a series of conferences in the Canal Zone and at Harvard University in
July, September, and October of 1946 to explore these questions. The engineers’ objective was
to better understand how the unique geological formations of Panama would respond to
conventional and atomic bombing.55 Their chief challenge was assessing the sheer diversity of
terrain along the narrow stretch of land. In response to a question regarding the capacity to
mitigate slope failures due to bombings one of the consultants provided an exasperated response,
claiming, “When you have such a heterogeneous geologic formation as in Panama, I doubt
whether anybody could give an unqualified answer, except one which would be applicable to a
very limited bracket rather than to a total stretch of 50 miles."56 Given that they couldn’t answer
questions about the impact of bombs without first understanding the geological realities of the
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region, the consultants began a concentrated study to better understand the formations that made
up the Canal Zone.
The final report on the geological formations in the Canal Zone identified over a dozen
different formations ranging from Atlantic and Pacific Muck- weak, silty substances that were
easily excavated but highly viscous- to the hard but brittle shales of the Culebra region.57 In
many ways the report merely reinforced what the consultants already knew: the Canal Zone had
a diverse array of soil compositions, each of which reacted to dynamic forces differently. And
yet the report also displayed a considerable growth in the geological knowledge of the Canal
Zone. The continual shock at the slides that plagued the Culebra Cut during Canal construction
suggested that in the 1910s engineers were relying on trial and error to determine the stability of
Isthmian soils. By 1947 their understanding of the local environment had evolved to the point
that they could proactively plan slopes and cuts that could withstand or at least mitigate the force
of explosions. This was a substantial step forward and helped Stratton and his engineers craft
tests and formulas that helped them gain a better understanding of how explosive forces could
unleash the entropy of the Panamanian environment.
The notion of conducting on-site tests in Panamanian formations was surprisingly a novel
one in 1946. Certainly, the ICC had used tremendous amounts of explosives in the creation of the
Canal, but since that point in time, there had been no experiments to understand how exactly
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formations, particularly the Cucaracha and Culebra formations, responded to dynamic forces.58
The 1946 tests consisted of a series of seven detonations in the Cucaracha formation. Engineers
detonated three 25-pound charges, three 75-pound charges and a single charge of 200-pounds.
While modest in size, the tests provided valuable data for the engineers. They suggested that the
consultants’ scaling formulas were accurate, at least as far as conventional explosives were
concerned. In addition, they reinforced just how dramatic the impacts unleashed by explosives
could be on the Panamanian Landscape. Reports of the tests warned, "Since Cucaracha is classed
as rock, its tendency to crater as severely as clay was wholly unexpected."59 These findings
served to reinforce the security concerns of the existing Canal and provided indications of just
how extensive security measures would need to be to create a waterway resistant to bombing.
These localized, on-site explosions were supplemented by a series of laboratory tests that
provided broader data on explosions at various Canal facilities. Among the most frequently
utilized of these tests were so-called "sandbox explosions" in which a four-foot by four-foot box,
filled with a foot of sand, was molded into small-scale replicas of Canal features which were
then subjected to controlled explosions. Scientists observed the craters left by these explosions
and used the data to determine the potential hazards presented by high yield explosives. The tests
reinforced the findings of the Cucaracha blasts and the engineers again concluded that crater size
and diameter tended to be larger than anticipated.60 Engineers used this data to try to determine
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how susceptible the locks were to destruction in an attack. The findings were grim. The
consensus was that a 40,000-pound bomb could damage locks and gates if it exploded at a
distance of 70 feet, a 100,000-pound bomb at a distance of 100 feet and 400,000-pound bomb at
a distance of 1,500 feet. A direct hit against any of the locks or bays would destroy the structure
in question.61 By any metric, conventional explosions held the potential to completely eradicate
the value of a lock canal.
Conventional explosives were certainly a threat to the Canal, and yet they could be
quantified, assessed and understood. Atomic explosives were a completely unknown entity.
Their destructive power had only been unleashed a handful of times to seemingly cataclysmic
effect. Thanks in part to the secrecy that shrouded nuclear weapons, their effects remained a
product of conjecture and guesswork. While they gained access to some classified information to
conduct their studies, Stratton and his underlings also found that they frequently ventured into
the realm of the unknown in their studies of nuclear energy. This was not a cause for comfort.
While studies were conducted into ways to safeguard the Canal against nuclear weapons,
scientists became increasingly aware that they were undertaking an impossible task. The energy
presented by the atom was so massive that no canal would be safe from its devastating
consequences.
The threat of the atomic bomb cast a shadow over the 1947 study. In Colonel Stratton's
welcome to the Board of Consulting Engineers, he identified the atomic bomb as the single most
pressing threat to the Canal and emphasized that any plan for canal security would need to
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mitigate the damage such a bomb could cause.62 With this imperative in mind, the consultants
attempted to conduct experiments and collect data that would allow them to fully understand the
consequences of an atomic detonation.
Studies into the carnage unleashed by an atomic bomb were entirely speculative and the
consultants were quick to point out that they could only really anticipate the physical destruction
rendered by the weapon rather than the consequences of radiation.63 Further complicating
matters was the fact that no one knew quite how rapidly the yield of atomic bombs would
expand. James Darling, one of the consulting engineers, didn’t mince words when cautioning his
fellow engineers, "The limitations of these data are readily recognized when one realizes that the
present atomic bomb (Nagasaki type) is the equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT and that future
bombs may be 10 to 1000 times more powerful."64 Despite these qualifiers, the consultants
attempted to summarize the destructive capacity of the atomic bomb in the Canal. They worked
with the data available to them, using the Nagasaki detonation as their guide and applying its
force to the Panamanian environment.
Their focus wasn’t necessarily on what would happen if an atomic attack was launched
on a canal structure. It was a foregone conclusion that a direct hit from a nuclear weapon would
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vaporize the locks or dam if they were hit, rendering the Canal useless until they were repaired.65
Instead, the consultants' primary concern was gauging how long it would take to recover from a
strike on the Canal prism. As had been the case with conventional explosions, the size of the
crater left behind depended on the material in which it detonated. H.M. Westergaard, a professor
at Harvard and one of the consulting engineers tackling the atomic issue suggested that a 40 kt
bomb would create a crater roughly 1,188 feet in diameter in marine muck, 943 feet in diameter
in the Cucaracha formation, 848 feet in Gatun sandstone, and roughly 642 ft in some of the
rockier regions of the Continental Divide.66 Westergaard’s figures were optimistic in comparison
to the figures put forward by Darling, who suggested that a detonation would create a crater 450
feet deep and up to 1,550 feet wide in clay and that this explosion would be considerably bigger
in muck and less cohesive material.67
Debating whether Darling or Westergaard’s estimates were correct was an exercise in
semantics. The more pressing issue was the fact that by any objective estimate the crater left by
an atomic bomb would likely be wider than the Canal itself. The consultants estimated that a
Nagasaki type explosion would displace anywhere between 1,000,000 and 2,700,000 cubic yards
of material if it struck the Canal in muddier, more viscous terrain. They estimated that in the best
circumstances this would take seven to eighteen days to fully dredge and that was assuming that
no structures were damaged in the attack. If the bomb struck the rockier terrain of the
Continental Divide it would likely displace at least 2,000,000 cubic yards of material and could
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easily take 40 days or longer to repair.68 These figures led the consulting engineers to determine
that it was impossible to fully mitigate the danger presented by the atomic bomb. Instead, they
sought to better understand the chief dangers it presented. To this end, they characterized the
potential types of attacks the Canal might suffer in order to determine which would be the most
devastating. After several weeks of discussion and debate, they settled on four categories of
attack, ranked in order of the threat they presented. The most pressing concern was a crater in the
canal prism as they worried this would block the entirety of the Canal and would create lips that
would need to be removed before the Canal could reopen. Slides resulting from craters within the
Canal were next on the list. While not as devastating as the crater itself, slides could still block
part of the waterway, complicating the recovery effort. Next in magnitude were slides resulting
from explosions outside the canal prism. While it wouldn't block the entire Canal, the consulting
engineers were concerned that such an attack could cause slopes to fail, blocking part of the
passage. Finally, they identified airblast as the least destructive force associated with an atomic
detonation. While airblast could still cause slope failure it would likely only erode a small part of
the slope and would not permanently halt traffic.69
The studies conducted by the consulting engineers into the dangers presented by
conventional and atomic bombs forced the Canal to reckon with an uncomfortable reality: it was
effectively impossible to protect the existing Canal from the dangers constituted by these new
weapons. A direct hit on any structure could close the Canal for years and the unprecedented
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yields provided by nuclear energy meant that even an attack on the canal prism could block
traffic for weeks or months at a time. While troubling, this information also helped the engineers
focus their attempts at renovating the existing Canal. They accepted the fact that they could not
prevent bombing from damaging the Canal. Instead, they focused their attention on creating
structures, either by renovating the existing Canal or creating a new one, that mitigated the
impacts of bombs. The plans for both lock-style and sea-level canals, motivated by the concerns
expressed by the consulting engineers, would modernize the Canal, rendering it secure and
ideally a crucial part of both America's national security and economic interests for decades to
come.
Locked In
Now that Stratton and the consulting engineers had identified the major threats to the
Canal, they focused their attention on the creation of a waterway that could meet the capacity
needs of interoceanic commerce and provide adequate security. This was no small task, and they
cast a broad net when searching for potential solutions to their issues. One of the most creative
solutions was the creation of a ship railway that would carry vessels overland from ocean to
ocean. Ultimately this idea didn’t bear fruit due to the fact that it addressed neither the capacity
nor security demands of interoceanic transit.70 More realistic was the search for routes outside of
Panama. The consultants examined possible routes in Colombia, Nicaragua, and Mexico
amongst other locations. While some of these routes were alluring, the infrastructure already in
place in Panama led them to decide that at the present time this Isthmus was the best site for the
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new canal.71 The next question was whether they should build a sea-level canal or if a lock canal
was still the best waterway for the Isthmus.
The consultants organized their vision for a lock canal into three distinct plans. Plan I
maximized the capacity of the current lock canal by improving facilities, widening the Gaillard
Cut, and limiting the necessity for regular lock overhauls. Plan I did not include any increase in
the size of the locks nor did it improve the security of the Canal, focusing exclusively on
maximizing traffic to extend the point at which the Canal reached capacity beyond 1964.72 Plan
II included all of these changes to maximize capacity, but added improvements that would
increase the size of the locks, allowing larger ships to transit the Canal. In addition, Plan II also
made modest security improvements to the Canal by separating lock sites, reinforcing structures,
and adding defensive structures.73 Plan III was the most ambitious of the lock-style plans. This
plan increased capacity and the ability for larger ships to transit the Canal, but also included the
most robust levels of security that could be afforded a lock canal.74 The three different plans all
presented their own merits. As the consulting engineers began examining these plans, they soon
recognized that they all also suffered from considerable shortcomings.
Plan I was the most modest of the three lock canal plans. With a price tag of only
$129,983,000, it was also the most economical and, as a result, potentially the most feasible plan.
Plan I focused on maximizing the efficiency of the current lock canal. There were several areas
where the engineers felt they could make relatively modest alterations to the existing Canal and
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significantly increase its capacity. One of the most frequently discussed solutions was the
widening of the Gaillard Cut, the narrowest point of the Canal and the most difficult to navigate.
At only 300 feet wide it wasn't uncommon for traffic in the Cut to be limited to a single ship
moving one way at a time.75 This would be accompanied by a series of traffic aids and
navigational tools that would help ships navigate in fog and other adverse conditions.
The bigger focus of Plan I was to modernize the existing locks to preclude the need for
four-year overhauls of each lock. The overhauls were the chief factor limiting the capacity of the
existing locks. Lock overhauls were conducted every two years, alternating between Pacific and
Atlantic locks. During these overhauls traffic was confined to a single lane, resulting in a
maximum of only 27 lockages over the course of a day.76 Renovating the locks to avoid these
delays would substantially increase the capacity of the Canal, allowing it to meet the projected
needs of interoceanic commerce for decades to come. Despite this, the consultants were reluctant
to support Plan I. While it was economical, the plan failed to address the security concerns or
provide passage for larger vessels. In addition, the obsolescence of the existing structure was
blatant. General Hans Kramer expressed the concerns of many of the consulting engineers when
he stated, "The present locks are over 30 years old and before the adoption and execution of any
of these plans they will be somewhat older. They have served well and are continuing to serve
well but are undergoing obsolescence and admittedly are inadequate in size for universal use. It
is poor overall economy to put money into an investment which already has definite bottlenecks
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and limitations.”77 Despite its economy, Plan I simply failed to address the issues plaguing the
Canal.
Plan II presented a middle ground between the lock canal plans. At $1,632,275,000, Plan
II was considerably more expensive than Plan I, but allowed larger vessels to transit the locks
and added a degree of security as well. Plan II explored several projects to accomplish these
objectives including a complete redesign of the existing locks or the creation of a third set of
locks, similar to the Third Locks plan of 1939. One of the most ambitious components of the
plan was the creation of a Pacific Lake at the Miraflores Locks. Unlike the Atlantic Locks, all
three of which were at Gatun, the Pacific Locks were split. Ships passed through two sets of
locks at Miraflores before entering Miraflores Lake, a small body of water which didn’t have
enough room for mooring sites. From there ships passed through a single set of locks at Pedro
Miguel. There was nowhere for ships to moor until they reached Gamboa several miles inland.
Engineers proposed the creation of a third set of locks at Miraflores and the creation of a Pacific
Locks Lake that would speed up traffic and allow vessels to moor at the Pacific end of the locks
as well.78 In addition to the increased capacity, this plan provided increased security by spreading
the locks out and creating larger, reinforced structures. While Plan II met capacity for the
foreseeable future, concerns remained about the vulnerability of the Canal to attack. Even with
added safety features it did not meet the mandate set by Stratton.
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Ultimately, the consultants looked to Plan III, the most ambitious, and, with a price tag of
$2,307,686,000, by far the most expensive of the lock canal plans.79 Plan III was proof that
security did not come cheap, but it seemed as though the ambitious plan might be the best longterm investment for the Canal. Utilizing many of the same measures as Plans I and II including
an increase in traffic capacity and the size of vessels, Plan III also directed considerable
resources towards the development of new, reinforced, and diffused facilities, as well as
defensive fortifications to help the Canal withstand any attack. The consultants were optimistic
about Plan III's security features, arguing that the current Canal would be completely irrelevant
in comparison to " a lock type of canal provided with two new two-lane locks at both ends of the
canal, each lock within itself to be invulnerable to the bomb of the largest size likely to be used
in saturation bombing..."80 Furthermore, they were optimistic that, "We have shown that these
two capacity deficiencies, volume and ship size, can be overcome with an improved lock
canal."81 The implication was clear. Despite its exorbitant price range, Plan III came the closest
to meeting the mandate set forth in Public Law 280.
And yet closest was not quite close enough. The consultants were confident that a lock
canal that would meet the needs of both traffic and ship size over the coming decades could be
constructed. Despite this, regardless of how strong they made the walls of the locks of a lock
canal, there was no way that the structure could withstand the hit of the largest conventional
bombs, let alone an atomic bomb.82 Much of this vulnerability stemmed from the fact that the
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lock canal was an inherently fragile construct. The need for specialized facilities in the forms of
locks and a summit lake created too many potential targets to be effectively defended from a
concentrated enemy attack. Ultimately it was Mehaffey who delivered the final verdict on the
lock canal. In his report to Congress, he wrote, "Lock structures and a summit lake are essential
elements of a lock canal. Because these features can be damaged or destroyed, and traffic
interrupted for such long periods of time as to make the canal undependable in war, it follows
that no lock canal can meet fully the future needs of national defense."83 No lock canal,
regardless of how stringent its defenses were, could ever truly be safe. If the consultants wanted
to construct a truly secure canal they would need to look elsewhere, possibly to the past, to find
their answer.
The Search for a Sea-Level Canal
If the issue with a lock canal was that it was susceptible to destruction due to the presence
of locks and a summit lake, the best course of action was to get rid of those liabilities. A sealevel canal possessed none of these limitations and could easily meet the capacity needs laid out
in Public Law 280. With this in mind, the consultants dedicated the majority of their time to the
development of a sea-level canal plan. The sea-level canal met all the needs required of the
waterway and the consultants were optimistic that it could be built. With a price tag of
$2,482,810,000 the sea-level canal was by far the most expensive plan put forth by the
consulting engineers, and yet the fact that it only cost about $200,000,000 more than Plan III for
a lock canal did indicate that it would provide the most worthwhile long-term investment for the
future.84 As a result, the Board of Consulting Engineers and Governor Mehaffey recommended
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the sea-level canal wholeheartedly. Ultimately, however, the steep price tag attached to the sealevel canal and concerns about developing the technology and obtaining the energy necessary to
make it a reality prevented it from being realized in 1947.
Initially, the proposal for a sea-level canal was met with considerable optimism. Several
plans for its development were put forward including the creation of a sea-level canal that would
run parallel to the existing lock canal, but eventually the consultants adopted what was known as
the "Panama sea-level conversion route." This plan would gradually alter the existing lock canal,
lowering the bottom of Gatun Lake to create a sea-level route. This was not a new idea. French
construction in the 1870s had been focused on the creation of a sea-level canal and initial
American’s briefly explored a sea-level canal before President Roosevelt, at the suggestion of
John Stevens, overruled the Isthmian Canal Commission and mandated the construction of a lock
canal instead.85 By 1947 the assumption was that technology and available energy had advanced
far enough that a sea-level canal was no longer a foolish fantasy, but rather a realistic alternative
to the increasingly obsolete lock canal.
Plans for the size of the channel itself varied widely. The Board of Consulting Engineers
suggested that the navigable prism should be as wide as it could feasibly be while still retaining a
degree of economy. The rationale for this was twofold. On the one hand, the engineers hoped to
appease the Navy. History had shown that the Navy tended to continually ask for increases in
channel size. Admiral Ben Moreell, the Chief of the Naval Department of Yards and Docks and
the Chief of Civil Engineers of the Navy, as well as the member of the Board of Consulting
Engineers with the most familiarity with Navy politics, somewhat playfully suggested "Our
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experience in Pearl Harbor is interesting. I believe we started out using a 500-foot channel... and
the ship operators insisted we widen it to 750'; then to 1000'. Of course, they had in mind getting
out quickly, at very high speed, but I think you will find that no matter what width of canal you
decide upon, the Navy will probably consider it insufficient."86 In addition to appeasing the
Navy, the size of the canal prism would have a substantial bearing on the Canal’s resiliency in
the face of attack. The wider the Canal channel was, the less likely an attack would be to close it.
Wilson Binger, the consulting engineer most versed in slope stability dynamics, went so far as to
suggest, "It is not thought that at this time that any design other than making the Canal wider
than the crater diameter could protect against such a closure.”87 The consulting engineers
ultimately settled on a navigable channel 600 feet wide and at least 60 feet deep.88 This met all
the needs laid out by Public Law 280 and ensured the Canal’s relevance for the foreseeable
future.
The plan for the Panama Sea-Level Conversion route was met with near universal
approval by the Board of Consulting Engineers and by Mehaffey himself. The sea-level canal
had the highest capacity of any of the routes with the potential to transit 174 vessels per day, a
figure that nearly doubled the highest projections for traffic by the year 2000.89 A sea-level canal
would transit the largest vessels on the oceans with ease and could do so far more rapidly than a
lock canal. Most importantly the sea-level canal seemed the only plan capable of adequately
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dealing with the threat of attack by conventional or nuclear bombing. The Board of Consulting
Engineers was quite explicit in their suggestions to Governor Mehaffey, stating, "There is no
absolutely secure canal in the sense that there would be no appreciable damage if the enemy
were to have his will. But this much is certain- no matter what gauge of effort it is assumed that
the enemy will apply, the answer will be the same: The sea-level canal can take it; the lock type
canal, be it at Panama or elsewhere, cannot."90 While a bit more diplomatic, Mehaffey shared a
similar sentiment in his final report to Congress, writing, "A sea-level canal constitutes the only
means of meeting adequately the future needs of both interoceanic commerce and national
defense. Such a canal can be obtained most effectively and economically by converting the
Panama Canal to a sea-level waterway."91 In both cases, the consultants and the Governor made
their preference for a sea-level clear.
The Limitations of Panama
The blatant preference for the sea-level canal expressed by those who had worked most
closely on the project raises an interesting question. Why was such a waterway never built?
Public Law 280 was passed with the intention of yielding actionable results and the previous
projects at Madden Dam and the work on the Third Locks suggested that there was the political
will to undertake a modernization of the Canal. While the sea-level canal was expensive, it also
was comparable in cost to the most advanced lock canal and bore considerable long-term
advantages over every competing route. In essence, it seemed the best possible solution to the
myriad of problems plaguing the Panama Canal. And yet the situation was far more complicated
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than the consultants' suggestions implied. The concrete infrastructure that had been emplaced in
1914 needed to be undone in order to create a sea-level canal and doing so would yield
considerable challenges including flooding, slides, and an acute lack of energy. In addition,
engineers still needed to find a way to gouge out the remarkable volume of material that lay in
the way of a sea-level waterway. All these uncertainties rendered the sea-level canal, at least for
the moment, an untenable proposition.
The consulting engineers and Governor Mehaffey were unified in their belief that a sealevel canal could be created. Mehaffey brushed aside caution, writing, "The construction of a
sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Panama, although one of the largest projects ever
contemplated, would present no more unusual problems than those which were met and
overcome in the original construction."92 Perhaps Mehaffey was unaware of just how close the
American attempt to construct a canal had come to failure, but his assurances rang somewhat
hollow in the face of the considerable engineering challenges presented by the excavation of a
new sea-level canal. First and foremost was the exorbitant cost and power requirements
necessary for the creation of a new sea-level canal. Of the proposed $2,482,810,000 budget set
out in the proposal, over half the funding was intended to cover the cost of excavation with
$1,047,986,000 directed towards dry excavation and additional 398,376,000 set aside for
dredging.93 This steep investment stemmed from the sheer volume of material that needed to be
removed to create a sea-level canal. Estimates suggested that excavation required the removal of
1,070,000,000 cubic yards of material, of which 750,000,000 cubic yards would be removed in
dry excavation and the remaining 320,000,000 cubic yards through dredging. This figure was
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more than three times higher than the total amount of material removed to construct the existing
canal three decades earlier.94
It was not only the sheer volume of excavation work that was concerning, but also the
methods that would be implemented to accomplish this gargantuan task. For dry excavation,
engineers predicted that shovels capable of excavating 25 cubic yards of material in a single
scoop were necessary. These massive machines would be accompanied by smaller 5 cubic yard
shovels. Blasting would loosen material which could then be removed by shovels or dragnets.95
While an imposing task, the technology for dry excavation at least existed. The same could not
be said for dredging. Initially, the dredging plan had been predicated on the gradual draining of
Gatun Lake. Dredges would excavate as much as they could reach over the canal prism. Gatun
Lake would then be lowered, giving the dredges access to more material. After several
successive passes, this process would conceivably yield a working sea-level canal. The catch was
that this approach was time-consuming and expensive. The consultants found it far more
appealing to pursue deep dredging, which required the development of specialized dredges
capable of dredging at depths of up to 145 feet.96 There was optimism that such dredges could be
developed, but at the time the plan was made the technology didn't exist.
If excavation proved feasible and a new sea-level canal was constructed, the removal of
the existing structures in the lock canal would simultaneously unleash the entropy they held at
bay, forcing the sea-level canal to deal with the issues of slides and flooding that had plagued
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previous construction projects. Slides were an unavoidable result of construction in Panama and
the Culebra and Cucaracha slides were very much in the minds of the consulting engineers.
While they were confident that their understanding of slope dynamics had evolved over the
intervening three decades, slope stability remained a concern, particularly in the continental
divide. Of the 1,000,000,000 cubic yards to be removed, nearly 30% was concentrated in a 4mile section of the Isthmus in the region of Culebra.97 Accomplishing this task required
unprecedented cuts of up to 600 feet in the Continental Divide.98 Given the region's propensity
for slides, the ability to create such deep cuts while still retaining stable slopes was a challenge.
This sentiment was cast in even starker terms by the concern for an atomic attack which loomed
over the entirety of the studies. Steep slopes would slide far more easily than flatter slopes in the
event of an explosion. And yet flattening slopes increased the already extensive demands for
power and capital that accompanied a sea-level canal.
It was not only in the realm of slope instability where Panama’s entropy complicated
construction efforts. One of the major benefits of a lock canal was that it precluded the need to
deal with the floods that had vexed infrastructural projects in Panama in the 1800s. The Gatun
and later Madden Dams had held floodwaters at bay, turning what had been a liability into Gatun
Lake, one of the key components of the Canal’s infrastructure. Creating a sea-level canal
required the removal of Gatun Lake, however, and consequently would unleash the destructive
potential of floods once more. While floods wouldn't have the potential to destroy the Canal
itself they could create dangerous cross-currents, rendering the Canal unnavigable until flooding
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stopped.99 The engineers' solution to the problem was the construction of a dam to supplement
the Madden Dam and contain the Chagres, as well as the creation of the "East Diversion" and
"West Diversion" a collection of dams, locks, reservoirs, and channels that would redirect water
away from the sea-level canal.100 While these projects made flood control viable, they also
included extensive environmental engineering. The reliability and efficacy of these systems were
by no means certain, and Panama's track record for wreaking havoc with the best-laid plans
suggested just how tenuous the sea-level canal's success may have been.
In addition to engineering challenges, the sea-level also was a victim of the energy
crunches that had complicated construction projects in the Transit Zone for decades. The sheer
scale of the project meant that it would have a far more voracious energy appetite than the lock
canal had in the early 1900s. Meeting this need required the importation and creation of
tremendous amounts of human labor, mechanical labor, and electrical energy.
Human labor and mechanical labor were perhaps the most easily obtained sources of
energy for the creation of a sea-level canal. By 1946 there was a workforce of 24,150 involved in
the operation of the Panama Canal. Estimates suggested that by the peak year of construction this
figure would balloon to nearly 51,730 workers.101 This was a formidable figure to be sure, but
the engineers were confident that, as had been the case with the construction of the original
Canal, with enough incentives they could attract the necessary number of laborers. They
harkened back to the same methods of labor recruitment that had served the ICC so well in the
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early 1900s, suggesting that, "Skilled and technical personnel would be obtained from the United
States. The unskilled employees would be largely indigenous to the Caribbean area."102
The consultants were also optimistic about their ability to obtain the mechanized labor
necessary to construct the Canal. There were questions as to whether suitable deep-water dredges
could be developed for use in the deep dredging scheme, but stage dredging presented a reliable
alternative should the worst come to pass. To successfully complete dredging in ten to twelve
years they required four suction dredges, two dipper dredges, eight Vulcan drill boats, and 37
rotary drill boats. These 51 vessels would be supplemented by numerous scows, and tugs to help
with the removal and dumping of material.103 The demands for a dry excavation force were far
more amorphous and never advanced beyond preliminary assurances that adequate plant could
be obtained if necessary. Indeed, most reports had a fairly optimistic outlook on getting the
necessary equipment for dry excavation, in one instance going so far as to state that, “a wide
choice of equipment of various types and sizes is available.”104 In any case, it was at least
feasible that the human and mechanical labor necessary to construct the new waterway could be
obtained, albeit at considerable cost.
The more vexing challenge was obtaining the necessary stores of electrical energy to
support the excavation and construction of the sea-level canal. Again, this challenge was
primarily the result of the need to remove the Gatun Dam and lower the height of Gatun and
Madden Lakes. In addition to keeping floodwaters at bay, the dams provided the bulk of energy
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in the Canal Zone. By 1946 Gatun hydroelectric plant was running without issue and had seen
the addition of another turbine and generator, bringing its output up to 22,640 kW. The more
recently constructed Madden Dam had an output of 30,000 kW. While a series of diesel plants
provided supplementary power in case of emergency, the hydroelectric stations were the chief
source of energy in the Canal Zone.105 Losing roughly 52,000 kW of generating power would
significantly hinder the creation of the sea-level canal, a task engineers anticipated would require
the generation of 116,800 kW of energy to meet the demands of construction and supply an
adequate reserve.106 This left the sea-level canal in a sort of energy limbo. The east and west
diversions diffused water so much that constructing a hydroelectric facility to replace the energy
lost at Gatun and Miraflores was deemed impractical. The only option was the creation of new
power plants operating on costly fossil fuels, a proposal that would drive the sea-level canal’s
costs even higher.
Due to the inability to overcome the engineering, entropic, and energetic challenges that
stood in the way of the sea-level canal, the plan set forth in Public Law 280 never came to
fruition. The sea-level canal presented an unprecedented undertaking, and while it was alluring
to the Board of Consulting Engineers and Governor Mehaffey, questions regarding the feasibility
of the project were simply too substantial to warrant a nearly $2.5 billion-dollar investment,
regardless of the benefits that might accompany the project. The idea was, for the time being,
laid to rest, and despite growing concerns about its obsolescence, the thirty-year-old Panama
Canal moved into the Postwar era.
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End of an Era
The interwar years showed that the Panama Canal had aged far more rapidly than anyone
could have anticipated. The waterway had weathered the ebbs and flows of commerce and war,
and as time went on concerns about the Canal's longevity began to grow alongside the volume
and size of ships passing through its fixed locks. The delicate structures that allowed the Canal to
operate and held the entropy of Panama at bay were increasingly seen as a liability, bottlenecks
that were being outpaced by the development of new technologies and larger vessels. During the
1920s and 1930s, these discussions suggested that the Canal's obsolescence was approaching but
still resided in some abstract, far off date. The same could not be said of the 1940s. The rapid
development of military armaments that took place in WWII, culminating with the development
of the atomic bomb, rendered the Canal's shortcomings more immediate than ever before. The
fixed nature of the Canal may have been able to stand up to the entropy of Panama, but it was no
match for the power of the atom.
With this reality in mind, the government sought to conduct studies to determine the best
method to fix the Canal. Under the guidance of Governor Joseph Mehaffey and Colonel James
Stratton, a group of over 100 consulting engineers came together to determine the future needs
for security and capacity in an interoceanic canal. After nearly two years of tests, conferences,
and debates they suggested emphatically that the only way to fix the Canal was to unfix it. By
demolishing the locks and summit lake that rendered a lock canal vulnerable to bombing attacks
and creating a sea-level canal it was possible to create a waterway that could meet the needs of
both America's military and interoceanic shipping.
Ultimately, the sea-level canal proved ill-fated. The ambitious plan to eradicate the lock
canal and the Panamanian landscape surrounding it was untenable. The massive amount of
221

excavation necessary to build the waterway required the use of unproven technologies.
Additionally, the removal of the summit lake and the need to make steep cuts through the
Continental Divide resurrected the potential that Panama's pesky proclivity for entropy could
once more wreak havoc with American construction efforts. Finally, the significant challenges to
obtaining enough energy to complete the project served as the nail in the coffin. It was a feasible,
although admittedly imposing, task to obtain the human and mechanical labor necessary for
construction but obtaining electrical energy for a sea-level canal was more vexing. Removing
Gatun and Madden Lakes would simultaneously remove the utility of Gatun and Madden
hydroelectric stations, the chief sources of energy production in Panama. While these stations
could be replaced, the costs would be extensive, to say the least. Ultimately, the coalescence of
these concerns proved prohibitive to the construction of the sea-level canal.
And yet the sea-level canal was not dead. Indeed, its salvation ironically lay in the force
which presented an existential threat to the existing Canal: atomic energy. The chief obstacle to
the creation of the sea-level canal was that its reliance on conventional excavation, which
accounted for over half of the total projected budget, rendered it excessively expensive. If a new,
more economical source of energy could be directed towards the task of excavation the sea-level
canal could rise again from the radioactive ashes. Interestingly, in his report on the potential
dangers presented by a nuclear explosion, James Darling acknowledged that, "Although the
atomic bomb was neither designed nor has it been used to produce earth-shaking and cratering
effects, our studies should consider such use particularly since the main structure components,
both earthwork, and masonry, which are involved in the canal studies, appear to be at least as
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vulnerable to underground explosion effects as to air burst, if not more so."107 While Darling was
primarily concerned about the devastation that could be unleashed by an underground explosion,
his comments proved surprisingly insightful. A little more than a decade after Darling submitted
his report, engineers would once again explore the consequences of underground nuclear
explosives, except this time it would not be a faceless adversary who brought the bomb, but
rather the engineers themselves
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Chapter V: A Radioactive Flash in the Pan: The Promise and Problems of Nuclear Energy
in Panama, 1960-1970
To the engineers meeting in Diablo Heights, Panama in February of 1947, nuclear energy
presented an existential threat to the Panama Canal. They felt the danger constituted by a nuclear
attack was so great that it was worth exploring the potential of replacing the barely three decades
old Canal with a new, more resilient Isthmian canal.1 A decade later, scientists suggested
purposefully detonating upwards of 300 nuclear explosives in Panama. Nuclear explosions still
held the potential to destroy the Canal, but by 1960 scientists thought they might also be the key
to its salvation. Scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission believed that the controlled
detonation of nuclear explosives could provide a safe, cost-effective means of creating a new
sea-level canal across Central America. Their faith in this plutonium panacea was so pronounced
that they concluded, "It should be emphasized that it is considered feasible to construct the
proposed canal with nuclear explosives and techniques presently available." 2 For the next
decade, they conducted tests, experiments, and surveys to bring their vision to fruition.
Despite the optimism of AEC scientists, a combination of technical challenges,
Panamanian environmental realities, and public relations issues prevented this plutonium
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pipedream from ever being realized.3 Over the last several decades, historians have explored
Project Plowshare and the hunt for an atomic canal. They rightfully emphasize the hubris of
American scientists and their unrealistic optimism about the future of nuclear engineering.4
While effective, many of these books suggest that it was public opinion, primarily on the part of
environmentalists, that doomed nuclear engineering. Public relations certainly played a role but
did not exist in isolation. A focus on energy and the environment suggests that the linked
challenges of crossing the continental divide and creating stable slopes doomed the atomic canal
before environmentalists could enter the fray. Nuclear explosives and their awesome power
impacted environments too dramatically, unleashing more entropy than they contained.
The tension between nuclear energy’s promise and problems stemmed from its
unprecedented efficiency. Nuclear fission and fusion (both reactions were present in the
thermonuclear explosives used for nuclear excavation) were as radically alien to the combustion
of oil and coal as those processes were to the oxidation of calories in human bodies. A single
pound of uranium can produce as much heat as 2.5 million pounds of coal.5 As a result, for the
first time, nuclear energy’s unprecedented capacity to “do work” forced policy makers and
scientist to reckon with the limits of a new source of energy as much as its promise. This
contrasted drastically with the relative lack of experimentation and foresight accompanying the
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adoption of coal and oil; processes which saw the marginalization and death of thousands of
Afro-Antilleans. And yet fossil fuels were silent killers. Explosions, drowning, and diseases were
disassociated from the energy-oriented infrastructures and labor hierarchies that enabled them.
The visceral terror that accompanied mushroom clouds afforded the dangers of thermonuclear
explosions no such anonymity. In this context, the decision to shy away from nuclear excavation
was not the result of atomic energy’s shortcomings, but rather its unrestrained power and the
logistical challenges that accompanied it.
In nuclear excavation this manifested itself in the inherent chaos of nuclear blasts.
Scientists could certainly attempt to direct these weapons, emplacing and detonating them in a
manner that improved the likelihood of desired outcomes, and yet there was a level of
unpredictability that accompanied these blasts. One scientist described nuclear explosives as “too
crude” to be used in tasks where a degree of precision was required.6 Another report emphasized
that "It should be clearly understood that Plowshare is not concerned with slight, only marginal
improvements of known procedures. Plowshare makes desirable changes in our environment
possible that could not be contemplated before."7 Nuclear excavation was what Paul Josephson
has dubbed a “brute force technology,” a heavy-handed attempt to impose order on a
disorganized natural world.8 That scientists believed they could control the awesome potential of
this reaction was a testament to their audacity and pride.
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Ultimately, the fearsome energy contained in atomic reactions was a double-edged
sword. While nuclear explosions could radically restructure the natural geography of a region,
they completely lacked the ability to maintain environments. The explosive shockwaves that
accompanied nuclear blasts would likely have destabilized the already fluid Panamanian
landscape. In addition, the steep slopes characteristic of nuclear blasts were prone to catastrophic
slope failures, particularly in places like Panama where heavy rains and saturated soils rendered
inertia hard to maintain. These technical shortcomings of nuclear energy need to be placed
alongside public relations failures in histories of the rise and fall of nuclear earthmoving to fully
grasp the complexity of this new, and daunting energy regime. In nuclear energy, American
scientists and engineers saw a means of finally liberating themselves from the limitations
presented by the Panamanian environment, and yet their desire to assert control over the
impenetrable swamps, mountains, and jungles of the Panamanian interior was vaporized by their
inability to fully control the awesome energy that resided inside the atom.
How Scientists Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Bomb
Nuclear energy’s presence in the 1947 report foreshadowed its crucial role in visions of
canal expansion. As early as the 1920s policy makers considered the limitations of the Canal,
and yet plans for substantial renovations of the Canal, let alone the creation of a new sea-level
canal, were prohibitively expensive and time consuming. The sheer amount of energy and capital
invested between 1904 and 1914 made additional investments an unsavory proposition. Yet the
threat of nuclear war reshaped questions of canal efficiency into questions of canal existence.
The unprecedented amount of energy released by nuclear bombs could completely and utterly
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obliterate a lock type canal in less than an instant. Given the military and economic importance
of the Canal such a possibility was unacceptable. However, the central problem of obtaining the
massive amounts of energy necessary to reshape the Isthmus remained. How were engineers to
carve through over one thousand feet of rock to create a sea-level canal?
A decade after the 1947 study, scientists began to think they might have found their
answer. Nuclear energy was not only the problem, but also the solution. In February of 1957,
nuclear scientists from several AEC affiliates met at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in
Livermore, California for the “AEC Weapons Laboratory Symposium on Non-Military Uses of
Nuclear and Thermonuclear Explosions.” For the first time, scientists came together to discuss
theoretical applications of nuclear energy for non-military applications.9 Within a few short
months of this program the AEC approved the organization of “Project Plowshare,” the study of
potential uses for peaceful nuclear explosions.10 The awesome energy unleashed by nuclear
reactions was simply too valuable to be reserved solely for military purposes. Nuclear energy
could allow humanity to finally assert its control over the natural world through previously
unimaginable engineering projects.
It didn’t take long for nuclear explosives to become an atomic elixir for the challenges
facing the Canal. Studies on potential improvements to the Canal were conducted every few
years following the 1947 study. Most simply reiterated already established realities: within a few
decades the Canal would be incapable of dealing with increasing traffic, many ships would be
too large to transit the Canal, and a lock canal was increasingly susceptible to subterfuge,
sabotage, and military threats. As the 1950s progressed, these studies became increasingly
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intrigued by the promise of nuclear engineering. The first group to seriously consider the nuclear
alternative was a Board of Consultants appointed by Congress in 1957. In 1960, they formally
presented their findings, suggesting that “the experimental development of excavation by nuclear
explosives should be vigorously pushed by the appropriate government agency.”11 The idea of
the nuclear canal had arrived. The rapid application of Plowshare’s ideas to the Panama problem
was unsurprising. Unlike previous energy sources in Panama, nuclear energy had the power to
level mountains and remove tons of material instantaneously, and, more importantly, to do so
economically. Plowshare ushered in a new era, one in which American ingenuity, technological
prowess, and a dash of hubris would finally bring the dream of a sea-level Panamanian canal to
fruition.
Plowshare scientists also found themselves lagging behind their Soviet counterparts in
both the theoretical and practical development of nuclear engineering. The Soviets were gaining
valuable data from a series of large chemical explosive projects. In 1956 they set off three blasts
in China to improve access to mineral resources. Two years later they took their cratering
experience further, detonating a row of charges to create a 1100-meter-long canal in the
Pokrovsk Uralskii district. The canal drained a river which had been flooding local mines and
simultaneously gave Soviet scientists vital information on detonation spacing for row charge
explosions.12 Given the prestige that accompanied large scale engineering projects, the Soviets’
edge in engineering was unacceptable. Americans needed to clearly display their own prowess in
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environmental engineering and a nuclear excavated sea-level canal across the Isthmus would
assert American primacy in spectacular fashion.
To this end the Panama Canal Company (PCC) and AEC worked together to create the
first substantial study of nuclear canal feasibility in January of 1960. The report was quite
optimistic on the potential of nuclear explosives as an excavation tool, particularly given the fact
that as of 1960 no non-military nuclear explosive had yet been detonated. But AEC scientists
refused to see their enthusiasm smothered by such an insignificant obstacle as a lack of
applicable experiments. They looked to four military nuclear explosions conducted between
1951 and 1958 to determine the technical feasibility of nuclear excavation and supplemented this
information with a series of chemical detonations.13 These data sets provided the basis of their
cratering formulas and hopefully contributed enough theoretical data to allow them to predict
challenges that could arise from detonating nuclear explosives in Central America.
Scientists found the potential of nuclear excavation promising for a variety of reasons.
Their report suggested that, "A nuclear excavating technique has several advantages over
conventional excavation methods. The most significant of these are lower costs, shorter
construction times, less maintenance of the resulting canal, and reduced vulnerability to
attack."14 These benefits resulted from the massive amounts of energy released by nuclear
excavation. While blasting was frequently used in conventional excavation, chemical explosives
merely loosened rock and soil, allowing mechanical excavation to proceed at a more rapid pace.
Nuclear excavation expedited this process by combining the loosening of earth, rock, and soil
with the act of excavation by ejecting the material out of the blast zone. Only minimal
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mechanical labor was required after the detonation. Additionally, the massive yields of nuclear
explosives were the only feasible means of cutting through the rocky Continental Divide which
peaked at over 1000 feet above sea-level.
The 1960 study emphasized two potential sites for the construction of a canal. The
Sasardi-Morti Route (Route 17) ran about fifty miles through the Darien region of Eastern
Panama. At just over 100 miles from the Canal this route was isolated enough to avoid damages
to existing infrastructure. Route 17 required an estimated 250 individual explosives and a total
yield of 120 megatons to be constructed. The Atrato-Truando route (Route 25) ran roughly 100
miles through Northwestern Colombia, along the Panamanian border, and required 150
individual explosives with a total yield of 150 megatons.15 Like Route 17, Route 25 was isolated,
and had the added benefit of running alongside two rivers, which would make accessibility to the
interior far easier. The report indicated that nuclear explosions provided enough energy for either
route to be viable.
The energetic benefits of using nuclear explosions were accompanied by substantial
financial benefits as well. Again, these were the direct result of the awesome potential held by
the atom. By precluding the need for a massive mechanical labor force, the nuclear canal would
cost a fraction of the price of conventional excavation. The AEC cautioned that their figures
were purely speculative at this point but suggested that along the Sasardi-Morti route (Route 17)
a nuclear excavated canal roughly 1000 feet wide could be constructed at roughly 25% of the 3.3
billion dollars the 1947 report estimated for a 600-foot-wide, conventionally excavated sea-level
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canal at the same site.16 With nuclear energy at their disposal, engineers could build larger, more
efficient structures for substantially less.
These projections made the fervor surrounding nuclear excavation unsurprising. The
power of the atom had the potential to enable previously unfeasible earthmoving projects with
ease and reduce their prohibitively expensive costs. The AEC also suggested that nuclear
explosives would allow the project to be completed in one-fifth the time it would take otherwise
and, once it was completed, the sheer size of the canal would require only a small labor force to
operate. Perhaps the most ironic benefit was that the nuclear canal would be far less susceptible
to a nuclear attack because of its massive size and depth.17 Nuclear energy seemed to be the key
to the Canal’s future and perhaps the future of mega-engineering.
This is not to say that the AEC was completely unaware of the hazards that accompanied
nuclear explosives. They acknowledged that air blast, seismic events, and radioactive debris
were all side effects of nuclear detonations, yet they suggested that these obstacles were
inconsequential compared to the potential of nuclear excavation, concluding that, "A TransIsthmian canal can be excavated with nuclear explosives with negligible damage to mankind and
his means of livelihood.”18 Damage from air blast or seismic shock was a trifling concern and
could be easily mitigated through experimentation. The AEC recommended the detonation of
six, 2400-pound heavy explosives each month for a year to obtain the necessary data. The AEC
neglected to seek Panamanians’ opinions on the subject of detonating explosives in their
territory.19
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Radiation, while problematic, was largely contained unground and could only endanger
people if they, or the food they ate, came into direct contact with it. AEC scientists concluded
that environmental studies could minimize any potential risk associated with radiation and
furthermore that, given the aggressive nuclear tests being conducted by the United States, United
Kingdom, and Soviet Union, any fallout associated with the creation of a new canal “would be
only a very small fraction of the worldwide fallout even if not scavenged by dust.”20 In essence
the radiation associated with peaceful nuclear explosives was just a drop in the bucket compared
to military detonations and consequently wasn’t worth worrying about.
The AEC was similarly nonchalant in dealing with local radiation. The small amount of
radiation that was not trapped underground would not be concentrated enough to harm the
general population, although as an added precaution “it would be desirable to protect human
population up to 50 miles of the detonation during the fallout period (48 hours or more) to
prevent ingestion of radioactivity and correspondingly higher exposure."21 After the prescribed
forty-eight hour window the AEC felt that radiation would diffuse so much as to no longer be an
issue. The only lingering challenge was ensuring that radiation didn’t contaminate any human
food sources. To this end the AEC proposed a plan to control and monitor food production “in
the canal, on the canal banks, and within a mile or two from the ends of the canal…”22 In the
eyes of the AEC, radiation was a concern that required only minimal precautions. This laissezfaire attitude was partially due to scientists’ faith in the development of new, low-fission,
thermonuclear explosives which minimized the spread of highly radioactive materials. However,
it also reflected an excessive sense of optimism that permeated many studies. The potential of
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nuclear energy was so vast that any potential problems seemed trivial in contrast. This was
particularly true during the earliest stages of nuclear canal planning when concrete information
and knowledge had yet to be developed. Ultimately it was this lack of information that made
nuclear detonation so appealing.
The factors that the AEC failed to address in their report were a testament to their
ignorant enthusiasm. While they were aware of radiation, air blast, and seismic shock, scientists
failed to address two problems which, eventually, proved to be far more troubling to the
realization of their atomic ambitions. The first of these issues was a lack of data and relevant
tests. Of the four nuclear detonations the AEC used to write its report, three were in alluvium and
one was in tuff. These media were dry, coarse, and loose, completely unlike the water saturated
muck and rock native to Central America. While the AEC was confident in how cratering
mechanics would work in the Nevada desert, they had little information of how craters would be
formed and maintained in wet, heavy, compacted material. Their most substantive study of
explosive mechanics in Panama stemmed from the 1947 study in which the Board of Consulting
Engineers detonated a series of chemical explosives in materials ranging from marine muck to
sandstone and basalt. That this data would apply to atomic explosions was highly suspect.23
The second major issue was the AEC’s lack of local environmental knowledge. Since the
creation of the railroad a century earlier, humans had struggled to control entropy. Mountains,
hills, valleys, and swamps had to be eradicated before a sea-level canal could be created. Nuclear
explosives seemed poised to finally be able to provide enough energy to overcome these physical
barriers, however slides that covered railways and blocked the canal suggested that even if
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engineers could gouge out a sea-level waterway, control over entropy remained elusive. In fact,
nuclear explosives stood poised to complicate the clash against chaos due to the tremendous
craters they left in their wake. Nuclear energy’s greatest asset in canal construction was that it
would eject material entirely out of the canal prism, precluding the necessity of conventional
excavation. The result was a deep crater with extremely steep raised lips. These unstable
structures required only the slightest disturbance to generate spectacular slides and slope failures.
Ultimately, the increased amount of material moved by nuclear explosives exacerbated the
challenge of creating and maintaining stability in Panama
In the alluvial material the AEC was familiar with, slope stability was an issue, but
seldom resulted in catastrophic slope failures that compromised the integrity of the crater. What
these scientists failed to realize was that the humid rainforests of Panama and Colombia were
completely different animals than the dry desert of the Nevada Test Site. Craters created in
Central America would be subject to pummeling rains which could saturate crater lips and slopes
with water weight, eat away at the supporting banks, and result in catastrophic slope failure. The
AEC seemed completely obtuse to these potential threats, writing that “The banks of a nuclearly
excavated canal would be natural angles of repose and therefore would be stable. If minor slides
occurred, the additional depth of a nuclearly excavated canal would provide a convenient local
disposal area for the material."24 The AEC’s dismissal of slope stability wasn’t necessary
surprising. At this early juncture, containing the spread of radiation and the energy contained in
air blasts and ground shock seemed to be more pressing issues. However, this also pointed to the
failure of imagination that plagued the AEC throughout Plowshare.
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Of all the oversights made by the AEC, their lack of understanding of slope stability was
the most egregious. Ironically, it was not issues of radiation, air blast, seismic shock, or even
foreign policy that doomed the nuclear canal, although all certainly played a role in eroding
confidence in the project. Instead it was the inability of scientists to obtain the necessary data and
test results to determine if nuclear excavation was technically feasible that foreshadowed the
obstacles that plagued Plowshare throughout its life. As the sun rose on Project Plowshare,
scientists failed to fully acknowledge the limits of their control, largely because they had yet to
fully comprehend them.
An Era of Optimism
While the AEC’s 1960 report didn’t result in the tests it had requested, it did engender a
tremendous amount of enthusiasm. During the first few years of the sixties, three men took the
lead in bringing the dream of a nuclear Panama to reality. Matthew (M.C.) Harrison, the
Engineering and Construction Director of the Panama Canal Company, Ernest Graves, The
Director of the U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group, and Bill Wray, Deputy Director of
the U.S. Army Nuclear Cratering Group were integral to keeping the vision of a nuclear canal
alive. Between 1962 and 1965, Graves, and Wray organized a series of tests at the Nevada Test
site while Harrison worked on the logistics of getting information necessary to nuclear feasibility
studies in Panama. All three faced the arduous test of lobbying for funding to carry out
comprehensive tests. In the first half of the 1960s, these men played an essential role in
promoting the nuclear canal and their efforts helped generate interest in a comprehensive study
of the technology’s feasibility.
Of the three, Graves was the most well versed with nuclear energy and unsurprisingly
spearheaded the quest for a nuclear Isthmus. After obtaining a Ph.D. in physics from MIT,
236

Graves was placed in charge of recruiting and training personnel for the construction of a nuclear
reactor at Fort Belvoir, Virginia in 1954. Graves then briefly served as an engineer in Korea
before he returned to nuclear research as an associate on Project Plowshare in 1959. He was then
tasked with establishing the Nuclear Cratering Group (NCG) in the spring of 1962.25 Graves’
research connected to Panama prior to the creation of the NCG in 1962, but it was the creation of
this entity that put him into contact with Harrison and led him to appoint Bill Wray as his
Deputy.
Despite not being directly involved in the 1960 study, Graves echoed its sentiments. In a
1961 draft statement on nuclear excavation of a sea-level isthmian canal he wrote that not only
did the technology seem to be feasible, but also that "Indications are that nuclear methods may
save over one billion dollars in construction costs and can be used with complete safety to human
life."26 Excited by the potential of this new technology, Graves immediately began plans for
safety tests and on-site surveys in Panama. Bill Wray took Graves’ enthusiasm one step further
by crafting a comprehensive budget for conducting site selections and field surveys. Wray’s
proposal focused specifically on geology, meteorology, air blast propagation, and seismic forces.
He believed these topics provided scientists with the information necessary to adequately deal
with the issues of air blast, seismic shock, and radiation that had been identified in the 1960
study.27
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As 1962 progressed, Graves, Wray, and Harrison became increasingly committed to
nuclear excavation. They were particularly excited by the execution of the .4 kt Danny Boy
detonation on March 5, 1962. Danny Boy was remarkable for two reasons. It was the first test
conducted in basalt and provided valuable information on how nuclear craters worked in rockier
media like the Continental Divide. Danny Boy also was the first cratering test at the Nevada Test
Site in nearly four years and suggested that interest in nuclear excavation was growing. There
was no guarantee that a nuclear canal was imminent, but Graves struck a cautiously optimistic
tone in a letter to Wray in which he wrote “There are two things I have learned about this
Plowshare business. One is that it shows enough technical promise to be worth looking into. The
other is that overcoming the political problems is going to be a long, slow process."28 Graves,
Wray and Harrison recognize that public anxiety surrounding nuclear explosions was
monumental. If they wanted to gain acceptance for nuclear engineering they needed to find ways
to show that nuclear explosions were safe, and practical for peaceful applications.29 To this end,
they set about trying to overcome these political challenges by focusing their attention on gaining
legislative support for a substantial canal study which they hoped would both provide the
information necessary to determine the best site for a new, nuclear canal, and also increase
public support for the project.30
While progress was slow, a series of developments bolstered their case. Increasing
interest in nuclear excavation from the Kennedy Administration suggested that political obstacles

28

Ernest Graves “Letter from Ernest Graves to Bill Wray, March 18, 1962” from “Materials of the Canal Zone
Office”
29
The best account of the fear surrounding nuclear explosives can be found in Spencer R. Weart The Rise of
Nuclear Fear, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012). For the tension between the promise of the
Atoms for Peace movement and public opinion see Chapter 8 “Good and Bad Atoms”.
30
Matt Harrison, “Letter from M.C. Harrison to Ernest Graves, March 27, 1962” from “Materials of the Canal Zone
Office”

238

were crumbling. On April 30th, 1962, Kennedy directed the AEC and Army Corps of engineers
to undertake a five-year study to determine the feasibility of nuclear excavation.31 A few months
after the Administration’s announcement another nuclear test was held in July of 1962. At 104
kt, Sedan was the largest test conducted by Plowshare and provided invaluable information about
cratering mechanics from higher yield explosives. While fallout was higher than had been
predicted, its spread was minimal and both air blast and ground shock were lower than
anticipated. The one major issue which remained unresolved however was the steep angle of the
crater slopes. The resulting crater was 320’ deep and 1200’ wide and the slopes were far more
extreme than anticipated, varying from 30-35 degrees at a depth of 100-250’ below ground level
and 40-45 degrees at depths of 50’ to ground level. These slopes were so extreme that one side of
the crater saw a major slide in the lip and upper portion of the crater wall.32 It was increasingly
obvious that slope stability needed to be dealt with for nuclear excavation to become a reality.
Despite these obstacles, the Kennedy Administration’s support and the increasing
resources directed towards Project Plowshare garnered the nuclear canal some allies in
Washington. Herbert Bonner, a Democratic representative from North Carolina and longtime
champion of the nuclear canal, introduced a bill to the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries on June 27, 1962. Less than two weeks later, on July 7th, Warren Magnusson, a
Democratic senator from Washington, introduced an identical bill to the Senate Commerce
Committee. Both bills failed to get out of committee during the 87th Congress, but their
introduction initiated the process of Congressional recognition that Graves, Wray, and Harrison
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had been promoting.33 Congressional support granted nuclear excavation an air of legitimacy and
suggested that the technology was feasible enough to receive serious consideration.
The next step for Graves, Wray, and Harrison was to justify their potential studies so that
when the proposed bills made it out of committee they would be greeted with enthusiasm. At the
Nevada Test Site, Graves focused on developing additional nuclear tests to refine the
understanding of nuclear excavation mechanics, particularly in row charge detonations. Row
charge detonation was the simultaneous detonation of several devices buried at regular intervals.
The explosions’ energy forced the material outwards creating a long trench rather than a single
crater. This excavation technique was imperative to the creation of a nuclear canal as scientists
needed to find a way to dig trenches without refilling them with the debris of subsequent shots.
While nuclear energy was awesome it was clumsy and brutish and thus could prove counterproductive if its force was not adequately directed and harnessed. To this end, Graves and others
at the AEC began planning “Buggy,” a row charge experiment of five, 10 kt explosives set for
1964.34
Meanwhile, in Panama, Harrison focused on the logistics of carrying out on-site surveys
to determine the optimal site for a nuclear canal. Harrison felt deeply that he, Graves, and Wray
needed to focus on the economic justifications for such a study if they intended to get
congressional approval. They hoped to contrast the potential costs of nuclear excavation with
those of conventional excavation to emphasize the dramatic financial benefits that accompanied
the adoption of this new source of energy. The catch was that estimates of the cost of nuclear
excavation were almost entirely speculative due to the lack of information about potential sites
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for the new canal. Harrison proposed a $12 million-dollar study to deploy scientists and
surveyors to Panama to identify a route. This also reflected a continuing trend in the deployment
of American energy in Panama. Nuclear energy did not act in isolation. To unleash atomic
energy, a vanguard of human energy had to first make its way into the interior to pave the way
for the deployment of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy’s utility was still predicated on the
capacity of human energy. While nuclear energy was exponentially more powerful than human
energy it was also relatively specialized, being effective in Panama only as a brute force
technology meant to reshape the environment on a drastic scale. This was a reality Harrison
recognized all too well. Responding to Graves’ assessment of tests carried out at the Nevada Test
Site, Harrison wrote, “It appears that you are raising Hell with the landscape there in Nevada—
with a little rainfall you might have some good swimming holes.”35
Progress towards the adoption of nuclear engineering moved rapidly in Panama. In
January of 1963, a group of AEC and NCG representatives descended on Panama to meet with
members of the PCC and voice their support for the proposed studies on the Isthmus. The
conference resulted in a more refined plan of study for Panama. Particularly important was the
fact that, for the first time, scientists clearly expressed their awareness of the unique hydrological
conditions in Panama, and the consequences that Panama’s humidity and rainfall could have on
fallout distribution. This recognition marked a decided shift from the disinterested approach the
AEC and NCG had previously taken in assessing the impact of Panama’s unique environment.36
While nuclear energy’s potential was significant, it was mediated by environmental realities
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which dictated its efficacy and shaped the consequences of its deployment. Unfortunately,
scientists only seemed to be aware of this in the context of fallout distribution. They still failed to
adequately acknowledge the impact that Panama’s propensity for entropy had on slope stability.
The fault in this oversight did not lie exclusively with the AEC or NCG. Even those
working in Panama, Harrison among them, seemed to underestimate the potential challenges that
slope stability presented. Rather than concerning Harrison and his colleagues, the January
meeting seemed to encourage them. In February of 1963, Graves suggested that support for a
study in Washington was growing as “There is every indication that the Administration’s
emphasis on our authorization bill, as demonstrated by the attitude of the Board of Directors, will
continue."37 The success of Plowshare tests, and the international prestige offered by a practical
example of nuclear excavation, became increasingly alluring to policy makers. Harrison too was
growing excited. Shortly after receiving Graves’ message he received approval to send twelve
technicians to Route 17, the most promising nuclear canal site in Panama.38 By the spring of
1963 it seemed only a matter of time before Panama was bathed in the radioactive light of an
atomic future.
Unfortunately for nuclear advocates, this positivity decayed faster than the radionuclides
scientists sought to harness. In October, negotiations surrounding the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
made the Kennedy Administration hesitant to conduct nuclear explosions, a position that
contrasted starkly with the stance it had taken just a few months earlier. The Administration’s
about face on atoms reflected a dirty truth; nuclear energy was perceived of as a weapon first,
and a tool second. The awesome amounts of energy unleashed in nuclear reactions made it next
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to impossible to avoid this reality. Nuclear excavation was an exercise in palatable devastation.
Rather than turning the atom towards the task of creation, “Plowshare” sought to find places
where destruction made landscapes more beneficial to humans. In this sense the application of
nuclear energy was still an act of violence. Peaceful nuclear explosives simply directed this
violent energy towards landscapes rather than people.39 The message was clear: it was laudable
to turn one’s swords into plowshares, but plowshares could easily become swords once more.
As 1963 ended it seemed that the best efforts of Graves, Wray, and Harrison had been for
naught. On-site studies had not been carried out, information about the Panamanian landscape
was dangerously spotty, slope stability had yet to be dealt with, and governmental support for
Plowshare was evaporating. A dejected Graves asked "Will this kill nuclear excavation? I doubt
it, but I have no idea under what penury the program will struggle on.”40 Graves’ frustrations
were directed less at the government and the Limited Test Ban Treaty and more towards the lack
of action taken by the AEC and PCC during 1962 and early 1963. Graves believed that if these
organizations had pursued the nuclear canal more aggressively, they might have been able to
weather the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations more effectively. As it stood, he sensed that
his years of work on the project were going to amount to nothing. Graves might have been more
dejected, had the Dodgers not tempered the blow. "Yes, there was joy at 436 Jackson Avenue
when Koufax pitched that curve for a called third strike on Mantle and two out in the ninth
inning of the fourth world series game," Graves admitted. The AEC wasn’t conducting any
blasts, but at least Mantle hadn’t either.
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Riots, Radiation, and Foreign Relations
The nuclear canal might have remained stagnant had a different energy not interceded.
Anger, hostility, and resentment towards sixty years of American authority in the Canal Zone
catalyzed a different sort of explosion on January 9th, 1964, as students from the Instituto
Nacional stormed the Canal Zone, attempting to raise their flag at a Canal Zone high school.
Canal Zone police were instructed not to interfere, but several Zonians resisted and, in the
ensuing scuffle, the Panamanian flag the students brought was ripped. Over the next three days
violent clashes broke out along the Canal Zone border between Zonians and Panamanians. By
the time the violence ended, twenty-eight people lay dead and Panamanian President Roberto
Chiari broke relations with the US until an alternative to the 1903 treaty was negotiated. The fate
of the Canal hung in the balance.41
President Johnson quickly acquiesced to Chiari’s concerns by opening renegotiation of
the treaty, a process that spanned three administrations and lasted nearly fifteen years. The
question of what was to become of the Panama Canal lay at the center of these negotiations. In
this context, a new nuclear excavated sea-level canal took on greater importance. A sea-level
canal was a more efficient waterway and could be operated by a relatively small number of
American employees, mitigating conflict between Panamanians and Americans in Panama.
Tensions between Americans and Panamanians pointed to one of the major complications
regarding human energy. Human energy in Panama was intimately entwined with international
concerns. American laborers, while allegedly essential to the operation of the Canal, were also
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seen as manifestations of unwanted American influence in Panama. A more energy efficient sealevel canal that relied less on American manpower could assuage this problem by removing
many laborers from Panama. An estimate from a 1964 report suggested that a sea-level canal
could be operated with as few as 200 Americans, a dramatic departure from the thousands who
were currently working on the Canal.42 The Martyr’s Day Riots, as they would come to be
called, breathed new life into the nuclear canal, suggesting that, remarkably, detonating nuclear
explosives in Panama could actually improve relations between the two countries.
The need for an alternative to the Panama Canal kicked studies for a new canal into high
gear. The AEC, PCC, and Army Corps of Engineers began compiling all the information they
could find on Panama and revised their earlier estimates for the feasibility, cost, and location of a
new canal. The PCC released a report in 1964 detailing the current state of the Canal. The study
dealt with a variety of concerns including cost comparisons between sea-level and lock canals,
potential upgrades to modernize the Canal, the potential of creating a new canal by conventional
excavation, and the nuclear canal. Interestingly however, while scientists and engineers remained
enthused about the potential of nuclear excavation, they had grown more reserved in their
optimism. The report emphasized the fact that "Tests and studies to date support earlier
conclusions that the construction of a sea-level canal by nuclear methods is feasible.” However,
they also acknowledged that "Further nuclear device development and testing are necessary to
assess positively the effectiveness, economy, and safety of nuclear explosives in applications of
the magnitude that would be required in constructing a sea-level canal."43
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Scientists were becoming increasingly aware of the limitations of their knowledge and
the fact that much of the energy released in a thermonuclear explosion was effectively
uncontrollable. Consequently, the lack of concrete examples and nuclear cratering explosions to
draw from was a vexing problem for engineers. Danny Boy and Sedan presented a wealth of
information, but questions about row charges and slope stability had been gauged only with
chemical explosives and had still been almost exclusively carried out in loose alluvial desert
soil.44 For a nuclear canal to be deemed technically feasible more nuclear explosions were
necessary.
Despite these limitations, by 1964 the PCC felt far more comfortable predicting a
construction program than they had in previous studies. Engineers envisioned three-phases of
construction. An initial period of detailed studies along the proposed blast site would obtain data
on topics ranging from rainfall totals to population densities among the inhabitants of the
proposed canal site. Simultaneously, the company would mobilize the necessary labor and
material along the proposed canal site. Once engineers felt comfortable with their data, they
would begin construction of essential facilities, including access roads to the centerline, the
drilling of emplacement holes, and construction of storage facilities for the nuclear devices and
housing for the workers. Those individuals, both hired workers and indigenous peoples, living
next to the blast sites would be relocated to an area outside of the projected fallout zone and the
detonations would take place on a rolling basis over the span of one to two years. Once all the
detonations were carried out, conventional construction would take place to stabilize canal walls,
construct navigational aids, tidal barriers, and support buildings; and dredge the final sections of
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the canal. All said and done this project would take roughly seven years to complete and
engineers were confident that cost and time would be similar along both routes.45
The 1964 report emphasized several areas of concern. Similar to the 1960 report,
scientists emphasized the need for environmental tests and meteorology to gauge the spread of
radiation as well as the potential impacts of air blast and ground shock. Additionally, by 1964,
scientists were far more aware of the public relations concerns that accompanied nuclear
engineering, the substantial amount of conventional energy and construction that would be
necessary to enable nuclear excavation, and the dramatic role that slope stability played in
mitigating the efficacy of a new sea-level canal. Scientists were recognizing not only the benefits
of nuclear excavation, but also its significant limitations. However, they were disheartened by
these challenges. The report suggested that "Undesirable side effects often accompany a new and
revolutionary technological advance. Development of a deeper understanding of the basic
scientific phenomenon and improvement of equipment generally lead to adequate control and
open the way to broader acceptance and use. Significant progress along these lines has already
been made in nuclear excavation."46 Their optimism might have been well founded on the topics
of air blast, ground shock, and radiation, however slope stability, political hurdles, and the local
environment of Panama were far more vexing concerns.
Air blast, ground shock and radiation were still governed by the same perceptions in 1964
as they had been in 1960. All three were deemed manageable so long as the necessary data was
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obtained to determine their spread. Containing Air blast was fairly straightforward. The massive
amounts of energy released in an atomic detonation released a shockwave that was strong
enough to break glass and cause damage at distances of up to 300 miles.47 There was nothing that
could be done to mitigate these concerns at locations close to the blast site, however at greater
distances air blast conveyance correlated with winds and jet streams. On a windy day these
forces carried the air blast hundreds of miles. In a small location like Panama this was an
unacceptable possibility, particularly if the air blast was carried west to Panama City. The AEC
suggested conducting rocket wind measurements in which rockets carried chaff to an altitude of
200,000 feet before releasing it. Radar stations tracked the chaff’s descent, determining average
windspeeds based on the chaff’s trajectory.48 Using this data scientists could select dates and
times for detonations that minimized the area impacted by air blast. That some air blast would
cause damage was merely a side effect of atomic energy’s awesome power; the trick was
minimizing it.
While air blast was conveyed through the relatively open medium of air, ground shock
travelled through the earth itself. To gain an understanding of the impact of ground shock,
surveyors and geologists needed to determine the geological make up of proposed canal sites.
This required a substantial investment of human and mechanical energy to get access to interior
regions of both routes and to bore holes to acquire the necessary geological data. As was the case
with air blast, ground shock was an unavoidable side effect of the awesome power of atomic
bombs. The underground explosions sent powerful shockwaves through the ground, creating
significant reverberations throughout the earth that could crack foundations and cause structural
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damage dozens of miles away. Understanding ground shock transmission through various media
was crucial to determining how it would spread in Panama, and the steps necessary to protect
nearby structures.49
Scientists seemed most optimistic about the question of radiation. They emphasized that
the most hazardous radioactive particles were a function of fission reactions. The thermonuclear
bombs used for nuclear excavation were catalyzed by a fission reaction, but fission only had to
provide enough energy to begin the fusion reaction, a process which released far less malignant
radionuclides. Scientists were confident in the progress they had made in this area, suggesting
“Improvements in nuclear explosives design since 1959 studies have materially reduced the
amount of radioactivity which would be deposited as fallout near the project.”50 By making less
of the yield of the explosive come from fission, scientists could minimize fallout without
sacrificing efficiency. Additionally, scientists clung to the claim that underground detonations
mitigated the spread of radioactive materials. While they did acknowledge that groundwater
might play more of a role in conveying radiation than they thought, they were confident that
cratering formation rendered much of the radiation inaccessible to plant, animal, and, most
importantly, human life.51
Between 1960 and 1964, scientists’ concerns about controlling the negative impacts of
nuclear explosives remained static. While they acknowledged that air blast, ground shock, and
radiation created problems, they found nuclear energy so alluring that they assumed, perhaps
correctly, that proper meteorological, hydrological, geological, and environmental studies
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allowed them to execute nuclear explosions safely, or at least safely enough to make these risks
well worth the potential rewards that this revolutionary new technology offered. Despite this
enthusiasm, several lingering issues remained. One of the most dramatic shifts between 1960 and
1964 was the growing awareness of the less direct hindrances that accompanied nuclear
excavation. Concerns over political obstacles, slope integrity, and the environmental realities of
the tropical environments were addressed in meaningful ways for the first time in 1964. While
scientists still felt comfortable in their ability to make nuclear explosions a viable source of
energy, they were beginning to recognize the limits of their control.
Slope stability had been a problem for nuclear excavation since its inception. However, it
failed to garner much attention throughout the early 1960s. Slope stability was seen as an
afterthought in the 1960 report and even though some scientists began discussing it in the
aftermath of the Danny Boy and Sedan explosions, the issue still failed to carry the same clout as
air blast, ground shock, and radiation. The 1964 report marked a departure from this rather
dismissive attitude as scientists began to acknowledge that slope stability wasn’t merely an
inconvenience, but rather a potentially catastrophic issue that could undermine the nuclear canal.
Steep slopes were a direct result of cratering mechanics. As the underground explosions
expanded, the surface became the only area where the extreme pressure could escape. Thus,
much of the energy of the detonation was channeled upwards resulting in more extreme slopes
than in conventional excavation. Consequently, nuclear detonation was infeasible in swampy
lowland areas where saturated soils and muds could not retain the parabola of the canal prism.
For this reason, scientists admitted that nuclear excavation was impractical along much of Route
25 due to the swampy lowlands flanking the Atrato and Truando rivers. Here dredges needed to
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deepen and widen these river channels to make them navigable.52 This conclusion differed from
earlier reports that suggested the universal applicability of nuclear excavations. Scientists were
starting to realize that this new form of energy significantly altered landscapes in the short term
but was incapable of maintaining them over time.
In the rockier terrain that spanned Route 17, nuclear energy seemed to be more practical
for excavation, however, here too uncertainty clouded optimism. Two major issues concerned
scientists along Route 17. First was the small yield of the Danny Boy test. At only .4 kt Danny
Boy had less than 1% of the yield of the smallest devices (100 kt) scientists intended to use to
excavate the new canal which were themselves only 1% of the largest explosions (10 Mt).53
Danny Boy provided the only data on how nuclear cratering operated in rocky media and
scientists had no idea if their scaling models applied to exponentially larger detonations. This
created an array of problems, but perhaps the most substantial was whether crater slopes would
be stable in explosions of higher yields. This issue was complicated by the fact that the basalt in
Nevada had far lower moisture content than the rocky clay shales of Panama. Scientists were
forced to admit that “a serious question arises as to whether these weaker, saturated rocks will
stand on the same steep slopes as the Danny Boy crater, particularly as the scale increases and
the slopes become much higher."54 It was very possible that nuclear explosions simply altered
environments to an effectively unsustainable extent: an untenable proposition in a tropical
environment where landslides were common and stability was difficult to maintain.
Scientists identified six potential causes of slope failures in Panama and acknowledged
that should such failures transpire they could destroy the economic and energetic advantages of
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nuclear excavation. Scientists pointed to a variety of potential issues including geological
failures from weak formations, terrain failures on sloping landscapes, rebound failures from
cratering, liquefaction failures from the loss of strength of saturated materials, hydraulic failures
from slopes undercut by rushing waters, or fractures induced by the explosion itself.55 In essence,
a lot could go wrong. By 1964, Bill Wray was growing increasingly concerned about the issue of
slope stability. In a letter to Ernest Graves in March of 1964, he admitted "The more I think
about the problem of slope stability in the deep cuts we would plan to make, the more I am
concerned about the likelihood of major failures requiring the movement, by conventional
equipment, of some rather large quantities of rubble."56 Again the root of the problem lay in the
sheer amount of energy released by nuclear explosives. Wray pointed to projections suggesting
that in high risk areas, particularly through the Continental Divide, the explosions could create
crater lips up to 700 feet tall. Wray believed the presence of so much rubble was a recipe for
disaster.
The discussion then wasn’t oriented around the question of whether slope instability was
possible- it certainly was- but rather the consequences that would result from a large slide. One
camp suggested that the Canal itself would be so large that a slope failure could only temporarily
block a small section of the waterway. In 1960 this view was commonplace, but by 1964 more
scientists were concerned with a complete blockage of the Canal and the cessation of all traffic.
This growing chorus of voices suggested that to minimize the risk of catastrophic slope failure
conventional excavation was necessary to create more gradual slopes. They predicted that fully
halting the potential threat of slope failure required the conventional excavation of up to one
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billion cubic yards of material. The mutated fly in the ointment was that "Remedial construction
of this magnitude would essentially wipe out the advantage of nuclear excavation."57 Slope
failures possessed the potential bury nuclear excavation. Nuclear energy’s economy stemmed
from the fact that it not only broke up rock and soil, but also ejected them from the canal prism,
minimizing the need for conventional excavation. If slope instability necessitated a tremendous
investment of mechanical energy it would eradicate the economic advantages that made nuclear
excavation appealing.
The issue of slope stability also reflected a broader lack of knowledge about the ways
nuclear explosives would operate in the Panamanian environment. To successfully create a sealevel canal across Panama, engineers needed to cut through the rugged mountainous terrain of
the Continental Divide. In the Darien region where Route 17 was planned, this required blasting
through terrain over 1000 feet above sea level. Nuclear energy could certainly accomplish this
task; indeed, it could do so with an economy and efficiency unrivaled by any conventional
energy source. The catch was that doing so required tremendous amounts of energy and
consequently would release tremendous amounts of entropy. Scientists suggested that felling the
Continental Divide would require the detonation of several substantial nuclear devices with
yields upwards of 10 Mt if not more.
Increasing the yield of explosives was not a problem. Indeed, nuclear explosives were
tremendous beneficiaries of economies of scale. As the yield of the device went up the
concurrent cost per BTU of energy declined significantly.58 For instance, a 2 Mt nuclear device
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cost $0.075 per million BTU’s while a 10 kt device cost $8.75 per million BTU’s.59 The issue
stemmed from the fact that increases in device yields also resulted in greater impacts from air
blast, ground shock, and radiation. The key was to try to find a sort of thermonuclear goldilocks
zone where leveling the Continental Divide was financially viable but wouldn’t harm Panama
City only 110 miles away. They begrudgingly conceded that one of their biggest worries was
“The uncertainty about our ability to blast the section of a channel through the highest levels of
the continental divide with a single nuclear explosive of safe yield."60 This proved to be one of
the ironic realities of the Panamanian environment. Its lack of land was a tremendous asset to
excavation of a canal as it could be crossed far more easily than a larger country- Route 25
through Colombia for example would span over 100 miles compared to Route 17’s 45 mileshowever, this also meant that there was no location in Panama that was truly isolated enough for
scientists to deploy their full arsenal of atomic energy.
The final issues facing the nuclear canal were the political and public relations obstacles
that lay in its path. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty continued to challenge the feasibility of nuclear
excavation, particularly in Panama. One of the central tenets of the Treaty was that fallout from a
nuclear detonation had to be contained within the territory of the country in which the explosion
took place. In the Nevada Testing Site (NTS) this was inconvenient; in Panama it was
impossible. In Nevada the AEC found that regulations imposed by the treaty significantly limited
both the size and number of experimental explosions they could undertake. One projection from
February of 1964 suggested that under these conditions it would take roughly 16 years to
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establish the technical feasibility of nuclear excavation.61 In Panama the problem was more
pronounced. At the proposed canal site, the Isthmus had a width of less than 50 miles. Even
under the best weather conditions it was impossible to keep fallout from drifting over
international waters, thus violating the stipulations of the treaty.62 The only way to create a
nuclear canal while still abiding by the treaty was to renegotiate or amend the treaty to create an
exception for peaceful nuclear explosions.
Unsurprisingly, the proponents of the nuclear canal were not going to have their
enthusiasm dampened by minor obstacles like internationally ratified treaties. They were
confident that the treaty could be easily amended. They even assumed that the Soviet Union
would be enthusiastic to exempt peaceful nuclear explosives so they could advance their own
nuclear excavation program. In a hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee AEC
Chairman Glenn Seaborg suggested that if other countries saw smaller explosions that didn’t
violate the guidelines of the treaty they would see the practicality of nuclear excavation and
“would also be able to assure themselves that nuclear excavation does not provide us an
opportunity to obtain weapons information that cannot already be obtained by underground
weapons tests.”63 Seaborg implied that if other countries felt assured of this they would be more
open to amending the treaty, allowing for the larger tests required to determine the feasibility of
nuclear excavation.
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This optimism permeated agencies affiliated with the project and led them to be
somewhat dismissive of the broader public concerns about fallout and radiation. In that same
hearing with the Senate Commerce Committee, John S. Kelly, the AEC’s director of the Division
of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, suggested that it would be possible to limit radiation from
explosives to just 1% of their 1962 levels, effectively rendering radiation a moot point. Senator
Philip Hart from Michigan sought to blunt Kelly’s optimism by pointing out that concerns over
radiation would not go away so easily. "There is going to be plenty of gnashing of teeth,” Hart
commented, “and that doesn't mean they are communist inspired or anything else."64 Despite the
best efforts of Hart and others to open the eyes of scientists to the widespread concerns the
public held regarding nuclear energy, scientists remained aloof and at times condescending in
their understanding of the issue. On the topic of public concern, they suggested “The safety
issues, particularly those dealing with radioactivity, are not well understood by the general
public. This lack of knowledge forms the basis for a natural resistance to the execution of a
project such as this one.” The 1964 report went as far as to identify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
as a symptom of this public ignorance, claiming, “The wide acceptance of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty is ample testimony to the general nature and seriousness of this problem.”65 The dismissal
of public concerns reflected the inability of nuclear scientists to realistically acknowledge that
shortcomings of nuclear energy. The sheer potential offered by the technology seemed to
outweigh any potential suggestion that it might be flawed or impractical. It appeared they were
blinded by the light. Ernest Graves suggested that perhaps there was a more practical reason for
this optimism. In a letter to Bill Wray he wrote that while he was at times overwhelmed by the
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obstacles that lay in their path, “Great endeavors require a fundamental faith in the ability of
man."66 The line between necessary optimism and naïve faith was razor thin.
Despite the unfortunate side effects of nuclear excavation, the awesome amounts of
energy the technology could provide, accompanied by the growing reality that the current canal
was both practically and politically inconvenient, led the federal government to throw its full
weight behind the proposed nuclear canal. As 1964 progressed both the Senate and House
considered bills to provide funding for on-site surveys in Panama and Colombia. This process
kicked off the final phase in the quest for the nuclear canal, a phase which started with optimism,
but soon revealed the task of harnessing the atom was far more daunting than anyone anticipated.
Congressional Debates and Missed Dates
The debates regarding on-site tests and the creation of the Atlantic Pacific Interoceanic
Canal Study Commission (ICSC) were surprisingly muted given the controversy surrounding
nuclear detonations. By September of 1964 the bill made its way through Congress and the ICSC
had been given $17.5 million dollars to conduct its study.67 Unlike the organizations previously
tasked with determining the feasibility of a nuclear canal, the ICSC was a civilian run
organization. Robert Anderson was named Chairman of the Commission as well as the lead
negotiator in the search for a new treaty with Panama. John Sheffey served as the Commission’s
Executive Director, overseeing organization and logistics. Alongside these two were four other
members: Robert Storey, Milton Eisenhower, General Kenneth Fields, and Raymond Hill. These
six men were tasked with a variety of charges, including determining the capacity of the existing
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canal, potential sites for a new canal, and finally assessing the technical feasibility of using
nuclear explosives to create a new sea-level Isthmian canal.68
Despite their best efforts, progress on the study itself was slowed by a variety of obstacles
that all centered around one issue: the rainy season. Despite technological developments in
harnessing new sources of energy, Americans in the 1960s still faced the same challenge that
G.M. Totten had faced over a century earlier. The rains of Panama between April and December
effectively slowed work to a crawl. The proposed plan of study for the Commission suggested
that "Under these adverse circumstances which will increase costs, we will get considerably less
field data for our programed resources."69 This issue complicated the fact that the ICSC was also
working on a fixed schedule and was expected to submit its findings to the President by June
30th, 1968.70 In essence this left them with four dry seasons to compile their information and
determine the best course of action for a new canal. A series of delays and budget issues soon
rendered this goal untenable.
The dry season of 1965 was a wash from the very beginning. The ICSC was not approved
until September of 1964 and didn’t appoint all six of its members until early 1965. It was
impossible to employ surveyors, scientists, and engineers and obtain the materials necessary to
construct facilities in the interior on such short notice. Additionally, the Commission had to
negotiate rights of access with Panama before they could even consider sending personnel into
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the region.71 These two challenges meant that throughout 1965 much of the ICSC’s work
focused on tasks that could be done domestically. The only major attempt to obtain on-site
information was the deployment of Field Director Alex Sutton to Panama for brief surveys.
Sutton’s initial report was not optimistic and even senior members of the Panama Canal
Company recognized the challenges the survey faced. In response to Sutton’s report, Canal Zone
Governor Robert Fleming wrote, “Without immediate access to work areas, without helicopter
resupply, without adequate potable water, without preparation and conditioning of the native
population, the field parties' energies and endeavors will be concentrated on survival with a
consequent detriment to the basic mission of the surveys."72 The Panamanian interior still
demanded tremendous investments of energy to breach, particularly during the wet season.
Because of these challenges the ICSC made only gradual progress during 1965.
Commission members made their way to Panama in August of 1965, and in October of that year
they visited the Nevada Test Site to get information on Plowshare’s progress.73 Nuclear device
development was also stalling. The Limited Test Ban Treaty and a popular perception of nuclear
explosives as doomsday devices limited public acceptance of any nuclear detonation.
Consequently, AEC scientists were forced to focus on theoretical cratering formulas using data
from previous nuclear detonations and chemical explosives to extrapolate the outcomes of larger
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detonations.74 Meanwhile, the AEC hired consultants from MIT and Duke to try to deal with the
vexing issue of slope stability. These studies focused particularly on the challenges of creating
stable slopes in the weak, saturated rocks that were common to Panama. While they made some
headway in exploring potential ways of generating more gradual slopes and promoting stability
in weak media, they were forced to admit that "It becomes obvious that no valid stability analysis
can be made without adequate site data."75 Until more nuclear tests could be conducted, or access
to proposed canal sites could be obtained, scientists could only speculate on the consequences of
deploying atomic energy.
Despite these challenges, the ICSC separated itself from its predecessors by taking public
concerns about nuclear explosives seriously and developing an informal program to assuage
public misgivings. The ICSC undertook a "Study of Public Information Aspects of Sea-Level
Canal Construction" which intended to “anticipate and evaluate the public reaction to each of the
courses of action under the consideration by the Commission and to weigh the influence of
public opinion on the feasibility of each." Additionally, the Commission adopted a policy of
responding to requests for unclassified information as expeditiously and thoroughly as possible.76
These new practices marked a tangible shift from the approach of earlier organizations. Public
fears about nuclear explosions were no longer dismissed as hallmarks of ignorance but
acknowledged as legitimate concerns. This more realistic interpretation of the challenges
presented by public resistance to nuclear energy reflected the ICSC’s far more nuanced and
cautious interpretation of the feasibility of nuclear engineering. Consequently, while the
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Commission failed to accomplish much in 1965 it did distinguish itself from its predecessors by
suggesting that policy makers were no longer as enthralled by the promise of nuclear excavation
as they had once been.
The ICSC’s slow progress continued as the dry season of 1966 approached. In this case
stagnation stemmed not from the Commission, but rather from Panama and Colombia’s
reluctance to grant Americans access to their territory.77 This too reflected the political
limitations to the deployment of atomic energy. The concerns of Panama and Colombia were
two-fold. Both countries were reluctant to make concessions to the American government
considering the ongoing conflict over the status of the existing canal. More concerning to both
governments was the future potential of Americans detonating nuclear devices in their territorial
borders. Colombian accounts suggested they weren’t worried about on-site surveys per se, but
rather the fact that these surveys were ostensibly conducted to gauge the feasibility of nuclear
engineering. Colombia was intrigued by the potential of a new sea-level canal; they were far
warier of this canal being excavated with nuclear energy.78 Panama had similar reservations
about nuclear energy. Sheffey testified before the Senate that Panama wanted to see a substantial
demonstration of the technology first “But they very clearly indicated that they don't want to be
the guinea pig for this.”79 Surprisingly, Isthmian nations weren’t lining up to have nearly 200 Mt
of nuclear explosives detonated within their borders.
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Finally, by the dry season of 1967, site surveys were able to begin in earnest in Panama.
Panama agreed to rights of access in February of 1966 (still too late to carry out substantial work
that dry season) and Colombia finally agreed in 1967 (too late to carry out substantial work
during that dry season). Yet the loss of two dry seasons in Panama and three in Colombia made
the July 1968 deadline for report submission impossible to meet. A hearing was held in June of
1967 to push the date back. In addition, the ICSC also requested an additional $7 million dollars
to cover the costs of more extensive surveys.80 While the Senate denied the ICSC’s funding
request, the organization was granted an extension of its work until December 1, 1969 largely
because of issues in the AEC.81
The Senate was hesitant to act on the ICSC’s request, particularly for increased funding,
thanks in large part to the hiatus of nuclear detonations. The AEC had not carried out an
underground nuclear explosive test in nearly four years and, as a result, technical information on
the potential of nuclear engineering had stalled. The ICSC found it impossible to fulfill its task of
gauging the feasibility of nuclear excavation without this information. John Kelly, the Chair of
the Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions for the AEC, suggested that not only could the AEC
not determine whether nuclear excavation was feasible for a new canal, they couldn’t determine
if it was feasible at all at higher yields. Kelly suggested that "To demonstrate the feasibility of
nuclear excavation, we must have the capability to more accurately predict the characteristics of
craters produced by nuclear explosives. Experience to date indicates that an empirically based
predictive capability does not suffice for higher yield detonations or for detonations in different
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media.”82 The unpredictability and uncontrollable nature of nuclear energy was too substantial to
deploy without more tests.
And yet, despite the lack of data, many scientists felt that the adoption of nuclear
excavation was a foregone conclusion. The disconnect between atomic enthusiasts and the
general apprehension surrounding nuclear explosions remained vast. An AEC contracted report
on the economics of peaceful nuclear explosives suggested that the technology was simply too
promising to abandon despite its risks. The report stated that “Even if Plowshare should be
rejected for the immediate future, the needs of the human race, in view of its vast and rapid
increase in numbers and the developing shortages of resources accessible by conventional means
eventually will force the use of this technology upon the world."83 This logic suggested that the
hazards of nuclear excavation were insignificant next to the demands of human development. An
exponentially more powerful source of energy needed to be adopted regardless of costs for
humanity to thrive. In some ways this sentiment reflected earlier trends in the adoption of new
energy regimes in Panama. Loss of life had been justified in both railroad and canal construction
on the grounds that these developments were essential to the bettering of the human condition.
And yet when this metric was applied to nuclear energy the sheer amount of energy that was in
play complicated matters. Coal, oil, and chemical explosives all lacked the sheer destructive
potential of nuclear reactions. The visceral power within the atom ensured that it was held to a
different standard than other technologies, a standard that many worried could not be met.
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Despite growing concerns regarding Plowshare, the quest for peaceful nuclear explosions
was not dead. Indeed, it rose from the irradiated ashes of the Nevada Desert again in 1968 to
carry out a series of tests which suggested that the dream of the nuclear canal could finally be
realized. The Cabriolet and Buggy tests, conducted in January and March respectively, were the
cause of this excitement.84 Buggy was particularly important. For the first time the AEC had
conducted a nuclear row charge experiment and proven, at least on a small scale, that the
technique created a trench. Members of the ICSC were pleased to report that both tests had
“results that equaled or exceeded expectations."85 These tests also increased Congressional
approval of the ICSC as hearings were held in the House in March and in the Senate in April to
again extend the deadline for report submission, this time to December 1, 1970, and increase
ICSC funding. An excited Robert Anderson suggested that these tests would allow the ICSC to
finally gauge the feasibility of a nuclear canal.86
Despite the rosy outlook for nuclear excavation, several issues remained unresolved. The
AEC had four additional tests planned, yet their record suggested that planned tests didn’t always
yield conducted tests. More problematic was the reality that, despite the best efforts of the AEC,
nuclear energy could not be fully contained. Substantial relocation programs needed to be
implemented before detonations took place. The utilization of thermonuclear explosives in
Panama would require the forced removal of at least 40,000 people from the rainforest
surrounding Route 17.87 The major issue was that the potential evacuees were native members of
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the Choco and Cuna tribes. Engineers were worried that these individuals viewed their lands
with “primitive cultural attachments that could not be easily overcome.”88 Removing the Choco
and Cuna from their ancestral lands was problematic not so much from its technical infeasibility,
but rather the public relations nightmare that would inevitably result.
The importance of these removals could not be overstated. The AEC’s first attempt at a
practical application of Plowshare had proposed the use of a nuclear explosion to create a deepwater harbor in Alaska. This project, codenamed Chariot, aimed to both provide a functional
harbor and unequivocally display the utility of nuclear excavation. It never happened. Scientists,
concerned with how the blast could impact local ecology and the Inuit who relied on it, raised the
alarm and public sentiment quickly turned against the program.89 Alaska Senator Bob Bartlett
cautioned the ICSC that "I am not going to pose this as a question, but there has always been this
thought in my mind, and I compare the relatively small population in the Cape Thompson
undertaking with the very considerable population down in Central America, and I apprehend
that there is a distinct possibility that those people who oppose this sort of thing will be
tremendously more active in this situation than they were in the Alaska one."90 Relocation was
not an issue that could be solved by experimentation or tests, and it had the potential to thwart
any canal across the Isthmus.
Despite the concerns about relocation, the ICSC moved ahead at a remarkable pace in the
months following Cabriolet and Buggy. Site surveys on Route 17 in Panama were effectively
completed during the dry season of 1967 and data analysis was already underway by 1968. The
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ICSC also managed to obtain rights of access in Colombia and was able to hit the ground
running in 1968. This onsite data answered crucial questions about the meteorology, hydrology,
and geology in both regions and helped engineers gain a better understanding of where and when
nuclear energy could be implemented. They believed that field work on both sites could be
completed by the end of the year, giving them time to compile data and obtain more information
from the AEC about its cratering experiments.91 Remarkably, even the AEC seemed poised to
meet its deadline, carrying out another nuclear detonation, Schooner, in December of 1968.92
The nuclear canal seemed to be closer at hand than it had been in years.
More Sizzle than Substance
As the ICSC entered 1969 and prepared to complete its studies, the enthusiasm that had
accompanied the nuclear excavation tests in early 1968 rapidly evaporated. Budget cuts limited
personnel numbers on the Isthmus and halted Plowshare experiments in the US. Meanwhile
questions remained about technical feasibility issues. Slope stability had yet to be dealt with and
scientists could not guarantee that they could successfully cut through the Continental Divide in
Panama with explosions of a safe yield. These questions were further complicated by the reality
that any sort of nuclear excavation required the relocation of tens of thousands of people, a
proposal that demanded the investment of tremendous political and financial capital. The verdict
on nuclear excavation was still out, but it did not look promising.
As 1969 began, the AEC and ICSC encountered a test that could not be overcome by
experimentation and theory: budget cuts. Less than a month into his first term, Richard Nixon
delivered on his campaign promises to limit government excess by cutting the number of
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government employees.93 While Nixon’s mandate impacted the entire federal government, its
impacts were felt acutely in Panama where nearly every service was operated by the federal
government. The result was a freeze in new hiring, an emphasis on internal promotion, and a
constant review of necessary personnel.94 In this climate, theoretical studies for a new canal were
not a priority.
The ICSC approached its deadline as these cuts came into effect and, in many areas, the
organization had already completed on-site surveys and data collection studies. As a result, it
was not directly impacted by budget cuts. However, personnel cuts did substantially impact the
progress of Plowshare. Unfortunately for the AEC, the Schooner test in December of 1968 was
the last test conducted under the purview of Plowshare and marked the end of the development
of the safe, high yield explosives necessary for canal construction. While the ICSC could
interpret chemical explosions, theoretical work, and scaling models, the lack of a large-scale tests
meant that they could not confidently determine the feasibility of nuclear excavation. Cabriolet,
Buggy, and Schooner provided exciting new information, but scaling accuracy remained
elusive.95
Despite these substantial roadblocks to the adoption of the nuclear canal, the AEC
remained obliviously optimistic about the program. An AEC report from August of 1970
parroted many of the results from early findings. While the report accepted that the Continental
Divide rendered Route 17 unviable it clung to the hope that Route 25 through Colombia
provided a cost-effective site of a canal. The study suggested that Route 25 was even more
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isolated from major population centers than Route 17, mitigating issues of ground shock and air
blast. It indicated that slope stability wouldn’t be as big an issue in Colombia and that the tests in
1968 had given them far more information regarding the formation of slopes. Finally, the report
echoed earlier findings that claimed radiation was a nonfactor due to the creation of cleaner
explosives.96 A perplexed John Sheffey wrote a letter to Chairman Robert Anderson stating,
“Note that this evaluation is considerably more optimistic than that of the commission, i.e., fewer
explosives and lesser total yields required for canal excavation than estimated by the Corps of
Engineers. It is also downplaying the problems of nuclear excavation."97 In the face of seemingly
conclusive evidence to the contrary, the AEC still saw the viability of nuclear explosives through
rose colored glasses.
Unfortunately for the AEC, the findings of the ICSC overshadowed nuclear optimism
when they finally delivered their report the President on December 1, 1970. The Commission
expressed itself unequivocally, writing, “Unfortunately, neither the technical feasibility nor the
international acceptability of such an application of nuclear excavation has been established at
this date.” While they acknowledged that nuclear explosions might become viable for large scale
construction projects at some point in the future, they cautioned the President that “no current
decision on United States canal policy should be made in the expectation that nuclear excavation
technology will be available for canal construction.”98 The nuclear canal was dead in the water
with no sign of help on the horizon.
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The rationale for the ICSC’s decision was unsurprising. They lacked the information
necessary to justify nuclear excavation. Interestingly, their concerns had little to do with
questions of air blast, ground shock, and radiation as they felt “extensive knowledge” of these
phenomena was available from earlier nuclear tests.99 Instead the ICSC emphasized the fact that
"The higher yield nuclear cratering experiments of the magnitude required for the Isthmian canal
excavation, however, remain to be carried out."100 The ICSC’s acknowledgment of these
limitations was a remarkable shift from the position taken by the AEC, which assumed that any
obstacle could be overcome with future experimentation and improvisation. The ICSC, more
focused on the practical application of the technology to real world situations, quickly
recognized that such an approach wasn’t sustainable given the economic, political, and societal
constraints surrounding the adoption of nuclear energy. While nuclear explosions could cut
through earth and rock, they were incapable of cutting through bureaucratic red tape.
In addition to a lack of information, the ICSC also identified several major problems that
had yet to be dealt with. Unsurprisingly, these concerns were focused on slope stability, public
acceptance, and the unique challenges presented by the Panamanian environment, forces which
had become increasingly central to the Isthmian canal discussion since 1964.
Slope stability remained the chief obstacle to technical feasibility. Scientific
understanding of slope stability had improved over the course of the 1960s and yet there were
still no solutions to this problem. In coastal and swampy areas saturated soils would simply erode
over time, or flash floods would sweep them away with terrible efficiency. These landscapes
were too fluid to have stability imposed on them and so nuclear excavation was considered
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infeasible for many areas, particularly along the Atrato and Truando rivers of Route 25.
Conversely, rocky areas were too rigid to effectively use nuclear engineering. Nuclear explosives
left sheer slopes in rocky terrain. If these slopes were subjected to high levels of water, extreme
weight, or even the shock of subsequent detonations they could fracture, creating catastrophic
slope failures.101 Nuclear energy had an awesome potential to restructure landscapes, yet in
doing so it often made it next to impossible to maintain them. Humans simply could not control
the power of the atom.
The central obstacle presented by the Panamanian environment remained the challenging
issue of crossing the Continental Divide. The interior of the Isthmus was comprised almost
entirely of rock and, while nuclear energy could certainly remove this material, questions
remained over whether the high yield explosives required to level the Continental Divide could
be safely used. This was certainly tied to questions over fallout, air blast, and ground shock, but
increasingly it was linked with questions over slope stability. For the canal to work it needed to
level one thousand feet of rock while simultaneously creating slopes at stable angles. The ICSC
determine that "Such slopes cannot be produced by single-row explosive excavation and the
chemical explosive experiments conducted this far indicate that it is unlikely that multiple-row
techniques can be developed to produce flatter slopes."102 Ultimately a new canal through
Panama was technically infeasible thanks to the varied terrain of the region. The landscape was
too fluid for the technology to work.
The issue of slope stability was exacerbated by continued public relations challenges that
had dogged the technology since its inception. The ICSC’s appreciation of these concerns made
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them uniquely qualified to gauge the impact that they had on the creation of an atomic canal.
While they suggested that these obstacles could be overcome if nuclear excavation was proven
technically feasible, the lack of progress on Plowshare rendered the potential for public
acceptance of nuclear engineering moot. If anything, the 1970 study showed that public relations
concerns were growing even more complicated. The ICSC argued that concerns about radiation
release were becoming entwined with questions of foreign policy and domestic dissent. The
Limited Test Ban Treaty had been joined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty
of Tlatelolco as obstacles to the international acceptance of nuclear detonations, and both
Panama and Colombia were growing skeptical of nuclear earthmoving.103 While the ICSC
reported that considerable foreign relations, education, and reimbursement campaigns could
overcome this resistance, they worried that “the political and financial costs to the United States
in obtaining such acceptance could offset any potential saving in construction costs and gains in
intangible benefits.”104 Unless nuclear energy’s utility could outpace the technology’s hazards,
public opinion would continue to work against it.
The message of the ICSC was clear. Nuclear excavation, while promising, remained far
too unproven to be used on the monumental scale demanded by an Isthmian canal project. This
was not to say that the ICSC rejected nuclear energy outright. They adamantly suggested that
they believed eventually this technology might pay tremendous dividends.105 Unfortunately, the
risk of testing this new technology in Panama was unacceptable. Nuclear excavation was too
unproven and the task too great. The dream of an atomic canal was, at least for the present, put to
rest.

103

ICSC, Interoceanic Canal Studies: 1970, pg. 43-44.
Ibid, pg. 45.
105
Ibid, pg. 43.
104

271

The Beginning of the End
Ten years of studies doomed the quest for a nuclear canal. The lack of progress on a
feasible nuclear technology and a broad array of public concerns relegated nuclear excavation to
the realm of science fiction. The idea reemerged in the 1970s, however, the ICSC’s decision
dealt a significant blow to nuclear engineering that it never fully recovered from. Plowshare
lingered on throughout the early 1970s but received no funds for large scale experiments after
1970. After several years of private studies and schemes to keep the program alive, Plowshare
was effectively defunded entirely in 1974.106
It's ironic that the decision to shy away from nuclear excavation in Panama was primarily
reflective of the awesome power of this new source of energy. Atomic energy’s tremendous
yields and uncontrollable nature created a series of unique challenges stemming from nuclear
explosions’ overabundance of energy rather than dearth of it. Nuclear explosions altered
landscapes too radically, creating steep sloped banks that were recipes for disaster in the entropic
Panamanian landscape. The hubris of some scientists allowed them to discount the concerns of
environmentalists and citizens as ignorance or a lack of understanding, but they could not
overlook the fact that the technology was fundamentally untenable in the Panamanian
environment. While public resistance and political challenges certainly impacted the decision to
shy away from nuclear earthmoving, technical infeasibility ultimately vaporized the project. As
the ICSC suggested, public and political relations issues could be overcome, but before this
could be accomplished the utility of nuclear earthmoving had to be established. The AEC’s
inability to do this made a public relations campaign a moot point.107
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The decision to avoid nuclear energy was a remarkable development in the history of
American energy in Panama. This was the first time that a new source of energy lay untouched
by Americans seeking to restructure the Panamanian environment. A decade of admittedly
inconsistent study preceded the decision to abandon nuclear technology and, while at times the
AEC’s optimism towards nuclear energy seemed insulated from real world realities, the ultimate
decision to shy away from Plowshare was indicative of a realization of the limits of a new energy
regime rather than a single-minded focus on its benefits.
Unlike coal and oil, which also certainly possessed destructive side effects, the
consequences of nuclear energy were brutal and explicit. The unrestrained destruction that
accompanied nuclear excavations proved an insurmountable obstacle to feasibility regardless of
how much energy the federal government brought to bear on it. Nuclear explosions were too
instantaneous and powerful to be safely and effectively controlled. The potential side effects of a
failed or even successful nuclear detonation were equal to the awesome energy the new
technology promised. Rob Nixon’s idea of “slow violence” is useful in understanding this
tension.108 Compared to the problems associated with coal or oil, the potential hazards of nuclear
exaction were literally explosive. Nuclear skepticism didn’t stop with nuclear excavation.
Thanks to the disasters of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, hostility towards nuclear energy
grew to encompass nuclear power plants as well. This movement rightfully identified the dangers
that came from the application of nuclear energy, and yet it’s worth noting that the fervor
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directed against nuclear energy allowed fossil fuels and their insidious byproducts to continue to
flourish in the radioactive shade cast by the mushroom cloud.
Ultimately the ICSC’s 1970 report spelled the end of not only the atomic canal, but also
American hegemony over the Canal itself. The ICSC suggested that the US explore conventional
excavation of a sea-level canal, but with an estimated price tag of $2.88 billion dollars the
venture constituted a significant financial risk.109 A slowing economy and an increasingly
expensive foreign policy made such a price tag hard to justify. While the treaty negotiations that
had begun in the 1960s had not yet borne fruit, Panama had clearly indicated that the status quo
was unacceptable, and that the governance of both the Canal and the Canal Zone needed to
change. These discussions defined the 1970s, setting the stage for the next chapter in the
complex energy history of the Canal Zone. While nuclear energy might have been the focus of
attention during the 1960s, fossil fuels still ruled the Canal behind the scenes. The discovery of
oil on Alaska’s northern shore in 1968 pushed fossil fuels to the forefront. As America was
forced to reckon with the limits of its thirst for energy domestically, Panama’s importance as an
energy highway came to impact treaty discussions, suggesting that the importance of American
energy in Panama was far from finished even though nuclear excavation had proven to be little
more than a radioactive flash in the pan.
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Chapter VI: A Crude Form of Survival: Alaskan Petroleum and Panamanian Pipelines:
1945-1990
Barrow, Alaska (or as it is known today Utqiagvik) was hardly a war zone. And yet it
was to Barrow, the northernmost town in the United States, that Navy Lieutenant W.T. Foran
ventured in the spring of 1944. Foran was leading the Navy’s survey of Naval Petroleum Reserve
No. 4 which ran through northern Alaska. For the next several years the Navy, U.S. Geological
Survey, and Arctic Contractors sent hundreds of researchers to the inhospitable landscape to
search for signs of oil.1 As Foran and others trudged through the arctic tundra, construction
workers employed by Williams Brothers Corporation laid an oil pipeline from the Gatun tank
farm near the Atlantic terminus of the Panama Canal to the Arraijan tank farm near the Pacific
terminus.2 Separated by over 5000 miles, the two developments seemed to be isolated from one
another, and yet two decades later their fates became inextricably entwined. The discovery of a
massive oil field near Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's north shore catalyzed an energy bonanza in
which companies sought to determine the most economical means of transporting millions upon
millions of barrels of Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil to markets around the world. Panama once
again was the centerpiece of one of the most lucrative trades in the world, and yet in wedding
itself to the ANS oil trade Panama encountered a new source of entropy. One connected not only
to physical forces, but also the instable and erratic nature of the global oil trade and diplomatic
crises. Questions about the Canal’s utility, domestic developments in the US and Panama,
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diplomatic disputes, and shifting global markets all threatened to undermine the potential
benefits that accompanied ANS oil shipments.
Since WWII, questions of the Canal’s obsolescence dogged the waterway, emerging from
hibernation a few times every decade before being subdued by more immediate concerns. The
failure of nuclear excavation and the sea-level canal project seemed to provide a conclusive end
to these debates by suggesting that, while the Canal had limitations, there was simply no feasible
way of economically restructuring the waterway. Petroleum complicated this narrative. Long
among the most important commodities to transit the Canal, petroleum provided economic
arguments for the continued relevancy of the Canal, and yet as oil production boomed during the
postwar years the Canal's inability to transit the largest tankers was a sobering reminder of its
limitations. It was perhaps unsurprising then that the Canal became the site of a new set of
interoceanic transportation networks, passages specially tailored and designed for the
transportation of oil: pipelines. The emergence of Panamanian pipelines emphasized both the
continued geographic importance of Panama itself and the challenges presented by the confines
of the lock canal.
The complexity that defined Panama's relationship with petroleum was exacerbated by
the increasingly volatile relationship between Panama and the United States. The fallout of the
Marty's Day riots reverberated through the next decade-and-a-half as, starting in 1964, the
Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations sought to renegotiate treaties between the two
nations. Among Panama's chief concerns during these negotiations was a desire to capitalize on
the financial opportunities offered by its position as a global crossroads. Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker, one of the lead negotiators of the new treaties, was quick to note that as early as 1975
"Already Panama has plans which call for the construction of an oil pipeline which would reduce
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the cost of transporting petroleum across the Isthmus."3 In this sense, Panama's own economic
ambitions also called the Canal's utility into question. Panama's frustration with the small
financial benefit it extracted from tolls led it to pursue alternative methods of transporting
petroleum products across the Isthmus. In the years following the Treaties’ ratification in 1979,
Panama doubled down on this commitment, creating a pipeline that proved immensely valuable
to the nation until the late 1980s.
Ultimately, the expansion of the global oil trade proved a bit of an enigma. It certainly
made Panama once more a focal point of global commerce, but the financial benefits that
accompanied oil ebbed and flowed, as fluid as oil itself. By becoming a crossroads for ANS oil,
Panama once again reasserted its intimate relationship with energy and accepted the entropic
consequences that accompanied it. Unlike previous eras of the Transit Zone’s history however,
the entropy was no longer solely physical, but rather diplomatic and economic. The erosion of
diplomatic ties between the two nations threatened to undermine the ANS oil trade and even
after new treaties were negotiated in 1979 the rise of General Manuel Noriega, a man whose
volatility made him entropy personified, caused the oil boom to come crashing down.
The postwar years gave rise to an increasingly global energy market that emphasizes the
connections between seemingly disparate regions on an unprecedented scale. As Daniel Yergin
has pointed out, the quest for energy stability is inherently beset by unforeseen “surprises” which
have the potential to radically alter the global status quo.4 Riots, dictators, international incidents,
and economic developments could easily restructure global energy networks. In wedding itself to
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ANS oil, Panama was also subjecting itself to a globalized world in which developments 5000
miles or more away could dramatically alter the status quo at home. This unpredictable
relationship between America, Panama, and petroleum shaped the postwar era. Petroleum seeped
into discussions of the Canal's future and emerged as the dominant source of energy impacting
the Canal in the 1970s and '80s. These developments ushered in the final chapter of American
energy in Panama. While the relationship between the two nations changed during the era, the
incessant importance of energy remained.
The Promise of Alaska
Alaska's potential as a site for crude oil extraction had been well established by the
1940s. The U.S. Geology Survey itself noted in January of 1945 that "Indications of oil in Alaska
are widespread and have been well known for many years” before qualifying its statement by
acknowledging, “investigations of potential oil areas by the Geological Survey have been
deferred in recent years because of even more pressing duties."5 Katalla, located about 150 miles
east of Anchorage had been tapped as early as 1902, producing 154,000 barrels during the three
decades it was in operation.6 And yet by the 1940s, this was the only source of Alaskan oil. The
abundance of reserves in California forestalled the relative expense of transporting oil from
Alaska to energy-hungry markets in the Atlantic and the lack of a demand for the product meant
that energy speculators looked for easier ways to turn a profit. Here too, WWII radically altered
the status quo. The war effort’s insatiable demand for oil rapidly dried up wells in California to
the extent that in July of 1944, Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum Advisor for the War
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Harold Ickes bluntly declared “we are running out of oil.”7 Such pessimistic assertions of
America’s energy security were far from universal, but even the most optimistic projections were
accompanied by a growing realization that existing reserves were finite. In light of these
concerns it was unsurprising that the Navy began exploring Northern Alaska with renewed vigor
in 1944 in hopes of finding a supply of oil that could meet demand for years to come.
Created by Executive Order in 1923, Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 (or as it came to be
known “PET 4”) consisted of a 150-mile-wide stretch of land bound by the Arctic Ocean to the
North and the Brooks Range to the south. From its western boundary at Icy Cape the parcel
extended all the way to the Colville River in the east. The Reserve contained over 35,000 square
miles of the most rugged terrain on Earth and, with the exception of a few anecdotal reports of
oil seepages along the northern coastline, it was unexplored by the Navy.8 Small scale
reconnaissance surveys were undertaken between 1923-1926 but even these provided only basic
topographical and geological data.9 As a result, when Lieutenant Foran launched his preliminary
investigation on March 21, 1944, he and his party were quite literally entering uncharted
territory. Despite this, the reconnaissance survey found indications of oil and, upon returning,
Foran immediately recommended the Navy conduct a full-scale investigation into the region.
Foran suggested there was an unusual abundance of seepages throughout the area and,
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furthermore, he believed there were indications of productive oil-bearing strata at relatively
shallow levels. In his mind, the potential of the area was simply too robust to ignore.10
Interestingly, it was at this moment that Alaskan oil forged its first connection with the
Panama Canal. One of Foran’s chief advocates in the Navy was Rear Admiral Ben Moreell, the
chief of the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, who would go on to participate in the 1947
Isthmian Canal Studies commissioned under Public Law 280. Upon Foran’s return, Moreell
wrote a memo in which he argued that investigations into the potential of PET 4 should begin
immediately. Moreell was so enthused about Foran’s initial findings that he suggested not only
full-scale reconnaissance but also the drilling of core holes and exploratory wells as well as
dispatching survey and reconnaissance parties to scout potential pipeline sites. While Moreell
wasn’t thinking explicitly about Panama in 1944, he was careful to point out that it was
important that the reconnaissance parties determine whether it would be economical to get oil out
of the Reserve.11 After several months of navigating political red tape, the project received
formal approval and, on July 20, 1944, 196 Seabees and 235 stevedores set out from Tacoma,
Washington en route to Barrow under the command of Lieutenant Command W.H. Rex.12
Work progressed slowly. The remainder of 1944 consisted primarily of attempts to
construct a camp at Barrow and obtain all the materials and supplies necessary to conduct the
studies. As a result, while some geological and topographical information was gathered during
the year, the more intensive ventures, particularly the drilling of exploratory wells, needed to
wait until 1945. As work began in 1945 the expedition was forced to reckon with new
challenges. Political jockeying between members of the Navy and surveyors of the U.S.
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Geological Survey sidelined much of the work. These two entities both wanted to assert their
ownership over the project and, as a result, personal rivalries hindered the work. The passage of
a $9,000,000 appropriation for the exploration rendered this question moot as the Navy and
Geological Survey used the funding to hire Arctic Contractors, a consulting firm consisting of
several companies formed specifically to help with the PET 4 surveys.13 As 1945 came to an end,
the shift towards a civilian-contractor model promised to ease the tensions between the Navy and
Geological Survey and a year's worth of work in Arctic conditions had also familiarized
engineers with the peculiarities of drilling in icy conditions.14
The shift from a military to a civilian-run project coincided with transitions in the
oversight of the project as well. While Moreell was still nominally involved in the project, direct
oversite was transferred to an operating committee headed by Commodore W.G. Greenman and
consisting of members of the Navy, U.S. Geological Study, and Arctic Contractors. The
committee provided the operational guidance for the project and directed Arctic Contractors’
employees. On the ground, the project was now led by a civilian, Arthur Daily, who was
appointed project manager. These changes were adopted without incident and soon the study
found itself on track. Labor was divided between the Geological Survey which was overseeing
aerial explorations and Arctic Contractors which took over the administration of the exploratory
wells.15 The result was a far clearer administrative hierarchy, alleviating the infighting that had
derailed work over the initial year.
The next several years saw the expedition generate substantial volumes of data and yet
massive oil fields still proved elusive. While the $9,000,000 granted to conduct the expedition
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was extensive, it was not limitless and forced the project be prudent in drilling exploratory
wells.16 Unfortunately for the contractors, while some wells showed indications of oil, there was
no definitive identification of substantial oil-producing strata as the years rolled by. Still,
optimism surrounding the region remained unabated and the Geological Survey put out a flurry
of reports in 1945, ’46, and ’47 all of which painted the future of Alaskan oil in a positive light.17
The largest coup for the Geological Survey during the 1940s was the Navy Department’s
decision to publish geological information and initial findings regarding PET 4 in 1947.18 In
addition to showcasing the work done by the Geological Survey and Arctic Contractors, the
Navy’s decision also legitimized future explorations in Alaska, sparking commercial interest in
the development of the region.
By the early 1950s surveys of PET 4 were dwindling. The initial appropriation was
intended to run only through 1950, and while it was extended to 1953, the lack of major oil
strikes made it difficult to justify further extension of the project. The most substantial find was
at Umiat Field in the southeastern part of the Reserve. Eleven wells were drilled at Umiat and
while estimates varied wildly, the consensus was that the field contained roughly 70 million
recoverable barrels of oil. This was a considerable amount of oil, and yet it appeared to be a bit
of an outlier as the next most enticing site, Simpson Field, was estimated to contain only 12
million barrels. Ironically, oil wasn't even the most common source of energy in PET 4. Natural
gas deposits proved far more abundant in the region and by the time studies were ended,
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projections suggested that Barrow Field alone contained between 5 to 7 billion cubic feet of
recoverable gas. This quantity was dwarfed by the 22 billion cubic feet of gas projected to be at
Gubik Field.19
Despite the inconclusive findings in PET 4, the expedition was considered a success. Oil
had been discovered and the geological qualities of the region indicated the potential of
additional deposits that could be found with more extensive searches. Arctic Contractors
employee E.W. Beltz summed up the feelings of many involved in the PET 4 surveys when he
claimed "In the writer's opinion, similar structural conditions in any oil country would justify
additional tests."20 The survey was careful to point out that it had carried out only 44 core tests,
drilled only 36 test wells, and been forced to cover tens of thousands of miles of rugged
landscape with only a modest supply of manpower and machinery.21 John Reed, a member of the
U.S. Geological Survey who visited PET 4 in 1947, summarized this perspective, arguing, "If the
present drilling program is unsuccessful, it can still be demonstrated that northern Alaska may
well have petroleum possibilities and that the small number of tests were not sufficient to prove
the possibilities."22 In addition, there were questions about the oil-bearing potential of the
remainder of Alaska's North Slope. PET 4 only extended as far east as the Colville River. In a
letter sharing his experiences, Reed insightfully noted that "The oil possibilities are by no means
confined to the Reserve and some of the best structures may well be outside the Reserve."23 Reed
didn’t realize how shrewd his assessment was.
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Had the boundaries of PET 4 extended just 50 miles east of the Colville River and
encompassed Prudhoe Bay, the findings of the survey may have been radically different. Lying
just below the surface of the Prudhoe Region was a massive oil reserve that would redefine
American energy production. It took another fifteen years before the Prudhoe Bay reserve was
discovered, and yet PET 4 had already paved the way for the development of Alaskan energy.
The survey not only assessed the region's potential as an energy producer but also identified
some of the challenges that would be involved in getting Alaska North Slope oil to market.
While Panama wasn't explicitly mentioned in conjunction with Alaskan oil in the 1950s and
1960s, (largely because it was assumed most of the oil would be consumed and processed on the
West Coast) there were rumblings of the important role the Isthmus would play in the expanding
global energy market.
Pipelines and Profits
Petroleum products had already been established as a staple of Panama Canal traffic prior
to WWII thanks in large part to the need to transport oil from California to Gulf Coast refineries.
Despite predictions that petroleum's importance to the Canal would wane over time, the
emergence of WWII served to redouble the centrality of oil on the Isthmus, both as an important
commodity and a component of American national security. These concerns led Americans and
Panamanians alike to explore the potential of expediting the transportation and distribution of
petroleum products in Panama. And yet the concerns of the two nations seemed to be
fundamentally at odds. The American government and Panama Canal Company saw oil as a
means of regulating traffic through the Canal by expeditiously fueling ships and preventing
delays in transit times and ensuring that American Naval vessels could promptly refuel as they
traveled between oceans en route to conflicts around the world. To the Panamanian government,
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petroleum presented the promise of profits, a promise the Canal had never delivered on. In
WWII and the decades following, both parties sought to bring their visions of the Isthmus’s
potential to reality through the creation of pipelines.
The first pipeline to cross the Isthmus was created solely as a means of improving
American national security. As WWII raged on in 1944 and the Panama Canal was utilized to
transport men, materials, and military vessels between the oceans, the navy became increasingly
cognizant of the need to provide a constant supply of oil for these ships. The Canal Zone
presented the perfect site for the creation of a pipeline that could be used to move fuel between
the coasts. The Navy hired Williams Brothers Corporation of Tulsa, Oklahoma to oversee
construction. The structure consisted of four main lines: two twenty-inch pipelines designed to
carry fuel oil, a twelve-inch pipeline meant to carry gasoline and a ten-inch pipeline for the
transportation of light diesel oil. Designed primarily to transport oil from Atlantic to Pacific, The
two twenty-inch lines could transport a maximum of 5,800 barrels per hour each from north to
south and a maximum of 3,400 barrels per hour each from south to north.24 The relatively small
volume of oil the pipeline could handle and the emphasis on transporting oil from Atlantic to
Pacific suggests it was not meant to serve as a means to transport oil between ships en route to
distant markets, but rather to transport oil to storage facilities on the Isthmus itself where it could
then be used to fuel naval vessels at the Atlantic and Pacific docks.25 This was an approach
meant not to generate a profit, but rather to improve national security.
Through the early 1960s, the perception of pipelines in Panama tended to mirror the
Navy’s approach of perceiving oil and fueling as supplemental to the effective administration of
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the Canal. The Panama Canal Company (PCC) managed its oil fields and reserves in this same
manner. The PCC operated four tank farms by the 1960s split evenly between the Atlantic and
Pacific terminals. These facilities contained 87 tanks which held roughly 3,320,000 barrels of oil
collectively. 55 of the tanks were owned by commercial interests, suggesting they were operated
for profit. And yet over the course of a calendar year, the facilities only handled roughly
18,300,000 barrels, a relatively modest sum, which suggested the continued preponderance of
local consumption.26 To the PCC these oil fields were a means of ensuring efficient flows of
traffic through the Canal. Delays in fueling forced ships to be delayed entering the locks, which,
in turn, delayed the next vessel hoping to enter the locks, generating a traffic jam that diminished
the Canal's already dwindling capacity.27 Neither the American government nor the PCC was
concerned with the large scale commercial transportation of oil through pipelines in the 1960s
and 1970s. In their mind, the Panama Canal remained an adequate solution to this problem. This
was unsurprising as Americans had invested considerable resources into the Canal and, during
these decades, particular the 1960s, still operated under the assumption that expanded canal
facilities could increase the capacity of the Canal, allowing it to handle the global oil trade and
the larger tankers that would accompany it.
Panama exercised far more foresight in its interest in transisthmian pipelines, identifying
their potential economic benefits far earlier than Americans. Panamanians explored numerous
opportunities to realize this potential throughout the 1960s and particularly during the 1970s.
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Indeed, Panama seemed to be interested in positioning itself as a major energy crossroads,
developing refineries in its territory while it advocated for the creation of pipelines.28 Panama’s
first forays into pipeline exploration were somewhat modest and never extended beyond
preliminary surveys and discussions with contractors. Nonetheless, they displayed a far more
concentrated interest in the potential of pipelines as a means not only of augmenting the
operation of the Canal, but also generating a profit.
Panamanian and commercial interests first explored the creation of a pipeline in 1962
when Otra Costa Corporation pitched the creation of a twenty-inch and a thirty-inch pipeline
across the Isthmus. Interestingly, the proposed route followed the Roosevelt-Boyd Highway and
lay predominantly outside the Canal Zone, suggesting that Panama hoped to develop a pipeline
that it could administer with minimal involvement from Americans or the PCC.29 A year later,
this plan formed the foundation of a proposal put forward by the Colon Free Zone. The Free
Zone sought to hire Williams Brothers, the creators of the Navy pipeline, to construct a
transisthmian pipeline that could carry crude and bunker oil across Panama. The projected
pipeline would be capable of transporting 100,000 barrels daily and would be connected to
storage facilities of 860,000 barrels on the Atlantic and 1,210,000 on the Pacific.30 The Panama
Canal Company was somewhat uncomfortable with the long-term implications of Panama’s
ambitious position on the pipeline. Governor Robert Fleming noted, "We see little probability of
a successful venture in the pipeline field in the near future, but we cannot dismiss entirely the
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possibility of its eventual development."31 While the PCC was confident that a pipeline couldn’t
immediately undermine the Canal’s role in international oil transportation, it was increasingly
concerned about the long term consequences of a pipeline if future levels of petroleum
consumption continued to rise or if tanker size continued to increase.
These fears seemed to be realized as the 1960s came to a close. On July 18, 1968,
Atlantic-Richfield Company (ARCO) Chief Executive Officer Robert Anderson announced that
his company had found a historically massive oil field at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North Slope.32
The dream of Foran, Moreell, and Reed had finally been realized and Alaska’s potential as a
source of energy seemed limitless. This discovery radically altered global energy networks, and
the Panama Canal soon found itself drawn into the burgeoning energy bonanza.
Accessing Alaskan Oil
The discovery of ANS oil was met with near universal enthusiasm. Experts eagerly
debated the size of the find with some estimates going so far as to suggest it would be the largest
field ever discovered, even larger than the 62 billion barrel Greater Burgan Field in Kuwait.33
More modest assessments established a safer (and extremely accurate), but still remarkable
estimate of 25 billion barrels. As one industry insider put it “That, as I’m sure someone has
remarked, is a lot of oil.”34 And yet the volume of the Prudhoe Bay Field would be for naught if
it could not be accessed. Retired General L.J. Lincoln, a representative for energy speculator
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Eugene Callis who sought to create a pipeline across Central American, argued "However, as
great as is the challenge and achievement of oil production at the wellhead in the Alaska Arctic,
the key to its use now becomes economical, reliable transportation to refineries and users."35
This was no small task.
In the months following the announcement, a slew of proposals sought to provide a
solution to the issue of getting ANS oil to refineries in the Gulf Coast. Among the most
ambitious was the $50 million-dollar overhaul of the 115,000-ton tanker SS Manhattan to turn it
into an icebreaker. The Manhattan would carve out the fabled Northwest Passage, allowing a
fleet of six 250,000 deadweight ton (dwt) tankers to travel directly from Prudhoe Bay to east
coast refineries. This would shorten travel time and allow for the use of the largest tankers in the
world.36 In the United States, the debate swirled around the creation of a Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System (TAPS) to connect Prudhoe Bay with the port of Valdez, 800 miles away.37 The flurry of
activity surrounding potential routes for ANS oil naturally came to encompass Panama as well.
It was unsurprising that Panama was considered as a route for ANS oil. The Canal had
long served as a crossroads of energy. In 1968, well before ANS shipments began, petroleum
products accounted for 18% of the commercial tonnage that made its way through the Canal and
generated 17.9 million dollars in tolls, roughly 21% of the tolls generated during that year.38
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Given the substantial role petroleum products were already playing in the Canal it seemed
natural that the potential of shipping ANS oil would be lauded by the PCC, yet this was not the
case. The chief concern among PCC officials was the continued inability of the Canal to transit
large tankers. A report assessing the economic impacts of ANS oil on the Canal noted "The oil
cannot be competitive in that (global) market if the movement is restricted to tanker sizes that are
capable of using the Canal."39 The most economical way of shipping the large quantities of oil
would be in tankers of over 200,000 dwt. The largest ships capable of transiting the Canal were
only 90,000 dwt, or the equivalent of roughly 450,000 barrels. Even these smaller tankers were
subject to clear-cut daylight only transits (CCDO) which meant that they had to go through the
Gaillard Cut individually during daylight, restrictions which further strained the Canal’s
capacity.40 For these reasons, the PCC didn't actively pursue transportation of ANS oil beyond
assurances that the Canal could handle some of the trade if it were transported in smaller vessels.
Panama suffered from no such failures of imagination. A scant three months after ARCO
announced the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay Field, the law firm Ragan and Mason submitted an
unsolicited offer to the Navy, asking that their clients, Williams Brothers and National Bulk
Carriers, be granted a fifteen-year lease to use the Navy pipeline to transport oil across the
Isthmus. While the Panamanian government didn't formally make the offer, it had worked
closely with both parties in the previous decade. In addition to constructing the Navy pipeline in
1944, Williams Brothers had also been tapped to build the proposed pipeline in 1963, and
National Bulk Carriers had signed a contract with the government of Panama to operate the
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nation’s lone refinery.41 That Panama would benefit from the transportation of ANS oil under
this contract was a foregone conclusion. The Navy and PCC, however, were reluctant to lease the
pipeline. Governor Walter Leber expressed concern that using the pipeline to transport ANS oil
between foreign ports might directly curtail traffic through the Canal.42 The Navy's chief concern
wasn't economics, but rather security. The Navy mandated that they be able to repossess and use
the pipeline at any time should there be a conflict, suggesting that such an arrangement was
essential to national security.43 Negotiations failed to overcome these obstacles and gradually the
Navy pipelines ceased to be considered as an option for the transportation of ANS.
Panama's interest in moving ANS oil would not be extinguished easily, however. As the
negotiations between the lawyers and the Navy stretched on, the government of Panama looked
elsewhere to find parties interested in the creation of a transisthmian pipeline. They soon found
their partners not in the United States, but rather in Europe. The English company International
Management and Engineering (IMEC) would oversee the design of the pipeline while the West
German firm Thyssen would be placed in charge of construction. The $76,000,000 project would
create a 30-inch pipeline capable of moving 700,000 barrels of oil a day.44 The venture
progressed rapidly and Panama explicitly tied to it ANS crude transportation arguing that they
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would be able to meet the need for transportation as early as 1972.45 With this objective in mind,
Panama appointed Dr. Eduardo Tejeira to oversee exploratory surveys and by August of 1970,
the surveys were underway. Despite its enthusiasm, Panama realized that the success of the
pipeline relied upon the creation of TAPS to turn a profit. One shrewd Panamanian government
official noted that "the crucial decisions regarding the Panama pipeline will be made not by the
PJG (Pueblo Junto Gobierno or United People’s Government of Panama), but rather by the U.S.
government…"46 Unfortunately for Panama, their faith in America’s appetite for oil may have
been misplaced. By the early 1970s TAPS was caught in a political quagmire as government
officials, oil companies, and environmentalists battled over the future of the project. The
European companies' interest in the project waned as TAPS negotiations dragged on and by
November of 1970 they had pulled out altogether.47 Other companies expressed interest in the
pipeline, but without assurances that ANS oil could even get out of Alaska, there was simply not
enough enthusiasm to turn a Panamanian pipeline into a reality.
A few projects sputtered into and out of existence over the first few years of the 1970s. In
1972 the Litton Group proposed a slurry pipeline that would transport both coal and oil across
the Isthmus, theoretically diminishing the potential financial risk presented by the debates over
ANS oil. The pipeline would move coal from the Atlantic to the Pacific where it would be loaded
onto massive 200,000 dwt freighters and shipped to Japan. These vessels would stop in Alaska to
load up on ANS oil before making their way to Panama where the oil would be pumped from
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Pacific to Atlantic en route to Gulf Coast refineries.48 Panama too continued to remain interested
in the construction of a pipeline, working with several American companies to explore the
financial and engineering viability of a pipeline.49 And yet Panama was patient in its approach,
recognizing that until the TAPS project received approval there was no need to begin serious
preparations.50 As the TAPS debate stretched over months and years, the economic potential of
ANS oil grew increasingly suspect. This obstacle pointed to the complexity of the global energy
network into which the Panama Canal had thrust itself. Domestic policy debates in the United
States prevented Panama from being able to capitalize on its position as the crossroads of the
world and emerge as a major player in the global energy trade.
The slow progress of TAPS was not the only concern. The increasingly strained
diplomatic relationship between Panama and the United States also complicated the creation of
pipelines. Unless the two nations could find a way to deal with the tensions stemming from
administration of the Canal, it would be impossible to fully explore the economic potential
offered by ANS oil. As the 1970s progressed, the push for a new treaty between the two nations
obtained an unprecedented level of support and brought with it the promise that Panama could
finally capitalize on the economic opportunities presented by its location.
A New Era Emerges
The Martyrs’ Day Riots of January 9th, 1964 were a clear indication that the existing
relationship between Panama and the United States was unsustainable. Decades of animosity had
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boiled over in Panama and the seemingly unlimited autonomy of the United States in the Canal
Zone was no longer an acceptable reality to Panamanians. These clashes embodied a new
diplomatic source of entropy that had to be dealt with in order for oil transportation to flourish.
To this end, starting in 1964 and extending through the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations, the United States and Panama conducted intermittent treaty discussions in hopes
of alleviating these problems.51 Americans were chiefly preoccupied with obtaining continued
access to the Panama Canal in a manner that alleviated the foreign policy issues stemming from
the 1903 treaty. Panamanians, on the other hand, were irate over a provision of the 1903 treaty
which allowed the United States to "act as if sovereign" in the Canal Zone.52 Underpinning these
major grievances were smaller concerns that impacted the future of Panama as a center of the
global energy trade. Americans were reluctant to invest in infrastructural networks in Panama if
there was the potential that domestic upheaval could damage those assets. Panamanians argued
that they were not allowed to develop economically under the provisions of the existing treaties.
Solving these issues would both mitigate the international tensions between the two countries
and provide an impetus for economic growth in the region through the distribution of ANS oil.
Throughout the 1960s, discussions between the two countries were far from amicable. In
the immediate aftermath of the Martyrs’ Day Riots, Johnson set out to ease tensions and the
President’s promise to renegotiate the treaties improved relations marginally, but the U.S. was
reluctant to make substantial concessions in their authority in the Canal Zone. Indeed, the U.S.
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seemed entirely unwilling to negotiate a fixed length treaty at this point in time, preferring to
maintain control of the Canal indefinitely. Negotiations dragged on until 1967 when a treaty was
put forward, however, the document's lack of engagement with Panamanian concerns made it
highly unpopular and ultimately the Panamanian government took no steps to ratify it, an
approach mirrored by their American counterparts.53 While the treaty negotiations contained the
discontent spreading through Panama and provided a degree of stability, they failed to address
the core disputes between the two countries.
As the 1970s opened, the United States and Panama again sought to redefine their
relationship. Under the leadership of Richard Nixon, the United States took a more moderate
approach to their discussions. Nixon still desired a treaty that cemented indefinite US control
over the canal but approved the negotiation of a treaty with a fixed date for Canal transition so
long as it extended US control for at least thirty years and was accompanied by assurances that
Panama would maintain canal neutrality. This was a major shift in American policy and
suggested that treaty discussions may actually create a document acceptable to Panama.
Additionally, Nixon committed to providing more economic opportunities to Panama.54 Of
particular interest to Panama was taking over the harbors at Cristobal and Balboa. Among their
chief interests was greater investment in commercial fueling. D.A. Dertien, the chief of Canal
Zone Executive Planning Staff, noted that in his conversations with Panamanian government
officials he had learned "The Government of Panama views marine bunkering as a profitable
commercial operation and has expressed a desire that the Canal Administration cease
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commercial bunkering operations under a new treaty."55 This idea, in conjunction with Panama’s
plans for a transisthmian pipeline, suggested that Panama was acutely aware of the financial
benefits that could come with greater involvement in the oil trade. A new treaty was crucial to
recognizing this potential. While there was still considerable progress to be made, the Nixon
administration's concessions created a foundation that later talks could expand on.
Despite Nixon’s insistence that the talks should be complete by 1972, in time for the
general election, the difficulty in ironing out contentious issues between the two countries
including control over specific Canal facilities and the timeline for Canal transition made the
timeline impossible to meet. As a result, the treaty put forward by the United States in December
of 1971 was ignored and in 1972 Panama adopted a nationalistic stance in which they attempted
to apply international pressure to the United States. This tactic came to a head with the
introduction of a motion before the UN Security Council in which Panama condemned the
United States and its "colonialist" actions in the Canal Zone.56 By 1973, the hardline Panamanian
approach seemed to be working and the United States felt compelled to adopt a new approach to
negotiations. The appointment of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to lead negotiations and a series
of meetings between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan
Antonio Tack reflected the growing desire to find common ground. The announcement on
February 7, 1974, of the Joint Statement of Principles between Kissinger and Tack outlined in
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broad strokes the framework of an acceptable treaty and detailed the path negotiations would
take. These eight principles included such longstanding issues as Panamanian sovereignty in the
Canal Zone, enhanced economic benefits for Panama, increased Panamanian administration of
the Canal, a fixed expiration date for U.S. control of the waterway, and promises of Canal
neutrality under Panamanian administration. A new era in Canal relations was at hand.57
At the core of the agreement was a shifting position on the part of the U.S. government.
Unlike negotiations under the Johnson government, and even the first years of the Nixon
government, the Joint Statement of Principles suggested that the U.S. was willing to make
concessions to mitigate Panamanian hostility to ensure long term access to the Canal. In some
ways, this approach served as a diplomatic parallel to the construction efforts that shaped the
early 1900s. While Goethals and his foremen had used concrete to hold the physical entropy of
Panama at bay, Kissinger and his fellow negotiators used compromise and concessions to keep
the diplomatic entropy of Panama at bay. In both cases the ultimate objective was the same:
access to and use of an interoceanic waterway in Panama.
Despite the support for a new relationship with Panama at the executive level and in the
State Department, the Nixon and later Ford and Carter administrations had no misgivings about
the challenge of getting domestic support for a treaty. As early as 1973 the National Security
Council acknowledged that "We are pessimistic about the possibilities of developing significant
support for any policy involving important concessions to Panama."58 Consequently, while
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negotiations progressed between 1974 and 1977, American politicians and diplomats launched a
massive public relations campaign to prepare Americans for the concessions contained in the
new Treaty. One of the most effective tactics implemented by Treaty lobbyists was emphasizing
the economic shortcomings of the 1903 treaties. Bunker, in an overview of the Panama crisis,
was careful to note that one of Panama's chief grievances with the existing treaty was the paltry
annuity of $2.3 million dollars the country received from the Canal. Indeed, some Panamanians
went so far as to suggest that they were effectively subsidizing the cost of the Canal. Bunker
suggested that a new treaty could not only make this annuity more competitive for Panama,
incentivizing the efficient operation of the Canal, but also encourage the economic development
of the Canal Zone in general. "Already Panama has plans which call for the construction of an oil
pipeline which would reduce the cost of transporting petroleum across the Isthmus," Bunker
noted, suggesting that this development would modernize the Canal, allowing free market
principles to increase competition and lower shipping and fueling costs.59
It wasn’t only attempts to build a new pipeline that came up during discussions. Panama
once again expressed its desire to utilize the Navy Pipelines that ran through the Canal Zone,
going so far as to discuss the potential for such a deal in the treaty negotiations. Americans were
starting to warm to the proposal, but by 1975 the Navy pipeline was falling into disrepair and
only two of the pipes were still in use.60 In addition, while the US was becoming more flexible in
its positions, lingering concerns over a pipeline’s capacity to bypass the Canal made American
negotiators cautious. It was one thing for Panamanians to create a new pipeline outside of the
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Canal Zone. It was another thing entirely for them to bypass Canal traffic by utilizing a structure
that had been created to facilitate Canal transit.61 In addition, there were some rumblings that the
United States should maintain the pipelines and use them to transport ANS oil across the Isthmus
themselves. Because Panama would have no access to the trade and would receive no benefit
from it, the American government decided that this course of action might antagonize Panama
and complicate treaty negotiations.62 While the pipelines weren't central to the Treaty
discussions, the fact that both Panama and the United States were actively discussing pipelines
indicated just how aware both parties were of the future economic potential of ANS oil
shipments.
In addition to discussing the direct economic benefits of a new treaty, advocates also
often emphasized the value of American access to the Canal rather than American control of the
Canal. While the Canal still certainly contributed to America’s economy, its significance had
declined by the time treaty discussions reached a fever pitch. Ambassador Sol Linowitz, who
was actively involved in negotiations, was careful to note in a speech before the American
Legion, "Today approximately 8 percent of all US exports and imports by value pass through the
canal each year. About 7 percent of US seaborne trade traverses the Isthmus. To a substantial
extent, therefore, the canal, though still important, is obsolescent."63 This was not to say that the
Canal was unimportant, but instead that it no longer was as instrumental to American economic
and security concerns as it had been over the previous decades. This realization led many in the
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State Department to adopt the perspective that maintaining access to the Canal was far more
valuable to American interests than maintaining control over the Canal and indeed pushing for
ownership of the Canal in the face of Panamanian resistance could undermine American use of
the Canal altogether.
The growing concern among many diplomats was that the discontent many Panamanians
felt about the existing treaty would lead them to take substantial steps to eradicate relicts of
American authority in the Canal Zone, perhaps going so far as to attack or sabotage Canal
facilities. This was an ultimate manifestation of diplomatic entropy. Disaffected Panamanians
could easily cripple the fragile locks or summit lake of the Canal with a single act of sabotage.
Faced with this dilemma, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown bluntly stated, “Use of the Canal is
more important than ownership.”64 In essence these concessions were an attempt to impose a
diplomatic order that would allow American shipping to continue to use the waterway, albeit not
with the same degree of authority it once had. This realization, in conjunction with a growing
willingness to acknowledge the damage the Canal issue was doing to America's international
image abroad, led American diplomats to finally accept a treaty with a fixed date for canal
administration to transfer to Panama. With this concession in place, negotiations could finally
reach their conclusion.
On September 7, 1977, pen met paper and the Torrijos-Carter Treaties were signed. The
treaties ceded control of the Canal to Panama through a gradual process that would come to
fruition on December 31st, 1999, when Panama took over the administration of the Canal. In
addition, they guaranteed that the Canal would remain neutral, a provision that ensured
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America’s continued access to the waterway. While there was some discontent on the part of
both countries, and indeed the treaties would not enter into force for another two years, the fact
that Panama and the United States had renegotiated their relationship suggested that the Canal
had a viable future, and, more importantly, could be used to explore long term solutions to the
energy trade questions that had been percolating over the last decade. The fact that TAPS also
came online in 1977 provided even more incentive for the two countries to explore the potential
the Isthmus had for transporting ANS oil. As the 1980s emerged so too did a new and promising
era for Panama and the United States, one in which billions of barrels of oil would flow through
the Canal, and later a Panamanian pipeline, bringing wealth to both Panamanian and American
companies. The only lingering question was how long this arrangement could last.
The ANS Era Arrives
The successful negotiation of a new set of Canal treaties coincided with a new age of
economic development in Panama. The erasure of the formal “Canal Zone” allowed Panama to
pursue economic ventures in the Transit Zone, and the shift in the administration of the Canal
also incentivized further exploration of energy transportation. Americans simultaneously
recognized how beneficial it was to expedite transportation between Alaska and the Gulf Coast.
As time went on and the sheer scope of the Prudhoe Bay Field became clear, it was increasingly
apparent that this oil could not be consumed exclusively on the West Coast. As a result, even
before the treaty entered into force, both Panama and the United States explored potential
options for the most rapid means of transporting the material between the oceans. Initially, the
Canal itself proved a viable means of transporting ANS oil and hundreds of thousands of barrels
passed through the Canal daily. To help deal with the resulting increases in traffic, Panama
began creation of their own pipeline across the Isthmus in the early 1980s. A project that had
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been envisioned for decades finally came to fruition. The utility of the Panama route once again
asserted itself to remarkable benefit, but the increasing concentration of oil in the Isthmus was
not without challenges, some of which called into question the long-term viability of the route.
In the immediate aftermath of the treaties, both Panama and the United States agreed that
ANS oil needed to move through Panama, and yet the new treaties complicated conversations
that had been going on for a decade. Panama, long an advocate for the creation of a pipeline,
preached patience in the late 1970s. The improved financial benefits they received from the
Canal's operation led Panama to advocate, at least initially, that oil shipments should actually be
routed through the Canal to maximize tolls.65 Americans on the other hand, recognizing the
terminal nature of their administration of the Canal, were interested in exploring alternative
arrangements to the Canal to expedite traffic. Harold Parfitt, the last governor of the Canal Zone,
emphasized that even though an average of 450,000 barrels of ANS oil moved through the Canal
daily in 1978, he predicted this figure would decline. He suggested that thanks to proposed
alternatives to the Canal "There are still many variables in the West Coast supply/demand
equation and pipeline alternatives to the Canal are not a closed issue. Further, there is still much
talk about the advantages and possibility of swap arrangements with Japan. All of this leaves us
pretty much up in the air as to the levels of our planning."66 Parfitt was so sure of the emergence
of alternatives to the Canal that he completely removed ANS shipments from predictions of
future canal traffic.
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Despite the assumptions of Parfitt and others that the ANS oil boom through the Canal
would be short-lived, the trade exploded in the early 1980s, generating tremendous revenue for
the Canal and Panama. The trade began modestly enough upon the opening of TAPS. Oil made
its way from Valdez on board large 120,000-260,000 dwt vessels. As it approached the mouth of
the Canal it was transferred to smaller vessels that carried the oil through the Canal and on to
Gulf Coast refineries. This wasn’t necessarily problematic during the first few years of the ANS
trade as daily movements of oil averaged roughly 450,000 barrels, a volume which could be
accommodated by one to two transits of the Canal depending on the size of the tanker. And yet
the Canal route was not without limitations. Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC), massive
200,000-320,000 dwt vessels, first started to emerge in earnest in the 1960s. Thanks to the
economy provided by this style of bulk transportation, many oil companies began adopting these
large tankers.67 The Canal simply could not handle these larger, cheaper ships, a reality
exacerbated by the fact that the Jones Act forced oil companies to use American vessels, which
were more expensive to build and crew then foreign vessels.
Despite these concerns, the expansion of production in Alaska and a growing global
demand for oil helped expand ANS shipments in the early 1980s. By November of 1980, there
were over 500,000 barrels of oil transiting the Canal daily. Less than a year later, in May of
1981, traffic hit its highest levels in over seven years. Canal Administrator Dennis McAuliffe,
who oversaw the first ten years of the Canal transition process, was quick to note that "The most
significant aspect of Canal traffic during May was the record Alaska North Slope crude oil
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movement and its effect on total traffic and tolls revenue."68 Daily traffic exploded to well over
600,000 barrels per day and generated $4.6 million dollars in tolls for the month. This trade
continued to explode as the early ‘80s progressed. In March of 1982, the trade hit another
milestone as, for the first time, ANS shipments averaged over 800,000 barrels per day. The $5.7
million in tolls generated by this remarkable figure helped drive up the Canal’s earnings and
McAuliffe once again excitedly reported "Canal traffic for the month of March was substantially
above budget targets, primarily as a result of a record Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil
movement."69 Thanks to the sheer volume of ANS oil transiting the Canal, the waterway was
thriving, laying to rest concerns that the Canal administration’s transitionary period would be
marked by inefficiency.
The benefits reaped from the ANS oil trade did not come without challenges, however.
ANS shipments were straining the limits of the Canal's capacity. March 1982 not only saw a
record in ANS movement through the Canal but also an average traffic of 42 transits per day, a
figure not seen in over a decade. This in and of itself was not problematic. The challenge lay in
the increasing size of the vessels making the trip through the locks. In that same month, 51.7% of
transits were made by ships with beams of 80' or wider.70 This limited the number of double
lockages that could be undertaken and, more concerningly, led to a greater number of clear cut
daylight only (CCDO) transits. CCDO’s placed a considerable burden on canal traffic as they
substantially impacted the speed at which other vessels could transit the Canal. While the Canal
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could manage to accommodate roughly 40 vessels with minimal delays, Canal administrators
believed that they could only handle roughly sixteen to seventeen large vessels without
substantially impacting traffic.71 The steady increases in ANS traffic between the signing of the
treaty and March of 1982 suggested that this capacity might be reached sooner than the Canal
could hope to manage.
In addition to straining the traffic capacity of the Canal, increasing ANS shipments also
were accompanied by greater risk for oil spills. In a waterway as complicated as Panama any
spill could have disastrous consequences and risked violating a treaty provision which charged
Panama and the United States with minimizing the environmental impacts of Canal operations.
Indeed, as the Panama Canal Commission (PCC, the organization that administered the Canal
after the 1977 treaty went into force) was jointly administered by Panamanians and Americans, it
was still operating under the purview of the Environmental Protection Act. These fears came to a
head on June 7, 1980, when the 39,366 dwt Texaco Connecticut, laden with ANS oil and
traveling north through the Canal, collided with the eastern bank of the Gaillard Cut, ripping
holes in its number 1 and 2 cargo tanks. Roughly 4,000 barrels of oil were spilled over 35 miles
as the ship made its way to Limon Bay where it could be anchored and repaired.72 While modest,
the spill served as a sobering reminder of the hazards that accompanied the increase in tanker
traffic thanks to ANS shipments. As more large vessels used the Canal there was an increasing
risk that they too could spill their cargo, particularly when navigating the dangerous Gaillard
Cut.

71

Michael Rhode, “Memo from Michael Rhode to the U.S. Congress, March 23, 1988,” USNA, RG 185, Collection
UD UP 114, Box 1: Folder: Panama Controversy- ANS oil, pg. 1.
72
Cesar Von Chong, John C. Jordan, and Ricardo Gutierrez (1983) THE TEXACO CONNECTICUT'S OIL SPILL INCIDENT
IN THE PANAMA CANAL. International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings: February 1983, Vol. 1983, No. 1, pp. 367370, pg. 367.

305

The combination of traffic limitations and concerns for oil spills led Panamanians to
reconsider a pipeline as a means of moving ANS crude. A pipeline administered by Panama
could still provide an immense financial benefit to the small country, allowing it to continue to
serve its role as an energy crossroads, while also mitigating traffic and environmental concerns
in the Canal. The negotiations into the construction of the pipeline progressed rapidly. Starting in
1981, Petroterminal de Panama (PTP) and the Panamanian Government began negotiations for
the construction of a $250 million pipeline project that would pump oil from Puerto Armuelles in
the Pacific to Chiriqui Grande in the Caribbean. This project precluded the need to transfer oil
from large 200,000 dwt in the Pacific to smaller vessels that could transit the Canal and would
save an estimated $1 per barrel in shipping costs. In July of 1981 the two parties came to an
agreement, and a month later, before an environmental impact study could be carried out,
construction began. Despite the controversy surrounding the environmental impacts of the
pipeline, construction progressed rapidly and fifteen months later, in October of 1982, the
pipeline was completed at a cost of $365 million dollars.73
The pipeline immediately proved its utility, fulfilling its promise of lessening canal traffic
and providing a more cost-effective route for the movement of oil. With 40% of the pipeline
owned by the government of Panama and the remaining 60% split between two American
companies, the pipeline, like the Canal, suggested that both countries were acutely aware of the
economic advantages offered by such infrastructure. The pipeline could transport 700,000 barrels
daily, and the continued presence of the Canal provided a safety valve should volume surpass its
capacity. Companies began utilizing the pipeline immediately and it soon became an essential
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component in Panama’s emerging energy economy. By 1985 the pipeline had become so
instrumental to the global energy trade that it generated 7.8% of Panama’s GDP.74
By the middle of the 1980s, the sky seemed the limit for Panama's booming energy trade.
The Canal Treaties appeared wildly successful as the waterway, thanks in large part to the
stability created by ANS oil shipments, was thriving. Traffic in the Canal was lucrative, below
capacity, and suggested that the transition from American to Panamanian control was
progressing smoothly. The waterway’s success, in conjunction with the creation of the PTP,
streamlined transportation of ANS oil across the Isthmus, allowing both oil companies and the
Panamanian government to reap the rewards. There was optimism that the wealth offered by the
energy boom would be there to stay, and yet, as had often been the case in Panama's energy
history, domestic issues and conflict with the United States once again upset the status quo, this
time with devastating consequences to Panama’s role in the burgeoning ANS oil trade.
Evaporating Energy
In August of 1981, a small plane flying over central Panama suddenly crashed, smashing
into the dense forest below and killing all aboard. In normal circumstances this would have been
tragic. Considering that one of the passengers in the plane was the de facto leader of Panama,
Omar Torrijos, the accident was a national catastrophe. After a dozen years of relatively stable
leadership, Panama found itself again amid a domestic crisis.75 The ensuing power vacuum
created tremendous domestic conflict in Panama as military and governmental authorities sought
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to assert themselves as the center of power in the small nation. For four years these machinations
unwound behind closed doors, safely out of sight of much of the world.
The rise of General Manuel Noriega, who later was accused of orchestrating Torrijos’
death, thrust the political infighting into the open. Noriega aligned himself with both Torrijos and
the U.S. government in the 1960s and reaped the benefits of his partnerships, rising through the
ranks of the Panamanian National Guard. By August of 1983, he had become commander of the
Panamanian National Guard and arguably the most powerful figure in Panamanian politics.76
Leveraging his military power, Noriega intimidated and brutally murdered his rivals, establishing
himself as the strongman behind the Panamanian government. While the US was content to grant
Noriega a long leash in the 1970s, the dictator’s increasingly blatant use of violence and growing
relationship with Cuba led Americans to become hostile to his regime by 1987.77 Noriega was
entropy embodied, a rogue element whose eccentric behavior and compulsive violence
destabilized American and Panamanian relations. The stability imposed by the Carter-Torrijos
Treaties eroded under the new regime and the next two years were overshadowed by the looming
threat of military conflict. The age of oil was coming to an end in Panama.
Noriega’s increasingly erratic decisions sowed concern amongst global energy
companies, particularly those involved in the ANS trade. While Noriega had established himself
as the de facto leader of the country, the American government and dissident elements within
Panama worked to withhold the $150,000,000 dollars generated directly and indirectly by the oil
trade from Noriega’s forces. The funds were held in a trust that would be returned to Panama as
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soon as a legitimate government was installed.78 While this arrangement may have eased the
consciences of American government officials who had helped Noriega rise to power, it
concerned business leaders who were worried that Noriega might order the Panamanian Defense
Forces to seize the pipeline. John McDonald, the President of Standard Oil of Ohio, a subsidiary
of BP that directed the company's operations in Alaska, wrote to Congress in March of 1988 to
express his anxieties. McDonald argued that, should the pipeline be closed, it would be next to
impossible for BP to continue shipments of ANS oil. McDonald suggested that the already
strained Canal would be incapable of maintaining the flow of roughly 700,000 to 800,000 barrels
that were going through the pipeline daily. Ultimately, McDonald concluded "it will not be
possible to maintain full Alaskan production if the pipeline is closed and the canal has to be used.
Producers would be forced, both physically and economically, to leave the incremental 400
MBD of oil in the ground in Alaska unless waivers are obtained for either the use of
CDS/foreign flag VLCC's around South America or for barrel-for-barrel exchange of ANS for
oil delivered in the U.S. Gulf Coast from other parts of the world."79 Noriega was not only a
threat to Panama but a threat to American energy security. Given that America had suffered
energy shortages in 1973 and again in 1979 the threat of another crisis was taken seriously.
At the crux of McDonald's argument was the old question of obsolescence. McDonald
suggested that "Canal congestion is the most serious problem in maintaining the ANS flow."80 In
his mind, the primary issue stemmed from the fact that if it used the Canal, BP would be forced
to use smaller tankers of up to 90,000 dwts which could only carry roughly 450,000 barrels of
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oil. This limitation necessitated a minimum to two additional Canal transits per day to meet
demand. This created substantial financial burdens for BP. The company would have to transfer
oil from large 200,000 dwt tankers to smaller vessels, a time consuming and expensive means of
transporting oil, although admittedly one that had been common practice just a few years earlier.
Even though these smaller vessels could fit through the Canal they were also forced to do so as
clear-cut daylight only transits. McDonald argued that the addition of two or three more transits
per day of this type would significantly slow traffic throughout the Canal. Finally, McDonald
identified the Jones Act as a hardship. McDonald argued that there simply were not enough
American tankers of adequate size to handle traffic if it were rerouted through the Canal.81
Ultimately, McDonald echoed sentiments that had been harassing the Canal for half a century.
The waterway was incapable of meeting the needs of modern maritime commerce, particularly
the booming ANS oil trade.
Others were not convinced by McDonald’s apocalyptic proclamations. Panamanian
Foreign Minister Juan Sosa argued that the Canal was more than up to the task of dealing with
ANS shipments in the unlikely event that the pipeline should close. Indeed, he argued that
McDonald’s claims were nothing more than an attempt to cut BP’s costs and would ultimately
“undermine the economic future of the Republic of Panama."82 Michael Rhode, the Secretary of
the Panama Canal Commission, argued that McDonald was gravely overstating the shortcomings
of the Canal. Rhode pointed to the fact that Canal traffic had averaged 34-38 vessels per day
during 1988 and that the Commission was confident the waterway could accommodate 40
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vessels per day without delay, including sixteen to seventeen large vessels. With these figures,
Rhode assured Congress that the Canal could handle up to four additional tankers carrying ANS
oil.83 Perhaps the most scathing criticism of McDonald and BP came not from Panama or the
Canal Commission, but rather American shippers. Ernest Corrada, the President of the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping, accused BP of merely trying to cut costs by getting waivers for
the Jones Act. Corrada suggested "It does appear from the letter that British Petroleum (BP,
America Inc.) is using the unfortunate situation in Panama as a cover to suggest Jones Act
waivers and Alaskan oil exports and exchanges it could not ordinarily hope to get through
Congress."84 Indeed those two provisions were exactly what McDonald suggested to alleviate the
impending energy transportation crisis. Although potentially unscrupulous, McDonald's methods
pointed to the complexity of the energy trade. While useful, the Panama Canal was not well
suited to the transportation of large quantities of oil. In the ANS trade, where bulk directly
correlated with economy, the limitations imposed by the Canal were a considerable liability and
led oil companies to view the Panama route with reluctance, particularly as oil fields in the
Middle East continued to boom.
Despite this, the Canal remained important to American interests, both practically and
ideologically. And it was not only oil interests that were assessing the Canal’s continued utility.
As the Noriega crisis unfolded, the United States continued to assert the value of the Canal in
hopes that they could use it as a justification to oust the dictator. American officials continued
the age-old trend of oscillating in their assessments of the Canal’s importance, emphasizing its
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significance, or lack thereof, to justify domestic and foreign policy agendas. Unlike Bunker’s and
Kissinger’s arguments during the treaty negotiations of the 1970s, politicians in the late 1980s
were asserting the indisputable importance of the Canal as justification for the removal of
Noriega.
The desire to oust Noriega led to a hearing on the strategic and commercial importance of
the Canal in November of 1989. At the hearing, Canal proponents pointed to the sheer growth in
the volume of goods that made use of the Canal, a figure that had expanded from 30 million tons
in 1950 to 152 million in 1988.85 Administrator Dennis McAuliffe stated that "Although use of
the Canal has changed over the years, I would argue that its overall value continues to be
significant and that it will still be playing an important role in world transportation in the next
century."86 These arguments carried a tremendous amount of weight and many politicians found
themselves advocating for action in Panama, with some, such as Congressman Phillip Crane,
going so far as to suggest that Noriega’s actions rendered the Carter-Torrijos Treaties null and
void.87 Interestingly, however, the nature of assessing the Canal's value changed. While
politicians still considered the waterway's importance to American interests, they were also
increasingly tying its value to global markets. This marked a departure from the primarily
domestic assessments that had shaped earlier discussions and perhaps reflected a growing
willingness to acknowledge that the Canal’s value transcended its utility to America.
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Even as Noriega tried to resurrect the narrative of the Canal as a colonial construct, he
shrewdly avoided closing down the Canal or the PTP during his authoritarian rule, recognizing
that doing either would likely result in his immediate removal from power.88 Despite his
measured approach to the Canal, as time went on the United States became increasingly
intolerant of his rule. President George H.W. Bush finally found his justification for the removal
of Noriega on December 16, 1989, when an American soldier was shot and killed outside PDF
headquarters. Four days later, 24,000 American troops invaded the country and while Noriega
briefly found refuge in the Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy See, he finally surrendered to U.S.
authorities on January 3, 1990.89
By the time Noriega’s regime fell in January of 1990, it had done irreparable damage to
Panama’s position as an oil crossroads. The combination of inept economic management and
substantial American sanctions undermined much of the economic vibrancy of the country, but
nowhere were these effects felt as acutely as in the oil industry. The PTP’s contributions to GDP
fell by nearly half between 1985 when it peaked at 7.8% and 1989 when it contributed only 4.8%
to a much smaller economy thanks to economic sanctions and a decline in ANS shipments.
When measured in barrels the difference was much more precipitous. Flowthrough dropped from
roughly 218 million barrels in 1987 to 116 million barrels in 1989. Revenue from the pipeline
dropped from $122.6 million in 1988 to $78.6 million in 1989 before falling even further to
roughly $59.4 million in 1990.90 The pipeline, which had seemed a central component of the
burgeoning Panamanian economy just a few short years earlier, was on the verge of irrelevance.
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The Canal, meanwhile, was only minimally impacted by the Noriega crisis. Its earnings
dropped by about $5 million dollars in 1989 but recovered quickly.91 The joint AmericanPanamanian Canal Commission continued to operate the waterway with remarkable efficiency in
the aftermath of the Noriega crisis and on April 30th, 1990, President Bush nominated Gilberto
Guardia Fabrega to be the first Panamanian to serve as Administrator of the Panama Canal
Commission.92 While the Canal weathered the storm it too was impacted by the shifts in the
global energy trade. Canal traffic decreased during 1988 thanks in large part to a 5.9% drop in
petroleum and petroleum products. While tankers still made use of the waterway, the significant
role petroleum products had played in the make-up of cargo was being usurped by manufactured
products such as automobiles and agricultural bulk items including corn and wheat. Meanwhile
ANS shipments were increasingly being sent to developing West Coast ports and harbors.93 The
Canal recovered, but it seemed unlikely that oil would play as large a role as it had in the
previous decades
Booms and Busts
Between the end of WWII and 1990 few commodities shaped the Panamanian Transit
Zone as much as oil, particularly ANS crude oil. Petroleum had long been a mainstay of Canal
traffic, so much so that even before the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay field, speculators clamored
at the opportunity to create a pipeline across the Isthmus. As Alaskan oil moved from a
speculative endeavor to a very real source of tremendous wealth, Panama became a center in the
transportation of ANS oil. Massive 200,000 dwt tankers carried hundreds of thousands of barrels
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of oil to Panama daily where it was transferred to smaller vessels capable of transiting the
Isthmus. Peaking in the 1982, this trade pushed the capacity of the Canal to its limit. No one
complained. Millions of dollars' worth of revenue poured in, generating wealth for Panama and
providing America with the energy security it craved. The creation of the PTP in 1982 created
even more opportunities for economic growth and soon the energy trade formed a crucial part of
Panama’s economy.
And yet the energy trade was highly volatile by its very nature. “Surprises" came from a
variety of sources. Initial searches for Alaskan oil proved relatively ineffective as the Navy,
Geological Survey, and Arctic Contractors struggled to find the oil fields that were allegedly
abundant in northern Alaska. When oil finally was discovered a new set of challenges arose. The
size of the Prudhoe Bay field was meaningless without the capacity to remove the oil and get it
to market. While the world was confident this would be feasible, the near decade long process of
negotiating and constructing TAPS muted enthusiasm for the creation of a transisthmian pipeline
across Panama. As if that weren't enough, the ongoing tensions between Panama and the United
States threatened to undermine the Transit Zone's promise as a site for energy transportation.
When treaties were finally negotiated, the Panama Canal had to reckon with capacity and the
potential ecological devastation that could accompany an oil spill. While the creation of the PTP
seemed to alleviate these concerns, even the pipeline could not withstand the entropy unleashed
by the rise of Manuel Noriega. The energy trade in Panama, while productive, was incessantly
haunted by the specter of missed potential. An energy boom always seemed just out of reach, and
even when ANS oil movements peaked in the mid-1980s, domestic and foreign policy concerns
ensured that the lucrative trade proved short-lived.
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Panama recovered from the havoc wreaked by the Noriega regime, and while petroleum
products returned to the region, it was the financial and service industry sectors, as well as the
Canal, that came to define Panama’s economic rejuvenation. Thanks to the explosion of West
Coast refineries and consumption, and domestic transportation of oil through American
pipelines, ANS oil simply didn’t need to utilize the PTP or Canal to the extent that it had in the
1980s. The energy trade then was chimera of sorts to the Panamanian economy and American
energy interests. Panama had been able to capitalize on global energy trade and finally take
advantage of its position as the crossroads of the world. Oil companies, while not thrilled with
the limitations placed on the trade by the Canal's size and the Jones Act, were able to ship oil
from Alaska to mainland America at considerably cheaper costs than they would if they were
required to journey around South America. Conversely, however, the oil trade never quite
delivered on the long-term economic growth it promised. The erratic nature of the energy trade
and the looming threat of political and diplomatic entropy kept it from fully reaching its potential
and becoming the centerpiece of the Panamanian economy.
The Noriega Crisis and the ensuing decline in the ANS oil movement across Panama
heralded the end of American energy in Panama. By 1990, the Canal's Administrator and the
bulk of its workforce were Panamanian, a trend that would continue as the end of the millennium
approached and Panama took over control of the Canal once and for all. For a century and a half
Americans had attempted to use Panama's unique geographic position to facilitate travel around
the world. In doing so they bound themselves to a variety of energy sources including human and
animal muscle, fossil fuels, and even nuclear fission and fusion. And yet in doing so they often
encountered limits to their ability to control the environment. Whether it was slides that
undermined attempts to establish permanence on the environment, strikes from disgruntled
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workers, or even the international crises that squandered the potential of the ANS oil trade,
control over Panama and the energy sources Americans brought to the Isthmus were never
absolute. Entropy whether physical, diplomatic, or economic, always lingered, unrelentingly
asserting the limits of control.
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Epilogue: Energy, Entropy, and the 21st Century
On December 14th, 1999, former President Jimmy Carter led a delegation of Americans
to the Miraflores locks for the ceremony celebrating the transfer of the Canal to Panamanian
control. While the formal transfer didn’t take place until December 31st, the ceremony was held
early amidst fears that the Y2K bug might make international travel dangerous on the official
date. Potential technological apocalypses aside, the moment failed to garner the pageantry many
thought it deserved. Carter celebrated the moment as “perhaps one of the most significant that
has ever occurred in this hemisphere.” The Panamanian delegation, however, didn’t share
Carter’s enthusiasm. Amidst concerns that Republicans would leverage domestic hostility
towards the Canal transfer in the 2000 presidential election, both Bill Clinton and Al Gore stayed
away from Panama. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was scheduled to go but backed out
citing issues in the Middle East. Roberto Eisenmann, a senior advisor to Panamanian President
Mireya Moscoso, voiced the anger of many Panamanians, claiming “It possibly shows a lack of
class, a lack of political courage. It’s caving to the extremes in your domestic politics.”1 While
Republican anxieties about the Canal transfer didn’t undermine the ceremony, they did point to
the continued centrality of the Canal in American politics. Despite these challenges, the transfer
went on as planned. As the new millennium dawned on January 1st, 2000, it did so on a Canal
that was now entirely under the administration of Panama.
In many ways, Panamanians proved more adept at managing the Canal than their
American counterparts had. There were no major issues in the years following the transfer. On
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the contrary, a little less than eighty years after it had first been proposed, the third locks project
was finally completed, although not in the way American engineers had expected. On June 26,
2016, the Chinese vessel Costco Shipping Panama, a container ship roughly 1000 feet in length
with a 158-foot beam became the first ship to transit the new locks of the Panama Canal. This
ended a ten-year, $5 billion-dollar project. The new locks, constructed adjacent to the existing
locks at both the Atlantic and Pacific terminals, consisted of chambers 1400 feet long by 180 feet
wide with a depth of 60 feet and were designed specifically to accommodate the newest neoPanamax vessels on the seas.2 The Panamanian public overwhelmingly supported the expansion
of the locks, hoping that larger facilities would make the Panama route more enticing to large
bulk carriers and allow the country to reassert the value of the Isthmus to global shipping.3
Unlike previous eras of Panamanian history, there was no foreign power to usurp the prosperity
that came with interoceanic travel.
And yet even the new locks were not exempt from the mandates of energy. In the original
locks, boats were towed through by electric locomotives, but ships entering the new locks were
guided entirely by tugboats. Pilots expressed their concern over the safety of this new
arrangement as soon as it was announced.4 Shifting away from the fixed tracks of the
locomotives increased the unpredictability of ship movements and could result in more
accidents. assuming that these accidents would involve massive vessels powered by tremendous
amounts of energy, the potential damages could be substantial. These worries proved well-
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founded. In April of 2017, a tugboat helping vessels navigate the Canal collided with the US
Coast Guard Vessel Tampa. The crash occurred when the tugboat captain fell asleep at the helm
after working a twelve-hour shift. To accommodate the increased volume of shipping and
manage costs, the Panama Canal Authority forced captains to work twelve to fourteen-hour shifts
and many simply could not handle the demanding schedule.5
In December of 2018, the International Transportation Workers Federation (ITF) and its
affiliate representing tugboat captains in the Panama Canal, the Union de Capitanes y Oficiales
de Cubierta (UCOC), released a study alleging that due to the excessive hours pilots were
working they were incapable of meeting safety standards.6 They worried that because of the
crucial role pilots played in transiting the new locks there was a significant potential that an
accident of catastrophic proportions could occur unless a more reasonable schedule was adopted.
Human energy, or lack thereof, still had the potential to undermine Isthmian transit over a
century and a half after George Muirson Totten first set foot in Panama in hopes of constructing
the Panama Railroad. While the landscape of the Transit Zone had been intricately altered to
maximize Isthmian transit, uncontrollable energetic variables remained that challenged assertions
of control over the natural world.
This reality defined the experience of Americans in Panama. Americans' faith in their
own infallibility came close to undermining numerous projects, and even when the Canal opened
it was beset by claims of obsolescence. This is not to say that the Canal was a failure. Indeed, the
waterway has generated billions of dollars in global revenue and played a crucial role in
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establishing America as a global superpower in the 20th century. However, it is worth noting that
transit networks in Panama never operated as seamlessly as was hoped. Canal projects, both
envisioned and realized, forced American engineers, and today force Panama Canal
administrators, to recognize the limits of their control as much as the extent of it.
For much of the 20th century, American engineers reacted to this reality with an
unflinching hubris. Americans had created the transcontinental railroad, they had built the Canal,
they had developed the bomb. In each era of Panama’s energy history, American engineers in
Panama justified massive infrastructural projects through self-righteous assertions that there was
nothing that they could not accomplish with ingenuity and elbow grease. What they hadn’t
counted on was the unrelenting persistence of entropy to undermine these efforts. Panama’s
environment challenged Americans’ expectations at every turn. Its shifting soils and drenching
rains eroded constructed landscapes and threatened to undermine the railroad and Canal projects
entirely. In hopes of establishing and maintaining order in this landscape, Americans obtained
and deployed tremendous amounts of energy, betting that this brutalist method would finally
help them overcome Isthmian entropy. It did, but also deepened their dependence on even more
powerful sources of energy: a Faustian bargain accompanied by unforeseen consequences.
The cyclical relationship between Panamanian transportation networks, entropy, and
energy consumption came to a head in the 1960s with the discussion of a nuclear canal. This
debate was remarkable, breaking the chain of energy escalation that defined American
transportation networks in Panama for a century. For the first time, Americans decided not to
deploy a new source of energy. The hazards that accompanied nuclear detonations, as well as the
technical infeasibility of the technology, were too extreme to be ignored. It took a decade of
study to arrive at this conclusion but doing so suggested that American engineers, policymakers,
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and bureaucrats were finally beginning to understand their lack of control and the limits of brute
force solutions to great problems.
Nuclear power proved the exception to the rule however, and, in the decades following
the nuclear canal discussions, Americans found themselves once again enamored with expanding
energy sources and networks, this time in the form of Alaska North Slope oil. While the trade
never quite reached the scale that energy speculators may have hoped, the billions of barrels of
oil that moved through the Isthmus indicated that Americans were doubling down on their
energy consumption. The dangers of nuclear energy were unambiguous and consequently could
not be overlooked. Fossil fuels were accompanied by smoke and pollution, but the consequences
of their deployment seemed to pale next to nuclear energy, appearing almost benign by
comparison. And yet as Americans' energy consumption ballooned the pervasive fallout of
burning billions of tons of coal and oil were laid bare. While Panama is not solely to blame for
these challenges, it serves as a microcosm for their development.
Panama is only one of the countless places where entropy and energy impacted human
attempts to alter landscapes. The decline of America's domestic transportation network in the
early decades of the 21st century forms an interesting parallel. While the Eisenhower Interstate
Highway Act created a remarkable transportation infrastructure in the United States, it also
created a landscape susceptible to seemingly marginal sources of entropy such as sinkholes, frost
heaves, and erosion. These relatively minor occurrences, when taken collectively, require the
investment of billions of dollars to hold at bay, and the crumbling bridges and potholed highways
that crisscross the American countryside suggest that we may be losing this front in the war
against entropy.
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The electrical landscape of the United States also warrants examination. Our current
centralized power grid, while it provides electricity to millions of people, also finds itself under
threat from a variety of sources. Inclement weather has long wreaked havoc with power
transmission as snow storms, high winds, and earthquakes are all easily capable of severing
power lines. Increasingly, these natural sources of entropy are being joined by artificial threats.
EMP bursts and cyber-attacks also have the potential to undermine these systems, allowing
hostile entities to capitalize on the centralization of America’s energy network. A more diffused
system of energy production may be able to mitigate these concerns, but fundamentally
restructuring America's electrical distribution would require a massive investment of capital and
energy.
Perhaps the most pervasive and damning source of entropy threatening not just the
United States, but the world, stems from our commitment to fossil fuels. Coal and oil, those
seemingly benign sources of progress that powered construction of the Canal and enriched the
nation, are today creating the most pressing environmental crisis in human history. Global
climate change, the product of our insatiable energy demand, is reshaping the global
environment. Human hubris, an unquenchable thirst for wealth, and an overconfident infatuation
with technological solutions to grand challenges have prevented society from taking meaningful
steps to address this challenge. Instead, we once again are placing blind faith in the assumption
that we can overcome any obstacles placed in our path. In the quest to establish control over the
environment and bend it to our will we have merely unleashed entropy on an unprecedented,
global scale.
Finding a way to deal with climate change (or not) will be the defining accomplishment
of the 21st century. There are no easy solutions to this crisis. Mitigating climate change will
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require remarkable investments of energy and significant alterations of the natural world, and a
willingness to accept the role that our insatiable appetite for energy has played in raising our
vulnerability to entropy. As individuals we seek solace in our anonymity, assuming that our
personal consumptions of energy are so minuscule as to be invisible. The collective impact of
this belief catalyzes the constant increase in the energy appetite of the nation and consequently
revitalized the positive feedback loop between energy and entropy that has defined the 20th and
seemingly the 21st centuries.
What society needs is a sort of energetic détente; a willingness to cut personal energy
consumption by exploring more energy efficient technologies and making behavioral changes in
energy usage. This process will ideally be accompanied by the adoption of decentralized and
localized energy infrastructures, shifting the burden of energy production away from massive
centralized networks reliant on fossil fuels and embracing the flexibility that comes with smaller
systems that can be adapted to meet the needs of localized energy consumption. The relationship
between energy and entropy suggests that the adoption of smaller, more localized solutions to
entropic challenges mitigates the growth of entropy, containing it to manageable levels. If
society can realize this objective it may be possible to minimize the impacts of climate change.
The relationship between energy and entropy mediated the relationship between
Americans and Panamanians for a century and a half. The “control” that came from the
consumption and deployment of unprecedented amounts of energy was an illusion, a siren luring
unwary idealists towards an even more unstable environment. Our inability to resist the
seduction of mass energy consumption has led us to the edge of a societal cliff. On October 8,
2018, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a special report arguing that to
avoid the most severe consequences of climate change, it is imperative that human society limit
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warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.7 The key to accomplishing this task is a substantial change in
the way society thinks about energy. Consumption of energy is not an action free of
consequences. And yet we have blindly accepted the fallout of our expanding energy palate
without question, thanks to comforts it has conveyed. To paraphrase the world’s greatest
fictional mathematician, Dr. Ian Malcolm, “we were so preoccupied with whether or not we
could consume more energy that we didn’t stop to think if we should.” Unless we stop to think if
we should consume more energy, and the way in which we should consume it, we stand doomed
to reap what we sow, a world of increasing entropy in which stability is history.
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